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PREFACE
The idea for this study was conceived in frustration and anger. Early in my
graduate studies, I had a survey course in Greek literature; the selections focused on
Greek society and its social organization. The texts were difficult; our progress was
slow. Thus, when Dr. Keenan cut back the Thucydides' assignment from III. 70-84
to III. 82-84, I walked blithely home--with only three paragraphs to translate, I
could rest easy.
For the first time in my struggle to learn Latin and Greek, I reached such a
pitch of frustration that I nearly threw my book against the wall. The words became
so entangled, my confusion so great that all I had previously learned about grammar
and syntax was lost: I did not think to ask why Thucydides had written like that.
The answer to this question Dr. Keenan suggested at our next meeting. He
proposed that Thucydides was reflecting the chaos of Kerkyra in the inconcinnity
and convolution of his prose.
Anger and frustration slid from my mind and a keen interest in Thucydides'
language and thought took root. Under Dr. Keenan's patient tutelage, respect and
admiration grew, and continues to grow, for a writer whose language and thought
ever enlighten and challenge always.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The aim of this dissertation is to obtain meaningful insight into Thucydides and
his History. Given such a rich and complex author, valid methods for achieving this
end are surely as numerous as thoughtful creativity can contrive. But as past
scholarship has shown, there are at least two methods, leading nowhere but the
barren desert, that should be avoided.
The most arduous and fruitless path scholars still tread is the one that attempts
to gain insight into the development of Thucydides' thought by identifying the

History's early and late passages. 1 The idea is sound enough. The problem is that
although late passages can be identified with some certainty, it is impossible to date
with surety any passage as early. Conceptual or stylistic arguments are matters of
opinion, and although they may win their adherents, in the end the detractors are the

1

For example, see D. Proctor, The Experience of Thucydides (Warminster,
Wilts, England: Aris & Phillips LTD, 1980) and S. Hornblower, Thucydides
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
The proposer of Die thukydideischen Frage, Ullrich argues for two different
periods of composition: (1) Books I-IV written soon after 421 (2) Books V-VIII
written after 404 and I-IV reworked. F. W. Ullrich, Beitrage zur Erklarung des
Thukydides (Hamburg: 1846). E. Schwartz is the first who uses Die thukydideischen
Frage to argue for a development in Thucydides' thought. Schwartz believes that
Thucydides originally saw Korinth as the cause of the war and only later conceived
of the aAYJBWTaTYJ :!tpiJ<f>aat~: his theory that Spartan fear of Athens' growth was the
true cause of the war. E. Schwartz, Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides (Bonn:
Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1960).

2
ones standing. Arguments which point to a passage whose validity becomes false at
some later point before Thucydides' death are more successful. For example, at II.
23. 3, the Oropians are referred to as Athenian subjects; their subjugation ends in
411, and so it is possible that the passage was written before 411. 2 Dating by this
method, however, is not absolutely conclusive and is seldom possible. What
happens, therefore, is that as each successor overturns the conclusions of his
predecessor, more and more of the History becomes conclusively dated as late and
less and less of it as early. 3 Thus it becomes impossible to trace any development in
Thucydides' thought.
The second method to be avoided is the one that considers Thucydides' own
thoughts, opinions, and assumptions immaterial. Those who use this method
emphasize everything and anything but what the historian himself thinks. 4 Even in
poetry where equating the poet with a poem's persona can put the reader in the
awkward position of Catullus' Aurelius and Furius, poetic intent, i.e., what the poet

2

De Romilly, Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism, trans. by P. Thody
(Oxford: Alden Press, 1963), 25.
3

1. Finley, "The Unity of Thucydides' History," in Three Essays on
Thucydides (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), 120.
4

For Cochrane this results in Thucydides the objective scientist; for Woodhead
it results in a neutral Thucydides who "in the fact of power and in the rightness of
its exercise" is simply "reporting and no more." C. N. Cochrane, Thuc,ydides and
the Science of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1929), Introduction and
165 and A. G. Woodhead, Thucydides on the Nature of Power, Martin Classical
Lectures 24 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University press published for
Oberlin College, 1970), 9.

3
thinks, is of paramount importance. 5 Why then in history and especially in the study
of Thucydides, where authorial comments are precious because of their rarity ,6 do
some consider the author's thoughts immaterial?
The answer lies, I believe, in the notion that the historian is merely an
objective recorder of events. If the historian is an objective recorder, then because
they do not impinge upon the work, his opinions are immaterial. The existence of
objectivity in history I attempt to disprove below. What concerns me here is not
whether history is objective, but why history's objectivity has so many standard
bearers.
At least part of the answer has its roots in 19th century inductivism. I think that
the adherents of inductivism advised scholars to hold no theory at all but simply to
observe because they realized that theory is by nature subjective and because they
thought that what is subjective has a lesser claim on truth. Though he claimed to
work solely by inductive observation, Darwin himself, in a letter to John Scott, a
young zoologist, supports this contention and at the same time shows the folly of
inductivism:
I would suggest to you the advantage at present of being very sparing in
introducing theory in your papers (I formerly erred much in geology in that
way): let theory guide your observations but till your reputation is well
established be sparing in publishing theory. It makes persons doubt your

5

6

"qui me ex versiculis meis putastis ... parum pudicum" (Catullus 16).

0f course the reader must guard how he interprets the statements lest irony,
sarcasm, understatement, or some other figure lead to the wrong conclusions.

4
observations. 7
Just as theory can make persons doubt observation so do I think that historians
who cling to the standard of objectivity do so because they think that admitting
history's subjectivity renders history a pseudo-discipline. But since, as I argue
below, subjectivity is the necessary component of meaningful history, and in fact of
any meaningful scholarly endeavor, objectivists should be disabused of their
objective illusion.
But before arguing against objectivity in history, I must pave the way for my
own approach to Thucydides by returning to scholars' past approaches to him. Most
fruitful, I believe, are those studies which focus attention on some aspect of the

History in their search for insight into Thucydides' thought. Parry uses the
}..byo~/'(pyov

(word/deed) antithesis that Thucydides employs throughout the History

as a means to uncovering Thucydides' thought and the History's theoretical
underpinning. 8 Akin to Parry's work is Rawlings' book on the structure of
Thucydides' History. There Rawlings uses the echoes and similarities between pairs

7

Francis Darwin, More Letters of Charles Darwin, vol. 2 (London: 1903),
323; quoted in Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the
American Historical Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 36,
n. 22.
8

A. M. Parry, Logos and Ergon in Thucydides (Salem, New Hampshire: Arno
Press, 1981). Compare L. Edmunds, Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975).
See also: M. Ostwald, ANArKH in Thucydides (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars
Press, 1988) and J. W. Allison, Power and Preparedness in Thucydides (Baltimore
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

5

of books to peer into the workings of Thucydides' mind. 9 Also after insight into the
workings of Thucydides, Connor, focusing on the work's rhetorical strategy and
literary technique, attempts "to determine Thucydides' expectations about his reader
and the methods by which he shapes and guides his readers' responses." 10
It is into this genre of Thucydidean studies that my work seeks admittance.

Pursuing the same end as those above and, like them, focusing on one aspect of the

History, I use Thucydides' stasis excursus, III. 82-84, 11 as my means to
understanding. The thesis is that Thucydides views the Peloponnesian War as a type
of stasis and that his reflections on stasis in III. 82-84 form part of the basis for his
understanding of the war in general. For this reason, I contend, III. 82-84 can be
used as a key for understanding the History.
Any study with such a sharp focus cannot hope to open all the doors in the
mind of so complex an author and work. But if my study clarifies one of the levels
on which Thucydides' History operates, its aim is fulfilled. Beyond this, a study that

9

H. R. Rawlings, The Structure of Thucydides' History (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1981).
10

W. R. Connor, Thucydides (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984),

18.
11

In the past most scholars have considered III. 84 spurious. As of late the
chapter has won more defenders: E. Wenzel, "Zur Echtheitsfrage von Thukydides 3,
84," WS 81 (1968): 18-27; H. R. Rawlings, The Structure of, 179 n. 7; M. R.
Christ, "The Authenticity of Thucy~ides 3.84," TAPA 119 (1989): 137-46; and J. R.
Ellis, "The Structure of Thucydides' Dissertation on Stasis and the Authenticity of
3.84," Electronic Antiquity 1(July1993): 1-7. Since the burden of proof rests upon
those who wish to excise, and since they have yet to prove beyond doubt tlre chapter
spurious, I accept its authenticity.
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focuses on Thucydides' understanding of stasis and war presupposes the subjective
nature of the work. For it is my belief not only that Thucydides' History is
subjective but that any meaningful history must also be. If there were not serious
debate concerning objectivity and subjectivity in history, 12 I would answer those
who believe in history's objectivity with these two quotes:
There is no such thing as pure objective observation. Your observation, to be
interesting, i.e., to be significant, must be subjective. The sum of what the
writer of whatever class has to report is simply some human experience,
whether he be poet or philosopher or man of science. The man of most science
is the man most alive, whose life is the greatest event. Senses that take
cognizance of outward things merely are of no avail. It matters not where or
how far you travel--the farther commonly the worse--but how much alive you
are. 13
and
History cannot be written impartially, as can botany, and the reason is quite
clear. An author can approach the life of the cabbage quite objectively. He has
no conception of the voluptuous thrill that a cabbage feels when it sinks its
roots into well fertilized earth. He, therefore, can lay aside all prejudice and
describe the life of a cabbage 'without love and without hatred.' If a common
cabbage were to write botany, the account would be filled with prejudice of
color, scorn for the inferior red cabbage, race prejudice against such foreign
interlopers as the Chinese cabbage and scorn for debased cabbage substitutes
like Brussels sprouts. A cabbage, however, could write an impartial history of
human events, and the nearer a historian's mental processes approach those of
a cabbage, the nearer he may approach impartiality in historical writing. 14

12

See, for example, P. Novick, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question"
and the American Historical Profession.
13

H. D. Thoreau, "Observation," in The Norton Reader: An Anthology of
Expository Prose, general editor, Arthur M. Eastman, 7th ed. (New York and
London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1965), 193.
14

Louis E. Lord, Thucydides and the World War, Martin Classical Lectures,
vol. 12 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1945), 27-28.

7
But since many take the debate seriously, I offer a more extensive argument for
history's subjectivity. My column is selectivity, whose pieces are held together by
the rods of subjectivity.
The argument of selectivity holds that because the historian cannot relate all the
events of his chosen topic, that is, because he must select those events that he deems
most significant and because selection requires taste and judgement, history must be
subjective. For an example of what would happen without selectivity, consider the
fable by Karl Popper. Suppose an ardent believer in objective science rigorously
pursues the method of inductive science. He records everything he possibly can,
filling notebook after notebook with all and sundry; he omits nothing. He dies,
certain in the gratitude of Science for his life's work, blissfully unaware of his own
inanity. For science like other disciplines requires more than fact. Facts alone are
meaningless. Our ardent believer might as well have been counting pebbles in a
pit. 15
Macaulay also recognizes the necessity of selectivity in history. Of history
Macaulay writes:
Perfectly and absolutely true, it cannot be; for, to be perfectly and absolutely
true, it ought to record all the slightest particulars of the slightest transactions-all the things done and all the words uttered during the time of which it treats.
The omission of any circumstance, however insignificant, would be a defect. If
history were written thus, the Bodleian library would not contain the

15

1. Bronowski, "The Nature of Scientific Reasoning," in The Norton Reader:
An Anthology of Expository Prose, general editor, Arthur M. Eastman, 7th ed. (New
York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1965), 929-30.

8
occurrences of a week. 16
This is what prompts him, I believe, to assert that "facts are the mere dross of
history. " 17
As a proponent of the 19th century belief that history consists of the maximum
number of irrefutable objective facts, Lord Acton's teacher Dollinger is ironic proof
of selectivity's necessity in history: Dollinger wrote no history of his own. Acton
himself signals the inanity of 19th century inductivism when he writes in his
introductory note to the first volume of the Cambridge Modern History that the
requirements pressing on the historian "threaten to tum him from a man of letters
into the compiler of an encyclopedia. "18 Acton does not mean to disparage the
encyclopedist; his point is that the historian is in danger of merely listing facts like
the devotee of Popper's fable.
Since the meaningful historian is not a mere compiler of facts but a careful
selector of those he deems requisite, what is it that sets him apart from the
compiler? In other words, it is certain that the historian must select, but if he merely
selects events he thinks pertinent and compiles them, is he not a smaller version of
Popper's devotee? If he writes such a history, then of course he is. But I write

16

Thomas Babbington Macaulay, "History," in The Varieties of History: From
Voltaire to the Present, ed. Fritz Stem (New York: The World Publishing
Company, 1956; revised 1972), 76 (page references are to the revised edition).
17

1bid.' 78.

18

E. H. Carr, "The Historian and His Facts," in The Norton Reader: An
Anthology of Expository Prose, general editor, Arthur M. Eastman, 7th ed. (New
York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1965), 756.

9

above that the meaningful historian is not a mere compiler, and so I ask again: what
is it that distinguishes the one from the other?
Simon Schama, a modern historian, relates precisely what this distinguishing
factor is. In the Afterword to his book Dead Certainties, which contains two
accounts that he calls historical novellas, Schama writes:
Though these stories may at times appear to observe the discursive conventions
of history, they are in fact historical novellas, since some passages (the soldier
with Wolfe's army, for example) are pure inventions, based, however, on what
documents suggest. This is not to say, I should emphasize, that I scorn the
boundary between fact and fiction. It is merely to imply that even in the most
austere scholarly report from the archives, the inventive faculty--selecting,
pruning, editing, commenting, interpreting, delivering judgements--is in full
play. This is not a nai'vely relativist position that insists that the lived past is
nothing more than an artificially designed text. (Despite the criticism of dug-in
positivists, I know of no thoughtful commentator who seriously advances this
view.) But it does accept the rather banal axiom that claims for historical
knowledge must always be fatally circumscribed by the character and prejudices
of its narrator. 19
The distinguishing factor is what Schama calls the inventive faculty, i.e., the
author's own subjective creativity that is subject to his own assumptions, beliefs,
values, and character and that makes meaningful his facts. 20
Schama argues that to some degree all historians make use of their own
inventive faculty. Since this is true, not only does Schama add his own blow to the

19

20

Simon Schama, Dead Certainties (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1991), 322.

Hayden White thinks history as a discipline is in bad shape today because "it
has lost sight of its origins in the literary imagination. In the interest of appearing
scientific and objective, it has repressed and denied to itself its own greatest source
of strength and renewal." H. White, "Historical Text as Literary Artifact," in
Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1978), 99.

10
rather gory horse of objectivity in history, but also by the method chosen in Dead

Certainties, he advances the argument a step further. The argument implicitly made
by the book is since the inventive faculty imbues all history, while maintaining the
sanctity of those details that we can say with some surety actually happened, if an
historian uses his inventive faculty to recreate one or more versions of what might
have happened, he will have a greater claim on truth than the historian who presents
one version of what, in his view, actually happened.
Schama takes us a long way from Thucydides, whose stated purpose and
method are wholly concerned with presenting what actually happened. Indeed when
we can check Thucydides' account against inscriptional and archaeological evidence,
the facts he uses are usually verified. 21 But since Thucydides' History, like any
other meaningful history, is not a mere collection of facts that can be tested by
external evidence, the creative faculties these two historians employ make their
works more alike than different.
Clearly I am making a distinction between the factual and creative elements of
meaningful history. I have no desire to lecture at length on the distinction between
fact and invention. Suffice it to say that when Thucydides says that Alkibiades,
Nikias, and Lamachos are the generals of the Sicilian Expedition, he is making a
factual statement that can be tested against inscriptional and other evidence; but
when he writes that war is a violent teacher, he has invented a metaphor in his effort

21

W. P. Wallace, "Thucydides," Phoenix 18 (1964): 254. This is notto say
that Thucydides does not commit errors of detail, just that he rarely does.

11
to comprehend war. This metaphor is his own subjective creation, and although the
majority may agree with it, it will never become a fact like the one above. Similarly
when he says that given a constant human nature similar events will recur in similar
ways (I. 22. 4 and Ill. 82. 2); that people are uncritical in their acceptance of the
past (I. 20. l); that there is an incalculable element (napa).oyov) in events (VIII.
24. 5); and that the truest cause of the war is the Spartan fear of Athens' growth, he
is also being subjective. 22
By subjective I do not mean to imply that the inventive statements above are
untrue, for any one or all may be as true as the sun's warming the earth. But even if
they are all true, they will still be subjective: subjectivity and truth are not mutually
exclusive. 23 What I wish to emphasize, however, is that there is a verifiable

22

riJv µ'fv yap akrJfJWTaTYJV npo<j>aaLV, a<j>aVWTaTYJV Of ).iJyq>, Wi}(;
'AOYjvaiovt; i]yovµm µEya).ovt; y1yvoµi:vovt; Kai <f>of3ov napi:xovrat; wit;
AaKfOatµovimt; avayKaaat Et; TO JT:OAfµfiV (I. 23. 6).

A. D. Momigliano argues that "if there is something that Thucydides does
not succeed in doing, it is to explain the remote origins of the conflict between
Sparta and Athens." The reason for this failure Momigliano attributes to the nature
of Greek political thought, which tended to concentrate on constitutional problems
and to view causes of war as marginal because war was considered inevitable,
whereas men had control over what type of constitution they adopted. It is only
recently (the beginning of the 20th century) that historians have begun to explain
more successfully the causes of wars, "Some Observations on Causes of War in
Ancient Historiography," in Studies in Historiography (New York and Evanston:
Harper & Row, 1966) 116-122.
23

There is good reason to believe that the validity of fact can be just as
uncertain as that of theory. In an interesting, compelling, and controversial
discussion on how and why new scientific discoveries happen, T. S. Kuhn, The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1962; 2d ed. enlarged, 1970), argues that adherence to a theory (paradigm) colors
our observation of the facts, and when one theory replaces another, our facts change
also (111-35).
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difference between Thucydides' factual statement noting the generals of the Sicilian
Expedition and his other inventive assertions: the one can be conclusively proven,
the others cannot.
In addition to this verifiable difference, there is another important distinction
that can be made between the above factual assertion and the subjective ones. The
distinction is that Alkibiades, Nikias, and Lamachos are the generals of the Sicilian
Expedition is, in itself, of little meaning; whereas the subjective assertions are not.
Herein lies the difference between compiling a list of facts and writing a meaningful
history: meaningful history requires subjectivity, or in Schama's words
inventiveness, to make its facts meaningful. 24 By the following examples I will

Kuhn also argues that we should relinquish the notion that theory (paradigm
in his terminology) brings us closer and closer to the truth. He doubts whether there
is one objective, true account of nature. We can speak of an evolution from
primitive beginnings, but not of an evolution toward anything. We should learn to
substitute evolution-from-what-we-know for evolution-toward-what-we-wish-to-know
(170-73).
In writing that truth and subjectivity are not exclusive, my object is only to
argue that to many the word subjective wrongly connotes falsity just as objective and
factual wrongly connote truth. If we could rid these words of such connotations, I
think many disciplines would benefit. The most factual and objective Popperian
account of the Vietnam War will surely distort our view of what occurred, but the
most subjective and theoretical account need not.
24

Thucydidean scholars have embraced Thucydides' subjectivity with two
contrary results: those who accept Thucydides' subjectivity without impugning his
integrity, and those who believe that Thucydides purposely manipulated the facts to
support his own personal viewpoints. The former believe in what Stahl aptly called
die subjective Redlichkeit (subjective honesty) of Thucydides. H. P. Stahl,
Thukydides: Die Ste/lung des Menschen im geschichtlichen Prozej3 (Munich: Beck,
1966), 30. The latter believe Thucydides not an historian but a manipulator of
evidence.
Examples of the former: H. D. Westlake writes "nor do I intend to try to
convict him of gross distortion or gross partisanship . . . his picture of the war is a

13
attempt to uncover Thucydides' inventiveness, i.e., to show four ways by which
Thucydides renders his facts meaningful. The examples show Thucydides' use of
theory, enargeia, characterization, and style.

THEORY
In 427 the Peloponnesians ask the Plataeans, besieged since the third year of
the war, to surrender with the understanding that the guilty will be punished but not
without trial. Because they expect the trial to be favorable, the Plataeans capitulate.
Five judges from Sparta arrive and without bringing any charge against the
Plataeans, simply ask them whether they have done the Peloponnesians any service

highly subjective picture." H. D. Westlake, "The Subjectivity of Thucydides: His
Treatment of the Four Hundred at Athens," Bulletin of the John Ryland's Library 56
(1973): 195. H. R. Rawlings emphasizes Thucydides' artistry and dramatic intensity
over his precision, The Structure of, Preface. By accepting the objective fallacy, R.
Connor feels free to "give passages their full emotional force and to recognize the
role of suffering in the work," Thucydides, 8. R. H. Moye says that "Thucydides'
history is based fundamentally on fiction, both in the way the record, the narrative,
is constructed and in the way the past itself is seen as possessing meaning and order.
No doubt Thucydides thought that his History was a truly accurate rendering of the
past, that he had discovered the true meaning of the past and had recorded it. No
doubt Thucydides did not see his History as a fiction; nor did he think of the order
that he saw in history as a fiction," "Thucydides' "Great War": The Fiction in
Scientific History," Clio 19 (1990): 179-180.
Examples of the latter: W. P. Wallace asks rhetorically, "Is it omission or
suppression when a historian fails to record pertinent facts which cast doubt on his
interpretation?" ("Thucydides, 11 255). M. Lang writes, "So far we have attempted
merely to explain why Thucydides and Aristotle present such different versions of
the conspiracy and to show that the validity of Thucydides' account is affected by
his efforts to disprove the parallelism of the situations in 514 and 415 B.C. 11 M.
Lang, "The Murder of Hipparchus," Historia 3 (1955): 395-407. For Lang see also:
"A Note on lthome, 11 GRBS 8 (1967): 267-273; "Scapegoat Pausanias," Classical
Journal 63 (1967): 79-85; "Kylonian Conspiracy," Classical Philology 62 (1967):
243-49; "Thucydides and the Epidamnian Affair," Classical World 61 (1968): 17376. In Thucydides the Artful Reporter (Toronto: Hakkert, 1973), V. Hunter devotes
an entire chapter to Thucydides' manipulative subjectivity.

14
in the war. Their eyes having been opened by this rhetorical question, the Plataeans
remind the Spartans that they were the only Boeotians to defend Hellas when the
Persians threatened the security of all; that they rendered Sparta assistance when the
Helots seceded to lthome; and that they allied themselves with the Athenians only
after the Peloponnesians denied their request for an alliance and told them to go to
the Athenians.
To such compelling reasons, the Thebans persuade the Spartans to allow them
to make a rejoinder. The Thebans argue that the Plataeans did not medize (go over
to the Persians) because the Athenians did not; that they themselves medized because
their government at the time, neither an oligarchy or democracy but an iniquitous
dynasty, forced them; and that the Plataeans willingly atticized and are, therefore, as
guilty of enslaving Greeks as the Athenians are.
After reading these two persuasive speeches, the reader is eager to know the
issue. When Thucydides says that the Spartans thought their question fair because
they had always invited the Plataeans to be neutral in accord with the treaty
Pausanias cut after the defeat of the Persians and because they had even extended
their offer of neutrality just before the siege, the outcome is certain: the Spartans
condemn and massacre the Plataeans (III. 52-68).
These are the bare facts of the event. The factual gives little understanding into
the reasons behind occurred. What the facts do is pique our interest in Sparta's
motivation behind destroying Plataea. For it is clear from the rhetorical question
they pose to the Plataeans that the Spartans never intended the trial to be a fair one.
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The reason that immediately pops to mind is that the Spartans destroy Plataea
because she is of material importance to the waging of the war. This reason,
however, is one that neither Thucydides nor the Spartans ever suggest. All the
Spartans do is defend their decision.
Though in the History he notes that Sparta is always concerned with keeping up
an appearance of propriety, 25 nonetheless Thucydides is not content with Sparta's
defense. 26 He is after Sparta's motivation behind the massacre. He never indicates
that the Spartans consider Plataea of material significance to the war. 27 But he does
stress their desire to maintain control of Plataea in the event of peace. The answer
he gives for their motivation is found near the end of Chapter 68:
OXfOOV Of 'il Kat 'iO ~vµ:nav :llfpl ID.arauiiv oi AaKfOatµOVlOl ovrwc;
a:JlO'if'ipaµµfrot i:yivovw 0YJfiaiwv EVfKa, voµiCov'ifc; i:c; 'iOV :llOAfµov avwvc;
ap'it 'iO'if KaOwdxµfVOV W</>fAiµovc; fivm.

The adverse attitude of the Lacedaemonians in the whole Plataean affair was
mainly adopted to please the Thebans, who were thought to be useful in the
war at the moment raging. (trans. Crawley III. 68. 4)
This reason places the episode into a meaningful whole. Throughout the affair, it is

25

He is careful to note that the Spartans thought they suffered misfortunes in
the Arkidamian War because they infringed upon the truce by the Thebans' entering
Plataea and by their refusing to listen to Athens' offer of arbitration (VII. 18).
26

Arguing that the Spartan rationale that they are justified in punishing the
Plataeans because the Plataeans are false friends who have broken the obligation of
friendship, Lionel Pearson writes that "Thucydides witholds comment." L. Pearson,
"Popular Ethics in the World of Thucydides," Classical Philology 52 (1957): 234.
Thucydides, of course, shows no such restraint.

27

Further proof of Plataea's lack of strategic importance is that in the
aftermath, a temple of Hera is built on the ruins, not a fort (Ill. 68. 3).
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expediency determining Sparta's actions. Plataea is not of material significance. The
Spartans wish to maintain control of Plataea because Thebes, who has always
detested Boeotian Plataea's independence from Boeotia, is useful to her. For this
reason, the Spartan judges condemn and massacre the Plataeans. 28
By this episode Thucydides emphasizes one of the main theories of the History:
justice aside, men act in accordance with their own expediency, an aphorism that
applies to the Athenians as well as to the Spartans, as Thucydides reminds us in the
last sentence of this event: "Kai ra µ'Ev Kara IV.araiav 'frfl rpinp Kat i:vwr/KOOTO/

bmoiJ · A&rjvaiwv £vµµaxm i:yi:vovw

ovrw~

i:uJ...Evr17aEv" (such was the end of

Plataea, in the ninety-third year after she became the ally of Athens) (III. 68. 5).
After such a reminder, who can forget the promise of assistance made by the
Athenians to the Plataeans (II. 73. 3)? After ninety-three years Athens allows an ally
of proven bravery and integrity to be extirpated because she means nothing
materially to the war being waged. To boot Plataea is destroyed by Sparta for no
other reason than the enmity of a useful ally.
ENARGEIA
The episode at Plataea shows how Thucydides' theory of expediency makes

28

0ne might argue that Sparta's offer of neutrality runs counter to Thucydides'
interpretation of the event, but it does not. Even if the offer was sincere (and I think
it was), Sparta would not have lost had Plataea accepted it. Acceptance without
handing the city over to Sparta would have left the Plataeans vulnerable to attack,
thereby pleasing the Thebans. Acceptance with handing the city over would have
enabled Sparta to do as she pleased: restore the city to the Plataeans, hand it over to
the Thebans, or use it as a bargaining chip in her negotiations with Athens in the
event of peace.
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meaningful an otherwise inexplicable event. Throughout the History theory and fact
combine to help determine our understanding of events. But in addition to theory
there is another aspect of Thucydides' inventiveness that impinges upon our
understanding--his ability to make the reader a participant in the action. 29
Thucydides places the reader on the boat sent to Mytilene to countermand the
order of execution (III. 49. 2-4). He places him in the stench-filled quarries of
Syrakuse (VII. 87. 1-4). He also places him in the mind of the actors. Connor
provides an example of this technique from the third year of the war. It is the end of
the campaigning season, and the Peloponnesians decide to make one last operation.
They will surprise the Athenians with an attack on the Peiraeus, Athens' port.
Connor notes the clarity and ease of the narrative until the reader encounters the
following sentence of "contorted phraseology and nine negatives" :30
ovTf yap vavTtKov ~v npoqm).aaaov €v aim{> oiJO"fv ovu npoaooKia oiJOfµia µi-J
av lrOTf oi no).i:µwt €;amvaiaJ1; OVTWt; ElrtnAfVOftaV, Elrft oM' ano TOV
npo¢av01jt; w).µijaat av KaB' iJavxiav, oM' fl OtfVOOVVTO, µi'J OVK av
npoawBfoBat.

2

9Thucydides' enargeia, or ability to make the reader a participant in the
action, has been noted since antiquity. Of this ability Plutarch writes, "o yovv
00VKlJOlO'Yjt; aft Ti{> ).byq.> npot; TaVTrJV aµ1).).(1Tat Ti'/v icvapynav, oiov BfaTi'JV
notijam TOV cacpoaTi'Jv Kat Ta ytvoµfva nfpt TOVt; opwvTat; EKlrArJKTtKa Kat
TapaKTtKa naB'Yj wit; avaytVWOKOVOlV EVfpyaaaaBat AlXVfVOµfVOt; (ITOTEPON
A0HNAIOI KATA ITOAEMON H KATA "'i.O<PIAN EN!iO'BOTEPOI, 347A).

For a recent exploration of enargeia, see Andrew D. Walker, "Enargeia in
Greek Historiography," TAPA 123 (1993): 353-77.
30

1 think the phraseology is straightforward: no navy was on guard; there was
no expectation that the enemy would attack so suddenly because not even openly and
at their leisure would they dare [to attack] nor, if they did intend to, would they [the
Athenians] not perceive them. It is the shift in perspective to the Athenians and the
negatives that make the sentence difficult.
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There was no fleet on the look out in the harbor [of the Piraeus] and no one
had the least idea of the enemy attempting a surprise: while an open attack
would, it was thought, never be deliberately ventured on, or if in contemplation
would be speedily known at Athens. (II. 93. 3)
Connor writes that Crawley added the crucial "it was thought" (unexpressed but
implicit in the Greek) to mark Thucydides' shift from the Peloponnesian point of
view to the Athenian. The negatives indicate to the reader that precisely because the
Athenians did not expect it, the attack might have worked. When Thucydides shifts
back to the Peloponnesian point of view the reader learns that the riskiness of the
operation kept the Peloponnesians from attacking the Peiraeus. The account
continues alternating between the two viewpoints. Connor concludes,
The effect is consistently ironic: by the time we hear of the Peloponnesian
decision to abandon their original plan we know that from the Athenian point of
view it might have worked; by the time we hear of the panic in Athens, we
know that from the Peloponnesian point of view the plan was too risky to carry
through. The irony is characteristic of Thucydides and so are the rapid changes
of viewpoint, a major component of his style and an important contributor to
this second source of his authority [i.e., his style]. 31
In addition to the irony, the alternation of viewpoints causes the reader to
experience the events as both the Athenians and Spartans did. Athenian
overconfidence turns into panic when the city thinks the Peiraeus taken and the
Peiraeus thinks Salamis overcome and the enemy about to attack. Spartan bravery
becomes fear, which makes them lose what they might have gained. The reader
experiences the one's good fortune and the other's hesitancy. He is not merely

31

Connor, "Narrative Discourse in Thucydides," in The Greek Historians:
Literature and History, Papers Presented to A. E. Raubitschek (Saratoga, California:
ANMA Libri & Co., 1985), 8-9.
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reading an account; he is taken into the action, and from different perspectives is
made to see things as they occurred. The result is that he knows what happened,
why it happened, what could have happened, and why it did not.
He also comes to know better the tendencies of his characters. The Korinthian
characterization of the Athenians and the Spartans is famous. Its essence is that the
Athenian dares beyond his power, but the Spartan acts below his potency (I. 70).
The overall effect of the aborted strike on the Peiraeus reinforces the Korinthian
characterization and suggests to the reader the danger inherent in the characters of
the two: overconfidence could be Athens' downfall, hesitancy, Sparta's.
CHARACTERIZATION
From the two naval battles off N aupaktos in the third year of the war,
Edmunds provides another example of Thucydides' inventiveness: the
characterization of the Spartans and the Athenians as two groups with different
qualities. In the first engagement Phormion with his twenty ships defeats the
Peloponnesians with their forty-seven ships, of which Phormion captures twelve.
Outnumbered, Phormion waits for the morning breeze, which always blows down
the gulf. The wind throws the Spartan ships against one another; the Athenians
attack and win. The Spartans attribute the Athenian victory to chance, but through
his experience Phormion knew the breeze would come. Superior Athenian intellect
and experience defeat the Spartans.
In the second battle, seventy-seven Peloponnesian ships lure the twenty

Athenian ships into the gulf, drive them ashore, and disable all but eleven. These
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escape and flee, pursued by twenty Peloponnesian ships. One Athenian ship falls far
behind the rest. Outside Naupaktos' harbor a transport ship is anchored. The trailing
Athenian ship maneuvers around it and sinks the lead Peloponnesian ship. As a
result, the Peloponnesians are thrown into confusion; the Athenians counter-attack,
win, and recover the ships that were initially disabled. Athenian intellect uses chance
to win. Thus, in the former battle what was thought to be chance (the wind) is not,
and in this battle, chance (the transport ship) is taken advantage of by skill. 32
By these two engagements, Thucydides distinguishes Athenian reliance on
experience and skill from Spartan reliance on bravery and superior numbers. He
shows the danger of fighting in a narrow strait, where a sea fight is similar to a land
battle, and numerical superiority does matter. Likewise, in open water, mere force
and numbers cannot overcome experience and skill. Thucydides suggests that if the
Athenians use the qualities at which they excel, they will succeed. But if the
Peloponnesians can do the same by forcing the Athenians to fight a land battle on
water--they will succeed.
Thus, in 413, when the Athenian Konon begs Demosthenes and Eurymedon for
ships because his own eighteen are no match for the twenty-five Korinthian ships
stationed opposite him, the reader knows the engagement is doomed (VII. 31). In a
narrow crescent-shaped bay with its entrance blocked, thirty-three Athenian ships
now under Diphilos' command fight to a draw twenty-five Peloponnesian ships with
reinforced hulls. The Athenians meet force with force and because they do not win,

32

Lowell Edmunds, Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides, 97-99.

21
lose (VII. 34). By acting contrary to their character, the Athenians defeat
themselves. Konon' s request for ships conveys this contrariness most trenchantly.
Doubt and reliance on numbers have replaced the confidence that results from
reliance on skill. As we get closer and closer to Athens' demise we get farther and
farther from the Athenians characterized by the Korinthians in I. 70.

STYLE
In addition to his use of theory, his making the reader a participant in the
action, and his characterization of the Spartans and Athenians, prose style is another
inventive element Thucydides uses to create understanding. Thucydides' style runs
the spectrum from clear to obscure. Hardly anyone has understood Thucydides'
reason for switching from a simple and clear style to a complex and obscure one. I
contend that part of the reason for employing his complex prose style is his desire to
recreate in the reader's mind the event under scrutiny. In the Peloponnesian aborted
strike on the Peiraeus, the nine negatives stress Athens' overconfident belief that
such an attack would never happen; but by piling up the negatives, Thucydides
emphasizes how never almost came to pass. 33
At VII. 44. 7 Thucydides helps recreate the event at hand by his arrangement
of words:
wau TEAO~ ;vµnwovu~ abr:oi~ Kar:a no).).. a r:ov ar:par:oJCf001J, fJCfl ana;
hapax&rjaav, </Ji}..oi u </JiAot~ Kai noA'ir:at no)..ir:ai~, ov µovov €~ </Jo{Jov
Kar:iar:rJaav, (x)..)..a K<Xl f~ XEipa~ (x)..)..fj)..oi~ f)..(}fjvu~ µoAL~ aJCfAVOVTO.

Thus, after being once thrown into disorder, they ended by coming into

33

See above.
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collision with each other in many parts of the field, friends with friends, and
citizens with citizens, and not only terrified one another, but even came to
blows and could be parted only with difficulty. (trans. Crawley VII. 44. 7)
In this description of the Athenians' disastrous night attack on the Epipolae,
Thucydides places </JiAot next to

<f>i}..ot~

and :noA'h:at beside

:no}..i·r:at~

to stress the

confusion of the attackers. Visually or aurally friend mistakenly strikes against
friend and citizen against citizen as they did in the darkness of their attack.
In addition to striking </JiAot against

<f>i}..ot~

and :noA'i:r:at against

:no}..i·r:at~,

Thucydides recreates the event by mirroring with his prose the confusion the
Athenians experienced in trying to distinguish friend from foe:
o'l u · Afh]vaim €Cirr:ovv u a<f>ii~ ain:ov~ Kat :nav r:o €; €vavr:ia~, Kat fl <f>i}..wv
fL'fJ r:wv ~O'f/ :nfx}..tv <f>rnyovr:wv, :no}..€µwv €voµtCov, Kat r:oi~ €pwr:ijµaat r:ov
;vv&f/µar:o~ :JrVKVOt~ Xp<VµfVOt Ota r:o µi'j ftVat a}..}..<p r:<p yvwpiaat a<f>iat Tf
abr:oi~ Oopvf3ov :!COAVV :napfixov aµa :navu~ €pwr:wvu~ Kat r:oi~ :JrOAfµiot~
aa¢€~ abr:o Kar:far:'fjaav. r:o o' fKfiVWV obx bµoiw~ iJ:niar:avr:o Ota r:o
Kpar:ovvr:a~ aiJr:ov~ Kat µi'j otw:naaµfrov~ ~aaov ayvofiaOat

and the Athenians were seeking for one another, taking all in front of them for
enemies, even though they might be some of their now flying friends; and by
constantly asking for the watchword, which was their only means of
recognition, they not only caused great confusion among themselves by asking
all at once, but also made it known to the enemy, whose own they did not so
readily discover, as the Syracusans were victorious and not scattered, and thus
less easily mistaken ... (trans. Crawley VII. 44. 4-5)
Thus far the subjects of the sentence are clearly expressed. But as the sentence ends,
the subjects of the verbs €vr:vxotfv and Otf</Jfvyov become confused just as the
Athenians confuse friend for foe and vice versa:
war:' fl µ€v fVTVXOtfV r:tat Kpfiaaov~ OVTf~ r:wv :JrOAfµiwv, Otf</Jrnyov abr:ov~ au
fKflVWV f:Jrtar:aµfVOt r:o ;vvfh]µa, fl o' abr:ot µi'j a:Jr0Kpiv0tvr:o, Olf</J0fipovr:o.

so that if being stronger they happened upon some of the opponents, they
escaped them because they knew their password, but if they did not answer,
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they were killed. (VII. 44. 5)
Exactly who, being stronger, happens upon whom and who is fleeing from whom is
not clear until the au-clause. It is only then that we realize that the Athenians are
the subject of f.vrvxolfv and the enemy the subject of oti:<jJEVyov. After the au-clause
the subjects become clear not because Thucydides makes them explicit but because
of the context: above we learn that the enemy knows the Athenians' password so he
must be the subject of €:maraµEv0t and, therefore, also of oti:</JEVyov. Once we have
determined these subjects, the rest reads easily. But in the meantime we have had to
tease apart the subjects of f.vrvxolfv and oti:</JEVyov just as the Athenians had to
struggle to determine who was who.
In addition to his piling up negatives to suggest that never almost happened,
these two examples show how Thucydides uses his style to recreate events in the
reader's mind; there are many others, for style is a main component of Thucydides'
inventiveness. By the examples of style, characterization, enargeia, and theory, I
have attempted to relate the two main levels on which Thucydides' History operates:
the factual and the inventive, i.e., subjective. I contend that it is through the
inventive that one understands the factual, that it is through understanding
Thucydides and his inventiveness that one understands his History.
To achieve this understanding one could scrutinize each sentence of each book
of the History for insight into Thucydides and his inventiveness. It is not my
intention to explicate all eight books of the History. Rather, as stated above, I will
explore one of the main tributaries of it, and hope that I end up at the mouth and not
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lost in a marsh.
My tributary, 111.82-84, is crucial to the History because it contains, in the
historian's own words, the lengthiest and most complex analysis of any event in the
Peloponnesian War. 34 For this reason alone it gives us unique insight into its
author. In most other sections of the history, Thucydides adopts an objective pose:
he keeps himself and his views in the background. 35 His opinions are still felt, but
the reader must glean them from the white of the page, thus making proper
understanding more difficult. In this passage Thucydides' frankness diminishes the
reader's opportunities for misunderstanding him. Thus the picture we draw from it
should be an accurate depiction of his expressed views.
In the main his expressed views comment upon stasis, society, war, and human
nature--four main concerns of the History in general. Thucydides grants stasis such
attention because it is one of the most important phenomena of the war. It afflicted
almost all participants, contributed greatly to Athens' downfall, and helped destroy
society's customary conventions. By making these chapters paradigmatic of all

34

Using Roman Jakobson's term, shifters, Roland Barthes indicates two ways
that an historian speaks in his own words: (1) shifters of listening (a) statements
like, I have heard, (b) the use of the non-historical present tense, and (c) reference
to his personal experience and (2) shifters of organization such as, as I said earlier,
or I will return to ... , or enough about . . . Roland Barthes, "The Discourse of
History," in The Rustle of Language, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and
Wang, 1986) 128-29. Because of the frequent use of gnomic aorists and the present
tense, III. 82-84 is an example of a shifter of listening.
35

Two exceptions are the Archaeologia (I. 1-23) and the account of the plague
(II. 47-54). It is the content of the stasis excursus that distinguishes it from these
two passages.
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subsequent staseis, Thucydides demands that we recall them at specific points in the
remaining account. In addition the analysis of stasis contains his philosophy of war
and human nature. Thus not only does he express his views in his own voice, the
views expressed concern four of the most important aspects of the History.
Finally, Thucydides composed III. 82-84 in a style which reflects the complex
interrelations among his thoughts, philosophy, and the events themselves. I suggest
that the complexity of the passage is deliberate. 36 By contorting the structure of the
sentences, Thucydides attempts to reflect the chaos rampant in a city afflicted by
stasis. The distorted structure confuses the reader so that he experiences the
helplessness felt by stasis' victims. 37
Because of its style, content, and candidness, this passage, more than any,
should have important consequences for understanding Thucydides and his History.

36

I understand that Thomas Garrity uses this method in his dissertation, "The
Experience of History: Reading Thucydides' Prose," (Ph.D. diss., University of
California, 1994). Due to its recent completion, I have not had the opportunity to
incorporate its findings. Tompkins takes a similar approach in his unpublished
dissertation, "Stylistic Characterization in Thucydides" (Ph.D. diss., Yale
University, 1968). Tompkins argues that in the speeches Thucydides adapts his prose
to reflect the speaker's personality. Thus, the speeches are distinctive but their
uniqueness is akin to that of the differences among actors' lines in a play written by
one author. For Tompkins, see also "Archidamus and the Question of
Characterization in Thucydides," Nomodeiktes: Greek Studies in Honor of Martin
Ostwald (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1993), 99-111;
"Reciprocities between a Text and Two Translations: Thucydides, Venizelos and
Kakrides," Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 5 (1978): 69-79; and "Stylistic
Characterization in Thucydides: Nicias and Alcibiades," YCS 22 (1972): 181-214.
37

I also suggest that the desire that prompted him to reflect in his style the
event being described may be an explanation for his dating the History by summers
and winters: his concern for accuracy was so strong that he wished his readers to
experience the events as they happened in time and space.
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By explicating it and by showing its relation to the whole, I expect to arrive at a
more complete understanding of the two. Because I argue in Chapter 3 that the style
and content of the excursus combine to create understanding of it, this study insists
upon the authenticity of III. 82-84. It demands that the passage's difficulties not be
eliminated by emendations, the tack taken by most commentators. To this end, in
Chapter 2, the text is reevaluated and presented with a grammatical commentary.
Chapter 3 presents a literary critical exegesis of this section. The concern of this
chapter is to elucidate the passage's meaning. Chapter 4 argues that Thucydides'
interpretation and understanding of stasis and of the Peloponnesian War are similar
and that for this reason, III. 82-84 can be used as a key for understanding the

History. Finally Chapter 5 uses III. 82-84 as a key to understanding the Mytilenean
Debate.

CHAPTER 2
TEXT, COMMENTARY, AND TRANSLATION

The complexity of Chapters 82-84 is notorious. Since Goller's commentary
(1835) at least, and as recently as Romilly's (1981), there has been a tendency to
eliminate the complexities with emendations. Because I argue that the difficulties of
this passage are integral to its overall import, a text with all the complexities intact
is required. To this end this chapter consists of a reevaluation of the text, a
grammatical commentary, and a translation.
In 1821 Bekker produced his Thucydidis de Bello Peloponnesiaco Libri Octo, a
critical edition which includes the scholia graeca and the essential variants of the
best manuscripts, a commentary, and the notes of Duker and Wass. Thus his edition
is the logical place to begin any reevaluation. To Bekker's apparatus criticus I have
added the significant variants from the apparatus critici of Poppo, Herwerden,
Arnold, Jones, and Romilly, any variants from Dionysius of Halicarnassos' Ilfpt
E>owcvOioov and Ilfpl

r'lj~ !lrJµoafNvov~ J..€grnJ~,

and any of the Scholiast's variants.

Where editors differ in what variant they chose to read, I have listed the choices of
each. I have also included the significant emendations proposed or printed by
Goller, Poppo, Kruger, Stahl, Herwerden, Poppo/Stahl, Bohme, Arnold,
Classen/Steup, Jones, Gomme and Romilly. I have printed the source of the
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emendation first, with those who later accepted the reading listed after. At times I
have included readings of editions not personally examined, such as those from
Dobree and Badham's editions.
The divergences of the manuscripts consist of either readily ascertainable
scribal errors (e.g. fraar:a ai µaaf3oAai for fraar:at ai µer:af3oAai (82.2)) or of
variants of little or no consequence (e.g. bmofJ for bffi (82.1)) or of differing
omissions and inclusions of articles, particles, prepositions, and prefixes (differences
which may be important but difficult to decide between or among, given
Thucydides' penchant for poetical prose and for rhetorical figures).
The general agreement among the manuscripts is so strong that it strengthens
my belief that Thucydides consciously contorted the language of these paragraphs
and that what we have is very nearly what he wrote. Thus the readings of the
manuscripts are preferred to the supposed ameliorative emendations proposed by
most editors and commentators: of the editors and commentators considered, only
Bekker and Jones resist simplifying and regularizing these chapters.
Consequently, with three exceptions, 1 the reevaluated text is the same as
Bekk:er's (although the punctuation is quite different), and except for three
punctuation differences, 2 the same as Jones'. For orthographical differences like

1

At 111.82.4 aa<f>aAf.iq, is read in place of aa<f>aAf.La and at 111.82.8 </>tAOVtKftV
is read, not </>tAOVflKE'iv, and </>tAOVtKiav, not </>tAOVflKiav.
At 111.82.8 a comma is printed after </>tAonµiav instead of a C); at 111.82.8
no comma is printed after otanpaE,aaOat, and at III. 84. 1 no comma is printed
after ota naOov~.
2
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a<j>paKWr; and a<j>apKwr;; 7tpOVXOlfV and 7tpOVXOlfV; </>tAOVlKflV and </>tAOVfLKflV,

Jones' text has been followed.
The goals for the commentary are two: to provide comprehensive grammatical
explanations when the syntax is unclear, and for the parts much debated, to provide
the different solutions previously offered as well as my own. The commentaries
consulted were those by Bekker, Goller, Kruger, Poppo/Stahl, Bohme, Arnold,
Classen/Steup, and Gomme. 3 Where appropriate the remarks of the Scholiast are
included.

3

Because Hornblower's A Commentary on Thucydides (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991) is interpretive rather than grammatical, it was not used for
this chapter.
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5

oirrwc; wµYj < fJ > oramc; :!tpovxwp'YJOf, Kat loo;f µaJ...J...ov, otim EV wic;
:!tpWT'YJ EYfvfW, E:ltft voupov YE Kat :ltav we; Ei:ltfiV TO • EAA'YJVlKOV EKlvf;O'Yj,
owcj>opwv ovowv EKaoraxov wic; Tf TWV of;µwv :!tpoorarmc; wvc; 'AO'Yjvaiovc;
E:ltaywOm Kat wic; bJ...iy0tc; wvc; AaKEOmµoviovc;. Kat EV µ'Ev Eipf;V1J OVK av
EXOVTWV :!tpocj>aatv oiJO' froiµwv :!tapaKaAEiV avwvc;, :ltOAEµovµfrwv OE Kal
;vµµaxiac; aµa EKarip0tc; riJ TWV Evavriwv KaKWOfl Kat ocpimv avwic; EK WV
aVWV :!tpOO:!tOl'f/OEl pq,oiwc; al E:ltaywyat Wtc; VfWUpt~flV Tl {JovJ...oµEvOLc;
E:!topi~ovw.

1 fJ mavult Kruger et acceperunt Herwerden Poppo/Stahl Bohme Classen/Steup
Jones Romilly O'l'l g EV om. B 2 E:ltELOf; g
3 owcj>Oopwv
A B rt{> of;µ<p c 5 f'l'oJ...µwv mavult Steup et accepit Romilly wJ...µwvrwv
Herwerden oiJOETipwv Marshall LCM 15 (1990) 6 post €Karip0tc;] ovo'Yjc;,
E:ltt Herwerden
7 :7tpoo:7t0tf;oELv g ai om. A r1 om. d

1. ovrwc; wµf;] ovrwc; wµf; predicate to :!tpOVXWP'YJOf.

< fJ >] "Articulus abesse

nequit, quod de seditione antea narrata sermo est" (Poppo/Stahl p. 143).
µaJ...J...ov wµYj (oo;Ev !f/:!tEp EyfVEW (Scholiast).

µaJ...J...ov]

Ev wic; :!tpWT'YJ] It is interesting that

not one of the commentators considered notes that Kerkyra is not the setting for the
first instance of stasis in the war, but Notion the port of Kolophon is (Ill. 34).
Rather most argue that Ev wic; strengthens the superlative (Kuhner/Gerth Satzlehre I,
i p.28 and Smyth 1089). Although he makes no mention of Notion, Arnold argues
that Ev wic; :!tpWT'YJ means among the first (p. 452). As support Arnold refers to his
note on III. 17. 1. 2 (Ev wic; :ltAEiouu), where the context demands that the meaning
be one of the largest (p. 360-61). (For this reason Classen/Steup and Jones bracket
the entire paragraph.) Of all the other instances in Thucydides of (v wic; with the
superlative, not one conclusively supports Arnold's contention (I. 6. 3. 1, VII. 19.
4. 1, VII. 24. 3. 1, VII. 27. 3. 4, VII. 71. 3. 11, VIII. 89. 2. 5, VIII. 90. 1. 4).
VII. 71. 3. 11 and VIII. 90. 1. 4 argue strongly against him. If Arnold is wrong,
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then perhaps Thucydides thought Kerkyra so different from Notion in kind and
degree that he considered the stasis at Kerkyra the first true outbreak. 4 The
Scholiast's wish to supply

K<pKVpaiot~

after €v

wl~

I find improbable.

3.

tna<j>opwv OV<JWV ... braywOm] braywOat is dependent upon ota<j>opwv. Both

sides were contending against one another to invite in either the Lakedaemonians or
wl~ npoaTaTat~

the Athenians.
ota<j>opwv.

... Kai role; bJ...iyo1c;] datives of possession with

4. Kai €v µ'fv EipfJWJ ...

€nopi~ovw]

This sentence has caused much

debate. At issue are the subjects of €xovTwv, hoiµwv, and noAEµo11µ€vwv, the lack
of a main verb in the µi:v clause, the syntax of

;11µµaxia~

and

EKaTi:pot~,

and the

soundness of a bare adjective (hoiµwv) answering a participle (€xovTwv).
As evidence of an adjective answering a participle, Poppo cites Ill. 69. 1: al bf
TwaapaKovux vfJE~ Twv Ilf}..onovvwiwv ai Awf3io1~ fiorJOol UOovam, w~ TOTE
<j>evyo11am 01a wv

nEAayov~

KpfJnJ XflµaaBEt<Jat Kai an'

'EK TE Twv •AB'fjvaiwv €ma1wxBEia<11 Kai npoc; Tf;
avTfJ~

anopa&c;

npo~

Ti'JV ITEA07tOVV'fj<JOV

KaTrJVEXO'f/aav, KaTaAaµ{Javo11mv EV Tf; K11AA'f/vr; ... (p. 137). Kriiger quotes

Julian, Epistle 56 p. 442, whose use of hoiµwv parallels Thucydides':

wv~

vvv

aKpowµi:vo11c; TOV µo1J<JIKOV !:1to<JKopo11 noi'fj<JOV avTtAa{JfoOat TfJc; TEXV'fjc;
npoOvµbupov, we; iJµwv hoiµwv E7fL lmEp av EBi:AW<JIV

aiJwi~

<J1JVapaaOat (p. 71).

These examples, I think, prove the validity of hoiµwv.
;11µµaxia~

the Scholiast construes with npoanotfJ<JEL (ota npoanoi'fj<JtV

For a recent examination of EV Toi~ npWT'fJ, see M. F. Williams, "Two
Traditional Elements in Thucydides' Corcyrean Excursus," Classical World 79
(1985): 1-3.
4
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avµµaxia~).

Goller takes

;vµµaxia~

with KaKwaEL and npoanotfJOEL, i.e., ''propter

imminutionem et propter acquisitionem," and he construes
€nopi~ovw: "€Karipwv wl~ vEwupi~flV TL f3ov).oµf.v0t~"

Portus, Poppo takes

;vµµaxia~

;vµµaxia~

otooµf.vYJ~; fKaTipot~

with

(p. 324-25). Quoting

with ai €naywyai; the lengthy separation of the two

he explains by hyperbaton for emphasis. For
Gomme explains

(xarf.pot~

fKarf.pot~

he quotes Goller (p. 137).

as another genitive absolute, lacking

bnapxova'Y/~

or

is the indirect object of the participle (p. 372-73). Because

word order and simplicity argue in Gomme's favor, I prefer his explanation. Instead
of

bnapxova'Y/~

possession with

or

otooµf.:vYJ~,

I suggest

oVOYJ~; €Karf.:pot~,

therefore, is a dative of

;vµµaxia~.

Stahl adduces VI. 69. 1 as evidence for the lack of a main verb in the µf.:v
clause and writes, "Duo hie membra µf.v--Oi particulis ita inter se iuncta sunt, ut
alterum verbo finito, alterum huic subditum participio enuntietur" (p. 143). Steup
thinks VI. 69. 1 quite different from III. 82. 1 and believes the lack of a main verb
an intolerable anacoluthon (p. 164). Following one of Classen's recommendations,
he emends fioiµwv to fib).µwv.
Steup's solution requires him to take Athens and Sparta as the subject of
€xovrwv and no).Eµovµf.:vwv but the oligarchs and democrats of the various cities as

the subject of the emended fioiµwv (p. 164). Conversely Gomme understands the
oligarchs and democrats of the various cities as the subject of €xovrwv, €wiµwv, and
no).Eµovµi:vwv (p. 373). I think Gomme is correct and reject Steup's argument

because the logic and perspective of the sentence demand that the oligarchs and
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democrats have no pretext (ovK av Exovr:wv npo</Jaatv) not the Athenians and
Spartans.
In agreement with Steup, Gomme thinks the lack of a main verb in the µfr
clause intolerable (p. 372). I offer three suggestions: (1) Gomme and Steup are
correct; there is a breakdown in syntax, but the breakdown is deliberate: Thucydides
skews the grammar to emphasize the difference between war and peace; (2) Exovr:wv
answers Enopil;ovw as Stahl asserts; (3) With a comma after AaKEoatµoviovq, the
sentence runs from Enfi to Enopil;ovw as Marchant suggests. If Marchant is correct,
then Thucydides is contrasting the primacy of EV wlq npwn1 Ey€vEw with the
regularity of pq.oiwq ai Enaywyat wlq vEwr:Epil;flv r:1 f3ovJ...0µ€vo1q Enopil;ovw. For
this argument to hold, the Kai of Kat EV µ€v EipfJV'l'J must be explanatory and
introduce a parenthetical phrase, running from Kat fv µ€v EipfJV'l'J to a<jJiatv avwlq EK
WV avwv npoano1fJaE1. I prefer the first suggestion.

6. r:iJ KaKWOfl and

npoano1fJaE1] datives of purpose (Kuhner/Gerth Satzlehre I #11 p.439 and Smyth

1473 a).

7. wlq fiovJ...oµi:vo1q] construe with Enopil;ovw.
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Kat E:Trf:TrWE noJ..J..a Kat xaJ..Ena Kara araOLv rai~ :TrOAWL, y1yvoµE11a µ'Ev
Kat aiEt i:aoµEva, f(J)~ av iJ avriJ </>VOL~ avOpwnwv lj, µaJ..J..ov OE Kat
iJa11xaiupa Kat wi~ ELOWt OtrJAAayµi:va, w~ av fKaarat ai µETaf3oJ..at 7:0)11
;11vwxuvv E<j>LaTWVTat. Ev µ'Ev yap EipfJV'IJ Kat ayaOoi~ npayµaOLV ai TE
:TrOAEL~ Kat oi io1wrat aµEiV01J~ Ta~ yvwµa~ 'fxmJOL Ola 7:0 µiJ E~ aK011aio11~
avayKa~ ni:TrTEIV
b OE :TfOAEµo~ v<j>EAWV riJv EV:Tropiav WV KaO' iJµipav
f3iwo~ otOixaKaAo~ Kat npo~ ra napovra ra~ bpya~ rwv noJ..J..wv bµowi.
0

15

9 f:TrWE v
noJ..J..a xaJ..Enix c f
10 </>VOL~ TWV avOpwnwv B h Stahl
Herwerden Bohme Classen/Steup
11 iJa11xwupa K iJa11xfoupa e
iJa11xaiupa Kat] Kat om. i
FJOwt OtrJAAayµiva €w~ A
lxaara A B E F g
i:Kfxarat~ mavult Hude ixfxarOL~ mavult Kruger
rwv wpwv ;1J11wxtwv c
14
i:aninutv Herwerden
f3io11 ante f3iaw~ forsan excidisse putat Kruger 15 ro
napov L 0
opµfx~ L 0 P d

9. Kat i:ninwE] Kat is intensive. i:ninwE] gnomic aorist, otherwise ytyvoµEva is
incomprehensible.

10. iJ avriJ] predicative.

µaJ..J..ov] worse, i.e.,

xaJ..Enwupa, modifying the noun present in ytyvoµEva and i:aoµEva. An adverb

similarly modifies a noun at IV. 68. 5: aa<j>fxAELa o'E
avoi;Ew~

iJ µf'llrOL
7).

avwi~

µaJ..J..ov i:yiyvEw

riJ~

(Goller p. 325). Adverb and adjective are similarly combined at III. 13. 2:

anoaraOL~

iJµwv Oaaaov YEYEVrJTat Kat

13. 'fxo110L Ota 7:0 µiJ

anapaaKE1JO~

E~ aK01Jaio11~ avayKa~

Ota ro µiJ €~ axovat01 €~ avayKa~ ninu1v.

(Poppo note 4. 2 p.

ninrELv] hypallage for fX01JOL

14. rmj KaO' iJµipav] Kruger's

suggestion that f3io11 has fallen out is unnecessary. rofJ articulates KaO' iJµipav.
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€01:aaia~€ u ohv Ta Tiiw noAEwv, 1cat Ta f.<j>vaTEpi~ovux n011 nvaTEL Twv

npoyEvoµivwv JCOAV EJCE</>EpE Ti'/V VJCEpj3o}..i'Jv WV KatvovaOat Ta~ otavoia~
TWV T' EJCIXELPfJOEWV JCEp1uxvfJaEL Kat TWV T1µwp1wv awniq,. Kat Ti'fv
EiwOvlav a£iwmv TWV bvoµaTWV (~ Ta 'fpya avTfjAAa£av TfJ OlKatWOfl.

~6

v<j>vaTEpi~ovTa

g

niau1 Q (mnvaTEL Dionysius, Ikpi 0ovK., p. 886
(but JC01J JCVOTfl, Ilfpi !l'fjµoaO., p. 953), Stahl Herwerden Bohme aJCOJCVOTfl
F1 M1
17 npoyEyEv'fjµivwv c cum Dionysio 5 Stahl npoayEvoµivwv e
no}..J...fjv Dionysius, IIEpi 0ovK., p. 8866 Stahl
wv KatvovaOat] (~ TO
Dionysius7 Stahl Bohme KEvovaOat AB E F h
18 T' om. K

16. Ta Twv noJ...Ewv ... Ta

(<j>vaupi~ovTa]

"i.e., ai

noJ...EL~.

Quaeritur, utrum Ta

y1yvoµEva" (Poppo p. 138). Poppo prefers Ta vaupov y1yvoµEva (p. 139). I prefer

i01w·ra1 of the prior sentence and because the plural lxvTfjJ...A.a£av of the next

sentence assumes the same subject as the preceding two.

17. noJ...v] adverbial.

18. nEp1uxvfJaEL and awniq,] datives of respect further defining KatvovaOat
otavoia~.

Ta~

Ti'fv Eiw&i1/av a£iwmv . . . f~ Ta 'fpya avTfjJ...J...a£avTa] It is not, as

many understand, that the accustomed meanings of words were changed, but that the

5

Dionysius also has npoyEvoµEvov. He quotes the passage twice in IIEpi
80111C110lo011 at 886 and once in IIEpi nj~ !lrJµoa0€vov~ A.€£Ew~ (953): (1) (nmvau1
TWV npoyEvoµivwv JCOAV EJCE</>EpE Ti'fv VJCEp{Jo}..i'Jv WV KatvovaOat Ta~ otavoia~, (2)
(mnvaTEL TWV npoyEyEVrJµivwv noJ...v (ni:<j>EpE Ti'fv vnEpj3oJ...i'fv (~ To KatvovaOat Ta~
ouxvoia~, (3) nov nvaTEL Twv npoyEyEv'fjµivwv noJ...v (ni:<j>EpE Ti'fv vnEp{Jo}..i'fv (~ To
KatvovaOat Ta~ Otavoia~. He explains thus, "oi Of vaupi~ovu~ (mnvvOavoµEVOl Ta
YEYEV'fjµi:va nap' hi:pm~ Uaµf3avov imEpj3o}..i'Jv EJCt TO otavo(iaOai Tl Katvoupov"

(p. 886).
6

7

Reiske reads noJ...J...fjv but Usener/Radermacher read no}..v.

See note 1 above.
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values of words were exchanged 8 in order to suit the faction's interest. For
example, in the next sentence avopEia maintains its positive meaning; its worth,
however, is debased by using it to obscure an abhorrent action (in this case r:o).µa
(x).bywr:o~).

oELAia

ebnpEnfJ~

otherwise honorable trait,

remains pejorative; it is misapplied to scorn an

µ€).).1,at~ npoµYJffff~.

Thus virtues become vices and vices

virtues by an exchange of words' usual values; meanings remain unchanged. 9

19.

OlK<XlWOEL] avr:I r:ov r:fJ fa1JTWV OLKaiq KpiaEL (Scholiast). "Sed OLKaiq omittere

poterat" (Goller p. 325).

8

Cf. Dennis Proctor, The Experience of Thucydides (Warminster, Wilts,
England: Aris & Phillips LTD, 1980), 204; John T. Hogan, "The agiwat~ of Words
at Thucydides 3.82.4," Greek, Rome and Byzantine Studies 21 (1980): 139-49; J.
Wilson, "The Customary Meanings of Words Were Changed--Or Were They? A
Note on Thucydides 3.82.4," Classical Quarterly 32 (1982): 18 ff; and I.
Worthington, "A Note on Thucydides 3.82.4," Liverpool Classical Monthly 7
(1982): 124.
9

Hogan argues convincingly, I think, that not only were vices called virtues
and virtues vices, but that a vice, such as r:o).µa (x).iJywr:o~, might have been
considered a good thing and a virtue, such as r:o aw<f>pov, might have lost its positive
connotation and become a word of derision (Hogan, "The agiwat~," 145). Note that
in this instance, meanings remain, but connotations change. For a detailed discussion
of this passage see Chapter 3.
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20

25

r:o).µa µ'Ev yap aAoytawr; avopEia </>tAfrmpor; icvoµiaOrJ, µiAArJatr; bf
:!tpOµYJf#Jr; OflAl<X eimpE:!t~r;, 1:0 Of aw<f>pov WV avavopov :!tpoaxrJµa, K<XL 1:0
:!tpor; a:Jtav ;vvET:OV E:Jtt :JtaV apyov. r:o o' f:p:!tA~Kr:wr; o;v avopor; µoipq
npoaffiOrJ, aa<f>aAEiq o'f r:o €mf3ov).evaaa8m anor:ponfjr; npo</Jaatr; EVAoyor;.
K<Xl b µ'Ev X<XAf:Jtaivwv :Jttar:or; aifi, b o' avr:1).€ywv avr:ii; fmonwr;.
€mf3ovAevaar; oi r:1r; r:vxwv ;vvEr:or; Kai imovo~aar; 'fr:1 oflvoupor; ·
</JtAaiupor; A G H P Q d e h i
npor; a:Jtav] :!tapanav L 0 p
fK:JtA~KTWr; b

20 r:o).µav K

wvoµaaOrJ Herwerden
22
23 aa<f>a}..fiq. B f g Mi Q

Schol. Poppo Kruger Stahl Herwerden Bohme Arnold Classen/Steup Jones
Romilly aa<f>ixAfla cet. Dionysius, Ilfpl 0ovK. et Ilfpl !J..YJµoaO., p. 888 et p.
954, Bekker Goller
aa</JaAEiq. Of 1:0] WV L 0 p
lcmfiovAfVWO<Xl K 'fr:t
f3011AEvaaa8m Herwerden
24 navr:' icnmvwv pro xaAE:Jtaivwv Rauchenstein
25 post r:1r; r:vxwv] < u > Dionysius, Ilfpl 0ovK. et Ilfpl !J..YJµoaO., p. 889 10
et p. 954, Stahl Bohme

20. µ€).}..,YJatr;

Of

:!tpOµYJf#Jr;, r:o Of aw</Jpov' and r:o :!tpor; a:Jtav ;vvfTOV] all subjects

of an icvoµiaOrJ understood from the first colon.

21. Kai r:o npor; anav ;vvf'T:ov

E:Jtt :Jtav apyov] Kat r:o :!tpor; :Jtavr:a avvf'T:OV :!tpor; :Jtavr:a apyov fAEyov (Scholiast).

22. 1:0 o'

icµ:JtA~KTWr;

o;v]

11

ein wahnsinniges Drauflosgehen II (Classen/Steup p.

166). Gomme rightly contrasts 1:0 o'

icµ:JtA~KTWr;

o;v with 1:0 €mf3ovAEvaaa8m (p.

375). But because of 1:0 €mf3ovAEvaaa8m, he wrongly thinks 1:0 o'
more intellectual vice. 7:0 o'

Eµ:JtA~Kr:wr;

icµ:JtA~KTWr;

bgv a

o;v is the absence of intellect; it is

unthinking, impulsive action.
The meaning of this thought is much disputed. The scholiast translates,

11

r:o icmno).v

fiovAEVaaaO<Xl 01' aa<f>aAflav npo<f>aatr; a:Jtor:ponfjr; (voµit,Ew. II Goller prints
aa<f>ixAfl<X and understands 1:0 €mf3ovAEvaaa8m as II quod attinet ad insidias. II Thus

the whole would be safety with respect to snares was a nicely phrased pretext for

10

0€

1:1

f. Usener/Radermacher
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declining to attack the enemy (p. 326). Poppo thinks the syntax of Goller's

r:o

bttfJov).EvaaaOat impossible; rather, for Goller's translation to be possible,
aa<j>a).fia Of WV btt{JovAfVOaaBat must be read (p. 140). Arnold prints aa<j>aAEiq.

and translates, "But safely to concert measures against an enemy was accounted but
a decent pretence for declining the contest with him altogether" (p. 455). I prefer the

Scholiast's

r:o

bttno).v fJmJAEvaaaOat ot' aa<J>aAEtav: planning for the sake of safety.

Gomme argues that €nt{Jov).f1JOaaBm cannot simply mean to plan; and so he thinks
emendation necessary (p. 376). But for €mf3ov).fvw in the sense of to plan or to aim
at so as to acquire rather than plot against see III. 20. 1. 4, IV. 103. 4. 2, and VII.

51. 1. 5.

25. wxwv] to succeed, as often in Thucydides, e.g. III. 42. 4. 1.
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30

npo{Jov).Evaa<; 0€ onw<; µJJOEV ain:ii.>v oEfjafl, r:fj<; u fr:atpia<; ota).vr:Tj<; Kat
WV<; €vavr:iov<; fK7Cf7CA'f/Yµivo<;. an).ii.><; Of 0 </>Baaa<; r:ov µ€).).ovr:a KaKOV Tl
opav f7C1JVftW, Kat 0 f7CtKfAfVOa<; r:ov µTj OtavoovµEVOV. Kat µTjv Kat r:o
gvyyEv€<; r:ov fr:atptKov ix).).or:ptwr:Epov €yivEr:o ota r:o fr:otµor:Epov dvat
anpo¢aaiar:w<; r:o)...µav.

26 bffjafl A B C E F G H I P V c d e f g h i Bekker Haack Goller Poppo
Kruger Stahl Herwerden Bohme Arnold Classen/Steup Jones Romilly vulgo
bffjaot
r:fj<; u] u om. i fr:atpEia<; Ac f i
ota}..vr:'f/<; E
27 an)...ii.><; bf]
u Haase et acceperunt Kruger Stahl Classen/Steup
28 €mKw)...vaa<;
Herwerden Badham o<; µTj f7CtKfAfVOavr:o<; OtavoovµEvov d f7CtKfAfVOa<; r:ov]
W1J B
29 r:o (1)...)...or:ptwupov K
ftVat Ot<X r:o anpo¢aaiar:w<; i
avnotµbupov Badham et accepit Herwerden

26.

oEfjafl] future indicative in an object

aiJr:ii.>v] r:ofJ €mf3ov).fvflv Kat vnovoE'iv.

clause of effort (Kuhner/Gerth Satzlehre II, Anmerk 5 p. 376 and Smyth 2211).

27.

an)...ii.><; bi] r:o gvµnav Ebmv, i.e., to sum up.

comrade anticipating another comrade just as

o¢Baaa<; r:ov µ€)...)...ovr:a] one

olmKEAEvaa<; r:ov µTj otavoovµEvov

(Classen/Steup p. 167); enemy anticipating enemy whereas

o f7CtKEAEvaa<;

encouraged a man would have taken no part in the conspiracy (Gomme p. 377).
Because it paints a more trenchant picture, I prefer Gomme's interpretation.

28.

o €mKEAEvaa<;]

supply E7C1JVEir:o.

r:ov µTj otavoovµEvov] generic µfj with an

attributive participle. Understand KaKOV r:t opav.
29.

r:ov fr:atptKofJ] party-tie not mere friendship.

r:o gvyyEVE<;] blood-tie.
fr:otµbupov] Badham posits

avEr:otµbnpov (accepted by Herwerden), but r:o fr:atptKOV is the unexpressed subject

of ota r:o fr:otµbupov Eivat.
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ov yap µer:a rwv Kflµivwv voµwv

w<j>EAia~

ai rotavrat ;vvooot, aJ..J..a napa

wv~ KaOwrwra~ nJ..wvE;i~.

31

rfJ~

w<j>EAia~

e et µEra rwv Kflµivwv voµwv
w<j>EAi~ mavult Poppo et acceperunt Poppo/Stahl B6hme Classen/Steup
w<j>iAEtat Herwerden
32 nJ..wvE;iat Herwerden
µEra

rwv Kflµivwv voµwv

31. µETa rwv Kflµivwv voµwv

w<j>EJ..ia~]

most commentators prefer

w<j>EAi~:

in

accordance with the established laws for the sake of profit. G6ller interprets the two

genitives as w<j>(J..Eta voµiµYJ, lawful gain, and cites as a comparandum Euripides'
Bacchae, I. 338, b

rfJ~ fJ01Jxia~ Biow~

for

{Jio~ fjavxo~

(p. 327). Because a

dependent genitive between the preposition and its object is common in Thucydides
and because Thucydides' penchant for inconcinnity is especially apparent in this
passage, I prefer G6ller's interpretation.
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Kai Ta~ €~ a<jJa~ ainov~ niaTfl~ ob Tep f-Mcp voµcp µaJ...J...ov f°KpaTvvovw fJ Tep
KOtVfJ Tl napavoµfjaat. Ta TE ano TWV fVaVTtWV KaAw~ AEyoµEva fVEOEXOVW
'fpywv <jJvJ...aKfJ, Ei npovxotEV, Kat ov YEVVatOTr/r:t. avr:mµwp~aaaOai Tf Ttva
7tEpt JtAEtoVO~ ~V fJ abTOV µi'J 7tpona0€lv. Kat OpKOt Et JtOV apa yi:v0tVW
;vvaJ...J...ayfJ~' fV Tep abTiKa npo~ TO anopov fKaTi:po; otooµEVOl iaxvov obK
fXOVTWV aJ...J...oOEv ovvaµtv.

33 0Eio; Kat voµiµcp Dionysius, Ikpi /),£µoa0., p. 955 ob Tep baio; 1wt voµiµcp
Dobree et accepit Herwerden
fKpawvvw I 34 aVEOEXOVW i
36 ob
ante 7tEpi inserit Badham lyiyvovw Dionysius, IIEpi 0ovK., p. 891, sed
yi:vmvw, IIEpi fj.EµoaO., p. 955
37 TOV anopov L 0 TfJV anopov p Ta
anopa F 38 EXOVU~ d

33. Tc{> KotvfJ r:t napavoµfjaat] compare the initiation rites of gangs in the U.S.A.
today.

35. (pywv <jJvJ...aKfJ] Gomme translates with precautionary action (p. 378).

Better I think to take AEyoµEVa and (pywv as the words and deeds of the party suing
for peace, i.e., with a guard against the enemy's deeds. 11

npovxotEv] the subject

is debated. Poppo, Stahl, Bohme, and Arnold argue for oi €vavTi0t; Classen/Steup
and Gomme for oi €voExoµEvot. Arnold argues that it is surely the weaker party that
would be cautious and suspicious (p. 456). Although such a change in subject is not
unlike Thucydides, it is precisely the stronger party who can act yEvVatOT'YJTL, not
the weaker. In addition it is usually the weaker party who sues for peace not the
stronger. Finally, I think Thucydides' next sentence supports this interpretation: the
stronger foe who accepted peace overtures had to be on guard against his opponent's
actions because revenge was more important than suffering the first loss.
avTmµwp~aaaOai]

11

subject of ~v.

Ttva] object of avTmµwp~aaaOat.

36.

Cf. A. M. Parry, Logos and Ergon in Thucydides (Salem, New Hampshire:
Arno Press, 1981).

43

airrov] subject accusative of nponaOEiv. 37.
€v Tip avriKa] airriKa articulated.

~vvaA.A.ay~~]

dependent upon opKot.

€Karipo;] dative of agent with 01ooµEvo1 (by

each, i.e., the oligarchs and democrats). For the dative of agent with the passive
voice cf. III. 64. 4 (Classen/Steup p. 168).

38.

€xovrwv] temporal genitive

absolute: oaths lasted in the immediacy of the moment on account of an impasse
while they did not have strength from elsewhere. €xovrwv is plural because of the
dual nature of €Karipo;. The change of case, dative to genitive, is frequent in
Thucydides and Greek literature.

44
40

fV Of re{> naparvxovil 0 </>Oaam; Oapaf,aat, Ei '100t a¢apKiOV, YJOlOV Ota ifJV
niailV filµwpEiw Pf ano iOV npo</>avovc;' Kat TO if aa</>aAf<; Uoyi~EiO IWL
Oil anair.J JrEptyEvoµEvoc; £1JVfaEW<; aywvwµa npoaEJ..aµ{JaVEV. pqov o' oi
JrOAAOL KaKovpy0t OVif<; od,wl KfKArJViat YJ aµa0Ei<; ayaOoi, Kai it{> µfv
aiaxvvovrat, €nl Of re{> ayaJ..J..ovrat.
0apaf,aat Herwerden
Ei] fJ E d i '10r.J N v g
!f/oEL c f
40 ano]
ota M 1 ro if] oil d
41 avayKr.J K nEptyEvoµEvov d p¢owv AF H g
h pro pqov Badham mavult ijowv 42 noJ..J..oi om. c
ovifc; secl.
Classen/Steup ro µiv I

39

39. a¢apKwv] understand €vavriov.

f]owv] adverbial.

40.

Kat TO if

aa¢aJ..fc;] explanatory Kai (Kuhner/Gerth Satzlehre II, #2 p.247 and Smyth 2869

a), parallel to ort. Both explain f]owv fi1µwpEiw.
also the subject of npoaEJ..aµfJavEv.

41.

Uoyi~Ew]

subject is

o¢0aaac;,

oil] see above, Kai ro if ixa¢aJ..fc;

oi

noJ..J..ol ... ayaOoi] The meaning of this aphorism depends upon ovifc;. Nowhere

does Thucydides predicate any form of Eivat to the verb KaJ..iw. Thus in Thucydides
ovifc; KEKArJViat does not mean !assen sich nennen as Kruger thinks (p. 75). As

Classen/Steup argue, Kruger's translation, "die meisten !assen sich aber Zieber
gewandte Schelme als ungebildete Biedermiinner nennen," which they accept,

requires bracketing ovifc; (p. 169). If Classen/Steup are wrong and ovifc; is not a
marginal gloss that has been incorporated into the text, then the statement must be
understood as Arnold translates, "Men in general, when dishonest, more easily gain
credit for ability, than, when simple, they gain credit for honesty. " He explains,

"This is inserted as the reason why successful perfidy was rather emulated than
detested; why men would rather deceive others than be themselves deceived" (p.
457).

42. Kai it{> µfv aiaxvvovrat, fJrt Of it{> ayaJ..J..ovrat] note the chiasm: (A)

45
pqov

o'

i-4> µ'Ev

oi :JtOAAOl KaKofJpyot ovuq &;w/ KfxA'YJV'Wl
aiaxvvovrat, (A) f:Jtl Of

i-4>

ayaAAOVTat.

~

(B) aµa(){iq aya()oi, (B) Kat

46
45

navrwv (j' avriiJV a'lnov apxi'J iJ ()1a JlAfOVE;iav /Wt </JtAO'!tµiav, fK o' avriiJV
Kat €~ ro </JtAOVLKEtv Kafharaµivwv ro npo&uµov.

44 airwv apxiJ A B C E F G H K L N 0 P V c g h Bekker Gc>Iler Poppo
Kruger Stahl Herwerden Bohme Arnold Classen/Steup Jones Romilly a'lrwv ()'
apxi'J d i et ainov iJ apxiJ ceteri airwv secl. Madvig iJ secl. Hude
45
</JtAOVtKEtv Q Stahl Herwerden Classen/Steup Jones Romilly </JtAOVEIKEtv cet. et
Bekker Goller Poppo Kruger Bohme Arnold

44. ainov] predicate of apxi'J

iJ

and ro npo&uµov. Supply

frv.

beginning but rule. Usually accepted as the meaning of apxiJ
E7lt81Jµia

wv {Jov}..w(}m

iJ

iJ]

not

is the Scholiast's

iJ

lxpxEtv. The article is necessary as Gomme asserts, "not all

apxiJ, obviously' brings such bad results, only

iJ Ota

aV'!OJV] i.e., riJ~ JlAfOVE;ia~ Kat </JtAO'!tµia~.

45.

with KaBwraµivwv.

apxiJ

JlAfOVE;iav" (p. 379).
E~

EK o'

'!O </JlAOVIKEtV] construe

KaBwraµivwv] genitive of possession with npo&uµov. The

subject of the participle is unexpressed. The Scholiast paraphrases well, navrwv o'
'!WV Eip'Yjµivwv KaKWV a'lnov ~v

iJ

Em&uµia WV fJov}..w(}m apxEtv riJ~ yif~ Ola

JlAfOVE;iav Kat </JtAonµiav. EK WV'!WV (jf
lxpxEtv Kat

rif~ n}..wvE;ia~

Kat

iJ

</JtAonµia~)

a-ram~ apxi'Jv AaµfJavo'IJaa (</J'Yjµt oi'J WV

varEpov }..aµfJavEt Eripav rwv KaKwv

airiav, ri'fv rwv auxmat,ovrwv npo81Jµiav, wanEp

Ei~

€;1v Epxoµivwv aiJrwv

wv

47

50

oi yap €v Tai~ no}..w1 npoaTavTE~ µETa bvoµaw~ €KaTEpot dmpEnofJ~,
n}..ij()ov~ Tf iaovoµia~ no}..mKf/~ Kat aptaWKpaTia~ aw<f>povo~ npoTtµfjafl,
Ta µ'fv Ko1va }..fJyq> BEpanefJovTE~ aB}..a €nowvvw, navTt o'f Tpimq>
aywvt~OµEVOI (x}..}..fj}..wv j{fptyiyvwBat ETOAµ'fjaav TE Ta OflVOTaTa fj{fgqaav
TE Ta~ nµwpia~ ht µEi~ov~, ob µ€xp1 wv 01Kaiov Kat Ti/ noAfl f,vµ<f>opov
npor:tBfru~' f~ Of TO lxaT(pot~ nov aft i]oovijv €xov bpi~ovu~' Kat F/ µETa
tpfJ<f>ov aoiKOV KaTayvwafW~ F/ XflPl KTWµfVOI TO Kpauiv froiµot ~aav TYJV
aiJTiKa <f>1}..ov1Kiav €KmµnAava1.

49 nEptyEvfoBat i 51 npoT18€vu~ secl. Arnold
K Dionysius, Ilfp/ 0ovK., p. 894 Kruger Stahl Bohme Romilly
r:t8€vu~ i
i]oovijv afi c f 52 KaTayvWOfW~ secl. Herwerden
53
<f>1Aov1Kiav Stahl Herwerden Classen/Steup Jones Romilly
</>tAOVflKiav cet. et
Bekker Goller Poppo Kruger Bohme Arnold EKmµn}..avm A B E F G H K d
f Bekker Goller Poppo Kruger Stahl Herwerden Bohme Arnold Classen/Steup
Jones Romilly EKmnAavm e €µmn}..avat L 0 P g vulgo €µn1µn}..avm
47

noAtTtKWV L 0 P

npoan8€vu~

46.

µET' bvoµaw~ EimpEnofJ~ . . . npoT1µfjafl] iaovoµia noAmKfj and

ap1awKpar:ia aw<f>pwv are the political slogans used by each party. That n}..fj()ov~
iaovoµia noAmKfj is in place of the offensive OYJµOKpaTia and aptawKpaTia aw<f>pwv

in place of the offensive b}..1yapxia as Poppo and others assert is open to debate (p.
143). Thucydides is surely, however, making a distinction between the noble words
and the nefarious deeds of the party leaders.
noAtTtKij~]

47.

subjective genitive.

"implies the relation of citizen to citizen, that is, of equal with equal, as

opposed to ownoTtKfJ or rnpavv1Kfj" (Arnold p. 458).
iaovoµia~

n}..ij()ov~]

and

aptawKpaTia~.

48.

ux Kotva]

nponµfjafl] governs

the commonwealth.

49.

€nEgf;wav u] u'x~ Ttµwpia~ imuTaµ{va~ inoiovv (Scholiast). Poppo and Arnold

place a comma after u because they think €nEf,f;wav

Ta~ Ttµwpia~

are surely wrong, cf. I. 70. 7. 2 and V. 100. 1. 4.

50.

not Greek. They

µ€xp1] correlative with

48
€~.

51.

npoTt0€vu~]

those who read

metaphor. From €nE;-f;wav to

bpit,ovu~

npom:10€vr:E~

miss the point of the

runs the metaphor of setting up and

surpassing physical boundaries. npor:i&Yjµ1 is commonly used to mean setting up a
mark (L.S.J. 3b);

npoaTL0€vu~,

rejected.

1/JiJ</>mJ aoiKOV

w<f>d.ia~,

KTWµEVOI.

µEr:a

line 39.

52.

therefore, spoils the metaphor and should be
Kar:ayvwafw~]

XflPi] vi, L.S.J. IV.

see above, µETa TWV Kftµfrwv voµwv
TO Kpauiv] direct object of

49
55

60

wau EVaEffriq, µ'Ev oiJOi:upo1 i:voµtl;,ov, Ev:rtporEiq, o( J...oyo11 oi~ g11µf3ai1J
i::rtuf>Oovwq ii Ota:rrpa;aa0at aµflVOV ~K01JOV. Ta Of µfoa TiiJV :rtOAITWV v:rr'
aµ<f>ori:pwv i7 Oil ov ;11vrJywviCovTO i7 <f>Oovq> TOV :rtEplftVat Olf</>BEipovw.
LXXXIII. OVTW :rraaa iOi:a KaTEGirJ KaKoipo:rriaq Ola Taq araaE1q i<{>
• EAArJVtK<{>, Kai TO EV1J0E~, ov TO yEvvaiov :rrJ...{iawv µET EX fl, KarayEJ...aaB'fv
iJ<f>aviaB'fj, TO Of aVTlifiaxBm aJ...kf]J...01q if} yvwµr; a:rriarw~ i::rrl :rroJ...v
Otf/VEYKEV.

54 Eimi:{3flav d J...oywv N V
cd f
59 avuifxxBm F H

55 riiJv :rroJ...1r1KiiJv i::rr' g

57

KaKo:rtpayia~

54. EiJ:rtpE:rtfiq.] "quibus autem contigisset, ut speciosa oratione utentes aliquid
invidiose (nefasti quid) perpetrarent, melius audiebant" (Poppo p. 144). It is better

to take fV:rtpE:rtfiq. with aµEtVOV

~K01JOV,

I believe, as Kruger does, "Das [fimpE:rtfiq.

with ota:rrpagaaBm] zerstort den Gegensatz, welcher erfordert: der Religiositat
bedurfte es nicht; bessern Ruf als sie schaffte eine beschonigende Darstellung
gehassiger Thaten" (Kruger p. 76).
~Ko11ov]

55.

i:m<f>Oovw~]

invidiose.

aµflVOV

past general condition: whoever happened to accomplish anything detestable

had a better reputation by specious rhetoric.

neither faction.

ra 0€ µfoa] the people allied with

56. <f>Oovcp wv :rtEptEivm] "weil die Parteien ihnen nicht die

ungefahrdete Existenz und Ruhe g6nnten" (Classen/Steup p. 171).

58. TO

EV1JOE~]

TO d:rrJ...ovv and ro d:rrtivrJpov. arJµfiwam ro EV1J0E~ i::rrl KaJ...ofJ (Scholiast). "Daher

wird unsere Stelle von den spatern Grammatikem (Photius, Moeris, Thomas Mag.)
als charakteristisches Beispiel der ursprunglichen Bedeutung hervorgehoben"
(Classen/Steup p. 171).

aJ...J...fJJ...01q TYJ yvwµr; a:rriarwq] as opposed to TO
:rtEOiq>.

59. ro 0€ avT1uraxBa1

:rrJ...Eiarov] adverbial.
Of

CtVilifiaxBm aJ...J...fJJ...01~ i:v

i::rrl :rroJ...v 01fJvEyKEV] KpEfrwv iyivETO (Scholiast).

50
ov yap ~v b otaJ...vawv OV'l'f J...oyo~ £xvpo~ OV'l'f opKo~ cpofJEpo~' Kpfiaaov~ Of
OV'l'f~ lm:avif~ J...oywµ{p E~ il) av€J...mawv WV {JE{Jaiov µi'f nafJ{iv µaJ...J...ov
np0110Kon01w Pj ntarEvaat Mvvavw.

61

oiaJ...vrrwv d
63 Mvvaw C

61. b otaJ...vawv]

11

iaxvpo~

df i

62

J...oywµoi K

Gewohnlich faBt man b oiaJ...vawv als Pradikat auf (vgl. Kr., Spr.

50, 4, 4). Aber dann wiirde angedeutet, daB zwar weder
¢o{JEpo~,

amawv Rauchenstein

aber etwas anderes

J...oyo~ £xvpo~

noch

opKo~

ootaJ...vawv gewesen ware, was doch ganz und gar

nicht die Meinung des Th. gewesen ist. Es ist daher notwendig, ein attributives
Verhaltnis von oiaJ...vawv zu ovTE
.

¢o{3Epo~

J...oyo~ £xvpo~

KTE. anzunehmen und b otaJ...vawv .

WV {JE{Jaiov] variously interpreted. The Scholiast writes,
w'i~ J...oywµoi~ npo~

ro µi'f

EJ...ni~Etv

µaJ...J...ov, '1va µi'f naOwatv avw't
11

KpEiaaov~

als Subjekt anzusehen 11 (Classen/Steup p. 172).

pE7COVif~

ovTE~

...

OE oi av0pw7COL

rtva nianv Kai {JE{JatbirJTa npoEvoovvw

KaKW~.

7CIO'l'fVOat OE OVK Mvvavw. II Dobree says,

Sensus est, Argumentis et jurejurando minime moti.

KpEiaaov~ OVif~

11

0€

11

Thus he understands,

iWV }..bywv Kat iWV opKWV (quoted in Arnold p. 459). Stahl

interprets wv {JE{Jaiov as Pj rip fJE{JaiqJ and cites Cassius Dio, fragment 49,

ytyvoµEvot 11 (p. 152). Classen/Steup, with whom Gomme agrees, offer 11 vielmehr

trafen alle, wenn sie starker waren (als die Gegner), in ihrer Uberlegung mehr fiir
die (oder im Hinblick auf die) Aussichtslosigkeit des festen Bestandes von Wort und
Eidschwur Vorsorge, nicht zu Schaden zu kommen, als daB sie ... 11 (p. 172).
Dobree's interpretation requires the reader to supply too much. Stahl and

51
Classen/Steup's interpretations may be right, but I incline more toward the
Scholiast's. I take Kpfiaaov<; OVTf<; ).oywµiij together: those stronger in respect to

intelligence. This interpretation requires that I.:<; be translated independently and that
it mean in view of or on account of or simply in. For the first two meanings, cf. II.
40. 4. 5 and VII. 63. 3. 8. 9. For the last, cf. I. 3. 4, I. 15. 3. 1, I. 32. 4. 3, II.
65. 7. 8, and VII. 21. 2. 4. What all commentators miss is that Kpfiaaov<; ovTf<;
).oywµiij is opposed to oi <fJ<1v).07:fpo1 yvwµ'Yjv. Thus there is an extended chiasm: (A)
Kpfiaaov<; ovTf<; ).oywµiij; (B) oi <j>avAoTfpOL yv6Jµ'f/v; (B) wAµrJpw<; npo<; dx 'fpya
l:xwpovv; (A) a<J>paKWl µfx).).ov Olf</Jfkipovw. This interpretation makes 7fl01:fVOat
Mvvavw more trenchant and ironical since those who µ~ naO{iv µfx).).ov
npowKonovv

r, ntaTfVOat Mvvavw actually did not foresee (npoataOfoOat), but

were destroyed. This interpretation also preserves the word/deed dichotomy, found
throughout Thucydides, and at work here. The more intelligent relied on their ability
of foresight to protect them from harm and were thus inactive. The less intelligent,
because of their acknowledged inferiority, acted first and thus succeeded.

52
65

70

75

Kat oi ¢av}.irnpot yvwµ17v wr; Ta lCAfiW 1Cfplfyiyvovw. Ti{> yap OEOti:vat TO
Tf m)Twv €v0€€r; Kai To Twv €vavTiwv £vvETov, µiJ Aoyotr; Tf fJaaovr;
Kai
fK TOV lCOAVTponov aVTWV Ti/<; yvwµ17<; ¢0aawat npoEmfiov}.rnoµEVOt,
TOAµ17pwr; npor; Ta 'Epya f xwpovv. oi o( KaTacj>povofJvur; Kav npoawOfoOat
Kat 'Epyqy OVOEV a¢ar; &iv AaµfiavftV a yvwµQ 'E£wnv, acj>apKTOt µaAAOV
Olfcj>0Eipovw. LXXXIV. fV o' ovv Tf; KEpKilpf! Ta lCOAAa aVTWV
npovwAµ'f/01], Kat bnoaa vfipEt µ<:v apxoµEVOL TO nAfov ~ awcj>poavV'l'J vno
TWV Ti/V nµwpiav napaaxovTWV oi avTaµvvoµfVOt opaaftaV, ltfViar; OE Ti/<;
Elw0viar; ana}.,).a£fiovTf:<; TtVf<;, µaAtaTa o' av Ota na()ovr; (m()vµofJVTf<; Ta
TWV nf:}.ar; EXELV, napa OlKYJV ytyvwaKOlfV, oi Tf µiJ fltt 1CAfOVf£if!, ano iaov
OE µaAWTa €movur; anatOfVOi<! opyfJr; lCAflOTOV fKcj>EpOµfVOL wµwr; Kat
anapatTfjTW<; fltfAfJOtfV.

wat

nAEiw] noJ..J..a Q 67 npoawfJwvT g npoaiafJwOat B F
68 'Epyqy
}.,oyt~oµEVOL wr; OVOfv h
OflV om. Q 69 KopKilpf! Herwerden
70
bnoa' av Hude
71 Ti/V om. K d e 72 TLVf<; f Schol. Bekker Goller

64

Poppo Kruger Stahl Herwerden Bohme Arnold Classen/Steup Jones Romilly
µaAtaTa av B Q
73 oiKrJ<; P

nvar; A B C E F G H K L 0 P b e g
ano TOV iaov H L 0 p d

64.

TO

Tf

(vavTiwv.

aiJTWV fVOfE<;] Ti/V EAAffl/JtV Ti/<; yvwOEW<; (Scholiast).

69.

66.

avTwv]

Ta lCOAAa aVTWV] the majority of these things. Most think aiJTWV

refers to the 'Epya of the preceding paragraphs, but Ta lCOAAa avTWV anticipates its
protases imoaa ... opaaEtaV, ytyvwaKOlfV, and fltfAfJOtfV. Notice that while fV

o'

ovv Tf; KEpKilpf! is specific, the optatives are generalizations. In fact the paragraph

becomes progressively more general from sentence to sentence: the next sentence
contains a gnomic aorist (MfJAwaEv); the next is a present contrafactual conditional
sentence; and the last has a future most vivid protasis and a present general
apodosis.

onoaa] relative adjective used correlatively with noAA a (i.e., as many

as ... of these things the majority ... ). onoaa is the direct object of opaaftav,
ytyVWOKOlfV, and fltfAfJOtfV.

70.

apxoµfVOt] passive, not apxfJfvTf<; because

53
Thucydides is generalizing.

ro n).fov] µdAAov.

Because of µa}..wra o' av ota

naOov~ €m0vµovvTE~

71.

opaaflaV ... EJ'l0.. 00lfV]

ra rwv ni}..a~ EXflV napa oiKrJV

y1yvwaKOlfV, Poppo wishes to understand av with opaaftaV, y1yvwaKOlfV, and
€ni}..0otfv. bnoaa, however, introduces a relative future less vivid conditional

clause; av by rule, therefore, should not be present in the protasis (Kuhner/Gerth
Satzlehre I, #6A p. 255 and Smyth 2566). The condition, of course, is mixed (future
less vivid protasis with an aorist indicative apodosis). At times Thucydides seems to
use av to strengthen µa}..wra cf. I. 76. 4. 2, VI. 22. 1. 15, VI. 49. 3. 1, and VI.
57. 3. 5. Thus I think it best to take av with µa}..wra not ytyVWOKOlfV or
f-mOvµovvTE~.

72.

01a naOov~] not passionately, as most understand the phrase

and, as a result, reject because it cannot have had this meaning before Aristotle, but
arising from, or as a consequence of, their suffering.
y1yvwaKolfv]

napix oiKrJV

"beschliej3en, sich vorsetzen" (Classen/Steup p. 174).

article, not the relative pronoun, modifying
participle.

73.

f-movTE~.

µ~]

oi] the

generic with attributive

ano iaov 0€ µa}..wra €movTE~] "are those who enter into revolutions on

an equality with their adversaries--not as oppressed men thirsting for vengeance, nor
as needy men desiring plunder--and whose cruelties are owing merely to the fury of
party spirit which they acquire in the course of the contest" (Arnold p. 461). 74.
anatof1Jaiq,] incontinence.

Jl'AftOWV] adverbial.

54

80

£vvTapaxBivnH; Tf wv f3iov (~ TOV Katpov wvwv TfJ :JlOAfl Kat TWV voµwv
Kpar:fwaaa ~ avBpwnfia ¢vat~, fiwBvia Kat napa WV~ voµov~ llOLKflV,
aaµEv'f} (oi}AWOfV aKpaTij~ µ'Ev bpyij~ ovaa, Kpfiaawv Of WV OLKaiov,
:JlOAfµia Of WV npovxovw~. ov yap av WV Tf baiov TO nµwpfiaBat
npovTiBwav wv u µij aotKfiv To Kfpoaivflv, (v cl> µij j3)..fxnwvaav iaxvv fLXf
TO ¢0oVflV. a£wvai Tf WIJ~ KOLVOV~ :llfpl TWV WLOVTWV oi avOpwnOL voµov~,
a¢' WV anaatv Uni~ V:JlOKflTat acjJaAflat Kav avwv~ owa(pl;,wBat, (v
aJ...J...wv TLµwpiat~ npoKaTaAVflV Kat µij bno)..finw{}at, fl :JlOTf apa TL~
Ktvovvfvaa~ nvo~ bff]afTat aiJTWV.
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82

78.

u om. L 0 P 77 KpaTf]aavTa C f'iWBf d i aotKfiV Kat aaµEv'f} i
npoKaTaAVOflV Q
Kai CE e
83 (x)..J...<p p Q

Mf]J...wafv] gnomic aorist.

ixKpaTij~,

Kpfiaawv, and no)..fµia] predicate

adjectives with ovaa, the verb in indirect discourse.
upon the prefix of npovTiBwav.
80.

79.

WV

Tf

baiov] dependent

TO nµwpfiaBat] direct object of npovTiBwav.

npovTiBwav] note the change in subject from ~ avBpwnfia ¢vat~ to an

unspecified third person plural.

(v c{> µij] ft µi'j (v wvT<p [xpi>v<p] (Poppo/Stahl p.

156). The condition is present contrafactual.
npoKaTaAVflV and µi'j vnoJ...finwOat.

complementary with a£wvat.

83.

81.

voµov~]

direct object of

npoKaTaAvfLV and µi'j vnoJ...finwOat]
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The following translation renders the Greek as literally as possible, to facilitate
understanding and to clear up any confusion the notes have failed to eradicate.

So rawly did the stasis advance, in fact it seemed worse since it was the first.
When later all of Greece, so to speak, was convulsed, there were struggles on both
sides: the leaders of the people striving to invite in the Athenians and the oligarchs,
the Lakedaemonians. For in peace time having no reason, nor being prepared, to
call them in . . . but being at war and there being an alliance to each side for the
purpose of harming the enemy and likewise benefitting themselves, invitations were
readily available to those desiring revolution. Many and difficult indeed are the
things which assault cities during stasis, things which are happening now and always
will as long as human nature remains the same though they be sometimes worse,
sometimes milder, and different in form as each chance variation asserts its force.
For in peace and prosperity, cities and individuals have better judgement on account
of not falling into unwilling necessities; but war, taking away the facility of daily
life, is a forceful teacher and assimilates the tempers of the majority to their present
circumstances. Thus cities and men were in stasis, and those afflicted later, because
of their knowledge of previous occurrences, carried further forth the excess of
inventing both in the ingenuity of their assaults and in the uniqueness of their
retributions. They interchanged the accustomed value of words in relation to deeds
as they saw fit. For brash temerity was considered bravery engendered by love for
the party; forethinking hesitancy, specious timidity; prudence, a veil for the coward;
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intelligence toward everything, delay for everything; mad haste was added to the
traits of manliness; planning for safety, a nice sounding excuse for turning tail. The
violent man was always trusted, his gainsayer always suspect. The successful
plotter, intelligent; the suspecter of one, fearsomer; if one planned ahead so that he
might need none of them, he was a subverter of the party and struck with fear of the
enemy. In short, the man anticipating one about to do evil was praised, as was the
man who ordered one not intending. In fact even kinship was more alien than
partisanship because of the latter's being readier to dare without excuse; for these
relationships existed not with customary legal gain but contrary to the established
laws for the sake of greed. They sealed their pledges to one another not by divine
sanction but by shared transgression. The opposition's noble overtures were received
by the stronger party with a guard against his actions not with nobility. It was worth
more to avenge someone in turn than never to have suffered. If oaths of
reconciliation ever came about, being given to each other in the immediacy of the
moment on account of an impasse, they remained strong while neither side had
power from elsewhere; when able to act, the one who dared first, if he saw the
other unguarded, exacted revenge all the sweeter on account of the trust than if he
had acted openly because he planned safely and because, having triumphed through
deceit, he also won the contest of wits. For the majority when knaves are much
more easily called clever than when ignorant they are called honorable; they are
ashamed of the one but exult in the other. The cause of all this was rule through
greed and ambition, and from these, the desire of those in love with triumph. For in
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the cities, the leaders, each with his own fine slogan, the people's political equality
or the prudent aristocracy, looking after the state in word, set up contests, and
vying in every way to surpass one another, dared the most dreadful deeds, went
after ever greater vengeances, not setting their endpoint at a place just and beneficial
to the city but making their boundary that which always gives pleasure to each, and
acquiring power either with an unjust vote's condemnation or by force, they were
prepared to sate their immediate desire for victory. Neither side considered anything
with reverence, but whoever happened to do anything liable to provoke jealousy, by
a specious speech he obtained better repute. Neutral citizens were destroyed by both
sides either because they did not join the contest or from envy of their survival.
Thus every form of wickedness was established on account of the staseis in
Hellas, and simplicity, of which nobility has the greatest share, was laughed into
oblivion, but an aligning against one another in mutual distrust thrived; for there
was neither a secure word nor a fearful oath to create a reconciliation, but because
of their despair of safety, the more intelligent were guarding against suffering more
than they were able to trust. The weaker in intellect succeeded most often; for by
fearing their own deficiency and their enemy's intelligence lest in planning they be
defeated and on account of the cunning of his intellect be plotted against first, they
boldly advanced to action. The former, contemptuously thinking that they would
foresee any threat and that it was hardly necessary for them to take by action what
they could by intellect, were rather often caught off guard and destroyed.
The majority of the following things were dared for the first time at Kerkyra,
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as many things as men might do in retribution if ruled more with arrogance than
with temperance by those providing punishment; as many things as men might
resolve upon contrary to justice if they desire to be rid of their accustomed poverty,
and especially if on account of their suffering they are eager to possess the things of
their neighbors; and as many things as men not after profit, but advancing from a
state of equality [with their neighbors], and being impelled mostly by uncontrollable
passion, might go after rawly and inexorably. When life is in turmoil during this
critical time in the city, human nature, reigning over laws, accustomed to do wrong
contrary to them, happily shows that it is unable to control its passion, stronger than
justice, and inimical to its superior. For they would not prefer vengeance to piety,
profit to propriety unless at this time jealousy had harmful force. Men think it
worthwhile in their attacks upon others to destroy utterly the shared laws concerning
these sorts of things, by which every one in trouble has hope that he may be saved,
and they do not leave them intact if ever someone in danger needs one of them.

CHAPTER 3
EXEGESIS OF III. 82-84

III. 82-84 is significant because it contains Thucydides' own views on war,
stasis, human nature, and society. Thucydides is not giving a bald narrative of
events, during which he assumes an objective pose that makes it difficult to discern
his own opinion. 1 He is not writing from the perspective of one of the History's
speakers. 2 His analysis is written on his own authority. The insights, thoughts, and
opinions are his alone.
In this regard the excursus on stasis is not unique. For example, in the

archaeologia and in the description of the plague, Thucydides also speaks directly to
his reader. 3 But because of its content the stasis excursus differs from these two.
The archaeologia is both a defense of the Peloponnesian War's preeminence and an
explanation of Thucydides' thoughts on power. In the description of the plague,
Thucydides' concern is to describe its symptoms and its effects on the Athenians.

1

See the introduction of R. Connor, Thucydides (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1984).
2

Even if the speeches are Thucydides' own creations, one cannot assume that
the insights and opinions they contain are Thucydides' own.
3

0f course authorial statements are made throughout the History, and I think a
worthwhile study would be to collect these statements and to analyze them with the
aim of establishing a picture of Thucydides' views.
59
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The stasis excursus is different because it examines human nature and society under
the pressure of war and stasis; its content is the same as the focus of the History
proper. It is for this reason that this analysis is so crucial: the conclusions drawn
from it should have important consequences for understanding the History in
general. But before leaping into the rest of the History, I must first explicate these
three chapters. Thus in this chapter the focus is the style, structure, content, and
purpose of III. 82-84.

STYLE
Since antiquity Thucydides has had the reputation for being one of the most
difficult of writers to comprehend. 4 His prose, often tortuous and at times nearly
incomprehensible, can also be clear and straightforward. The disparity in ease of
comprehension between pure narrative and detailed descriptions, speeches, and
diagnostic evaluations is great. The pure narrative is as readable and comprehensible
as Hemingway, the others can be as difficult as Finnegan's Wake. This difference in
Thucydides' style is seldom recognized. 5 Rather than seek to answer why
Thucydides' two prose styles differ so greatly, critics generally have been content
with either condemning the style as a whole or with criticizing the more complex

4

See Cicero, Orator, 9. 30; Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, X. 1. 73; and
Hermogenes, I1Epi 1onvv J..oyov, 2. 12. 155.
5

Exceptions include Dionysius of Halicarnassos, I1Epi 0m11C110fom1; H. J. Rose,
A Handbook of Greek Literature: From Homer to the Age of Lucian (New York:
E.P. Dutton & Co., INC., 1960), 304; and A. Lesky, A History of Greek
Literature, trans. by James Willis and Cornelis de Heer (London: Methuen & CO
LTD, 1966), 480.
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passages. For example, Collingwood calls the

styl~

"harsh, artificial, repellent," and

says that it is a result of a "bad conscience. "6 Dover writes that "[Thucydides was]
not always sufficiently self-critical to read what he had written with the eyes of
someone who could not know what train of thought had run through the writer's
mind. "7
Limiting his criticisms to certain passages, Dionysius of Halicarnassos, a Greek
rhetor and historian of the first century B. C., criticizes in particular the style of
Thucydides' analysis of civil strife, Book III. 82-84. 8 Dionysius writes,

a Of Toin:ou;

E7r:t</Ji.pfl, OKOAta Kai ovanapaKOAOVffr/Ta Kai Ta~ TWV
axYJµm:taµwv n)..oKa~ aoA0tKo<jJavEi~ €xovTa Kai ovu wi~ KaT' EKEivov Tov
{Jiov yEvoµivm~ E7r:tTYJOf1J0EvTa o1Ju wi~ vaTEpov, ou µaAtaTa F/KµaaEv fJ
no)..1rnci] ovvaµ1~.

The passages that follow these [the account of the stasis at Kerkyra] are
contorted, hard to follow, and contain ungrammatical weavings of figures,
[figures] that were not used by writers of that time nor by those of later times
when political ability was at its peak. (Ilfpi E>omc1JOioov 29)
Pointing out the faults of this section, Dionysius goes so far as to show how
Thucydides could have improved some of his more complex sentences, had he
written them differently. Struck also by the difficulty of Ill. 82, a modern scholar,

6

R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946),

29.
7

K. J. Dover, Thucydides, Greece and Rome New Surveys in the Classics,
No. 7 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 13.
8

Also criticizing this passage, A. Andrewes writes that there is "some reckless
paradox in the celebrated chapters on stasis." A. Andrewes, "The Mytilene Debate:
Thucydides 3.36-49," Phoenix 16 (1962): 74 n. 25. Quoting Andrewes, S.
Hornblower writes that the passage "has justly been said to contain some 'reckless
paradox'." S. Hornblower, Thucydides (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1987), 75.
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Williams, attributes it to the chapter's "almost certainly mutilated text. "9
But critics like these are to be feared the least. Worst are those with pen in
hand who, like the well-meaning editor who corrected the misspellings in Twain's

Huckleberry Finn, think that Thucydides cannot possibly have written the words
before them and think themselves obliged to put his sentences into proper Greek.
One editor, Herwerden, makes no fewer than fourteen emendations over the course
of the three pages that this passage runs. 10 But rather than emend like Herwerden
or criticize like Dionysius, Dover, and, Collingwood, I think it preferable to ask
what makes a given passage complex and to ask why Thucydides chose to make it
so.
In reply to the first question I propose that one of the things that make this
passage so complicated is its high rhetorical style. Thucydides polishes every
sentence with figures, many used multiple times. Some of these figures simply serve
to heighten the solemnity and grandeur of the passage, that is, they mark the passage
as different from the ones written in Thucydides' plain prose style. But they do not
add appreciably to the passage's complexity. Having made this qualification, I do
think that the totality of the figures present in this passage adds something to the

9

M. F. Williams, "Two Traditional Elements in Thucydides' Corcyrean
Excursus," The Classical World 79 (1985): note 1 p. 1. As support he cites Gomme,
A Historical Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford: 1956), 372-73. It need hardly be
said that Gomme makes no such assertion. What Gomme says is that the second
sentence of Chapter 82 cannot stand in its present form as what Thucydides wrote.
For a full discussion on this sentence see my comments in Chapter 2.
10

Herwerden, ed., 0owcv0io011 Svyypa</nj (Utrecht, Holland: 1877-1882).
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complexity of the whole. What follows is a list and explication of the figures present
in III. 82-84. The figures that do not strain comprehension precede those that do.

HENDIADYS
Thucydides breaks one phrase into two (hendiadys):
no}..}..(x Kat XaAE:JCa

many and difficult (III. 82. 2. 1)
not

many difficult. 11

CLIMACTIC WORD ORDER
He arranges cola so that each successive phrase is longer than the next
(climactic word order):
(1) µfx}..}..ov 0€ Kai (2) ijavxair:Epa Kai (3)
3)

wl~

EtoWt otrJAAayµf.va (III. 82. 2.

and
(1) aB}..a €nowfJvw; (2) f-rbAµ'fjaixv 'ff r:a Of.tvbr:ar:a; (3) E:TCEgqaav u r:a~
r:1µwpia~ f.r:t µEi~ov~; ( 4) fr:o'iµo1 ~aav r:ijv aiJr:iKa ¢1)..ovtKiav EK:TCtµn}..fxvm.
(III. 82. 8. 6)

ALLITERATION
At III. 82. 3. 1,
for.aaia~i IE ovv r.a r.wv !!..OAEwv, Kat r.a €1J_var.Epi~ovr.a !Im' !Ivar.EL r.wv

!lfJOYEVoµivwv !J..OAV f!J._EdJ_EpE r.i'Jv V!J..Ep{JoAijv r.ofJ KatVofJaBat r.a~ otavoia~ r.wv

r.' f!!..lXELPfJaEWV !J..fPl!.fXVYWfl Kat r.wv r.tµwptWV ar.o!J..LC!,

11

The hendiadys, I think, sets a lofty tone similar to that set by Lincoln's
writing "four score and seven years ago" instead of 87 years ago.
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Thus cities and men were in stasis, and those afflicted later, because of their
knowledge of previous occurrences, carried further forth the excess of
inventing both in the ingenuity of their assaults and in the uniqueness of their
retributions,
pi's and tau's 12 pile upon themselves just as ingenious impropriety proliferates.

ASSONANCE
Thucydides uses assonance to emphasize an antithetical thought:
wan: fVOE/friQ µfv ovMupOL lcvoµt,OV, EiJ1Cp€1CflQ Of Aoyov oiq E,vµ{JairJ
Em<j>Oovwq Tl Ota1CpaE,aa0at aµELVOV !f/K01JOV

Neither side considered anything with reverence, but whoever happened to do
anything liable to provoke jealousy, by a specious speech he obtained better
repute. (III. 82. 8. 12)

JUXTAPOSITION
To heighten contrast, he juxtaposes words:
ro E,vyyEvf: q r:ov hmptKov (x}..}..orpuiJTEpov

kinship than partisanship was more alien. (III. 82. 6. 1)

CHIASM
At other times he uses a chiastic arrangement:
(A) pqov o' oi 1COAAOL KaKovpyot OVTff;' OEE,wl KfKA'YJVTat
Kat (B) rq> µfv aiaxvvovrat, (A) E1Cl Of rq> ayaAAOVTat.

r, (B) aµaOEtq ayaOoi,

(A) For the majority when knaves are much more easily called clever than (B)
when ignorant they are called honorable; (B) they are ashamed of the one but
(A) exult in the other. (Ill. 82. 7. 10)

HYPALLAGE
He changes the relation of words so that men fall into unwilling necessities

12

Though grammatical necessity accounts for a number of the tau's, l do not
think it strong enough to dismiss the alliteration.
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instead of falling unwillingly into necessities:
Ota TO µi'j (q iucovaiovq avayKaq :rri:rrntv. (III. 82. 2. 6)

ANTITHESIS
Or he makes esteemed vice antithetic to despised virtue:
TOAµa µf.v yap aJ..iJytawq avopEta </>tAfratpoq (voµiaOrJ, µ(AA1]atq Of
:rrpoµ17()i'jq OftAia c:iJ:rrpc::rrfJq, TO Of awifJpov WV avfxvopov :rrpoax17µa, Kat TO
:rrpot; a:rrav ;1JVfTOV f:rfl :rrav apyov. TO o' lcµ:rr'AfjKTWt; b;v avopoq µoipq
:rrpoaETfOr/' aaifJa'Ac:iq Of TO E:rrtfiov'AevaaaOat a:rroTpo:rrfjq :rrpoifJaatq c:v'Aoyoq.
Kat O µf.v xaJ..c::rraivwv JTWTOt; aic:i, O o' avn'Aiywv aiJTii; v:rro:rrwq.
lcmfiov'Aevaaq M Ttt; wxwv ;vvffoq Kat iJ:rrovofJaaq 'frt oflvonpoq ·
:rrpof3ov'Aevaaq Of o:rrwq µ17of.v aiJTWV oc:fjafl, Tfjt; Tf i:Tatpiaq OtaAVTi'jt; Kai wvq
lcvavTiovq fKJTfJTA17yµ€voq. a:rr'Awq Of b <j>Oaaaq TOV µiAAOVTa KaKOV Tl opav
f:rf1JVftW, Kat b f:rrtKEAevaaq TOV µi'j otavoovµc:vov. Kat µi'jv Kat TO ;vyyc:vf.t; WV
fl"atptKOV a'AAoTptWT<:pov lcyivffO Ota TO fl"0tµOT<:pov dvm a:rrpo<j>aaiaTwq
WAµav· oiJ yap µffa TWV KflµfVWV voµwv wifJ<:Aiaq ai WtaVTat ;vvooot, a'AJ..a
:rrapa wvq Ka0wTiinaq :rr'Awvc:;ig,.

For brash temerity was considered bravery engendered by love for the party;
forethinking hesitancy, specious timidity; prudence, a veil for the coward;
intelligence toward everything, delay for everything; mad haste was added to
the traits of manliness; planning for safety, a nice sounding excuse for turning
tail. The violent man was always trusted, his gainsayer always suspect. The
successful plotter, intelligent; the suspecter of one, fearsomer; if one planned
ahead so that he might need none of them, he was a subverter of the party and
struck with fear of the enemy. In short, the man anticipating one about to do
evil was praised, and the man who ordered one not intending. Indeed even
kinship was more alien than partisanship because of being readier to dare
without excuse; for these relationships existed not with customary legal gain but
contrary to the established laws for greed. (III. 82. 4. 2)

Notice that the structure is haphazard: that what, in an ethic of peacetime, would be
despised--a vice--and what, in an ethic of peacetime, would be valued--a virtue--are
not regularly opposed but rather a single vice (TOAµa µf.v yap a'Aoywwq avopc:ia
ifJt'Afrmpoq lcvoµiaOrJ) opposes three virtues (µ€'A'A17att; Of_ :rrpoµ170i'jq OflAia
c:iJ:rrpc::rrfJq' TO Of awifJpov WV avavop011 :rrpoax17µa' Kai TO :rrpoq a:rrav ;1JVETOV f:rft
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nav apyov); next comes a combination of vice (ro o' (µnAfjKTW<;

o;v avopo<; µoipq.

npooEriffr/), virtue (ao<j>aAEiq. o( ro €mf3011).Evoao8a1 anorponfJ<; npo<j>aat<;
EVAoyoc;), vice (Kai 0 µ(v xaAE7Taivwv moroc; aiEi), virtue (o o' llV'l'tAiywv avrii,)
vnonwc;); then come two vices (€mf301JAEVOa<; Of 'l't<; rnxwv ;vvaoc; Kat imovofjoac;
'frt OEtVOTEpoc;) followed by a virtue (npof3o1JAEVOa<; o( 'bnwc; µ'f]OEV avrwv &fjaEt,
rfjc;

TE

f'l'atpiac; otaAVTYJ<; Kat wvc; €vavriovc; EK7TE7TA'f]Yµivoc;); and finally two more

vices (a7TAW<; Of

o <j>Oaoa<; rov µ€).).ovra KaKOV 'l'l opav f7T1JVEiW,

Kat

o E7TlKEAEVOa<;

'l'OV µi'j otavoovµEvov) against a virtue (Kat µi'jv Kat 'l'O ;vyyEv(<; WV f'l'atptKOV
{x).).orptwTEpov EYEVEW Ota 'l'O fWtµorEpov ElVat anpo<j>aoiorwc; w).µav).

Throughout this passage, Thucydides shuns regularity and parallelism.

INCONCINNITY
In fact the rhetorical device Thucydides uses most frequently in the analysis is
inconcinnity, i.e., a deliberate skewing of sentence structure or a deliberate
avoidance of parallelism and regularity. 13 At III. 82. 1. 5, for example, the
prepositional phrase (v JlfV EtpfJv1J: in peace is answered by the participle
7TOAEµo11µ€vwv: being at war instead of by a parallel prepositional phrase Ev o(
no).iµo;: in war. At Ill. 82. 8. 15 the conjunction 'Ort: because is answered by the

dative case of the noun <j>Oovo;: from envy,
µEra l/JfJ<f>ov aoiK01J KauxyvwOEW<; Pj XEIPl KTWµEVOt, O'l'l ob ;vV'f]ywviCovw Pj
pOovw wv nEptEivat

13

For a detailed examination of this figure, see J. G. A. Ros, Die µaa{Jo).fJ
(Variatio) als Stilprinzip des Thukydides (Paderborn: 1938; reprint, Amsterdam:
1968).
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Neutral citizens were destroyed by both sides either because they did not join
the contest or from envy of their survival.
What makes this next sentence so difficult is the coordinate use of Kai and or:t:
EV OE Tl{> napawxovr:t b <j>Oaaa~ Oapafjaat, fi iOot a<j>apKWV, YJOIOV Ota TTJV
niaTtV htµwp{iw fJ ano WV npo<j>avov~' Kat TO Tf aa<j>aJ..€~ Uoyi~fW Kat OTI
anaTYJ 7rfptyfVOµfVO~ ;vVfaf(l)~ aywvtaµa npoaEJ..aµ{JaVfV.

When able to act, the one who dared first, if he saw the other unguarded,
exacted revenge all the sweeter on account of the trust than openly for he
planned safely and because, having triumphed through deceit, he also won the
contest of wits.
The parallel use of these two different words is so difficult because Kai's most
common meaning is and not for and because Kai is not usually coordinated with OTt.
In the sentence,
ToJ..µa µ'Ev yap aJ..oyww~ avopEia </>tAfratpo~ €voµia&rJ, µi:J..J..YJat~ OE
Of/Ala ebnpEnfJ~' TO Of aw<j>pov WV avavopov npoaxrJµa' Kat TO
npo~ anav ;vvETOV Ent nav apyov
npoµYJ(}Tj~

For brash temerity was considered bravery engendered by love for the party;
forethinking hesitancy [was considered] specious timidity; prudence [was
considered] a veil for the coward; intelligence toward everything [was
considered] delay for everything, (Ill. 82. 4. 2),
€voµia&rJ from the first colon must be supplied to the subsequent three cola. In the

next sentence,
TO o' lcµnJ..fJKT(l)~
€mfiovJ..evaaaOat

o;v avopo~ µoipq, npoaETE&r/,

aa<j>aJ..fiq, Of TO

anoTponfJ~ npo<j>aat~ d1J..oyo~

mad haste was added to the traits of manliness; planning for safety [was] a nice
sounding excuse for turning tail,
Thucydides introduces a new verb, npoaET€fff/: was added to. As in the previous
sentence, he omits the verb in the next colon. As before the reader expects to supply
the verb expressed in the first colon, npoaET€&rJ, to the subsequent colon; but the
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reader is thrown off balance: not npoaer:i.Jh7 but the verb Eivat, to be, must be
supplied. Greek permits the omission of the verb, Eivm; in doing this there is
nothing remarkable. What is remarkable is the deliberate skewing of sentence
structure: the reader's expectations are not met.
At III. 82. 6. 1, Thucydides similarly confounds the reader's expectations,
Kat µYjv Kat To ;vyyEvE~ wv f1:mptKov (x}..}..oTptwnpov EyivEw 01a To
f1:0tµoupov Eivm anpoif>aaiOTW~ w}..µfxv

In fact even kinship was more alien than partisanship because of being readier
to dare without excuse,
What is readier to dare without excuse? The grammar of the sentence says kinship,
but the sense demands partisanship. One finds this disruption, this inconcinnity,
confounding the structure of many sentences of the passage.

ANACOLOUTHON
A rhetorical device similar to inconcinnity is anacolouthon, which is not an
avoidance of parallel sentence structure but an actual breakdown in the grammatical
structure of the sentence. The first colon, (III. 82. 1. 5),
Kat EV µ€v EipfJvr; OlJK av EXOVTWV npo¢aatv ovo' f1:oiµwv napaKaAf'iv aiJwv~ .

For in peace time having no reason, nor being prepared, to call them in .
lacks a main verb. When you read the whole,
Kat EV µ€v EipfJvr; OlJK av EXOVTWV npo¢aatv oM' Ewiµwv napaKaAflV aiJwv~,
JrOAfµovµivwv OE Kat ;vµµaxia~ aµa EKaTipot~ Ti/ TWV Evavriwv KaKWOfl Kat
a¢imv aiJwi~ EK wv airr:ov npoan0tfJaE1 pq,oiw~ ai Enaywyal wi~ vEwnpi,EtV
n {Jov}..0µ€v0t~ Enopi,ovw

For in peace time having no reason, nor being prepared, to call them in .
but being at war and there being an alliance to each side for the purpose of
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harming the enemy and likewise benefitting themselves, invitations were readily
available to those desiring revolution,
the lack of a main verb in the first part of the compound sentence makes the
transition between the two abrupt.
ELLIPSIS
Although there are surely more rhetorical devices Thucydides employs in this
passage, the last I wish to discuss is ellipsis, which Smyth defines as "the
suppression of a word or of several words of minor importance to the logical
expression of the thought, but necessary to the construction. "14 For example,
an}JiJ~

OE b <f>Oaaa~ TOV µiA.A.ov-ra KaKOV
-rov µi'j 01avoovµEvov

Tl

opav E:Jt'QVELW, Kat b E:JtlKEAEVOa~

In short, the man anticipating one about to do evil was praised, and the man
who ordered one not intending (III. 82. 5. 5),
and the man

What is the main verb?
one not intending

What is he not intending?
With the suppressed parts added, the sentence becomes comprehensible, and
the man who ordered one not intending to do evil was praised.

The ellipsis of the next example is even harsher:
EV Of -rt{> napa-rvxovn b <f>Oaaa~ OapafJaat, Ei Wot a<f>apKWV, f]owv Ota TfJV
:JtlOTtV htµwpEtW Fj a:Jto WV npo<f>avov~' Kat TO TE aa<f>aA.€~ Uoyi~EW Kat OTt
a:JtaT'YJ :JtEptyEVOµEVO~ g1JVfaf.W~ aywvwµa :7tpOOEAaµ{JaVEV.

14

H. W. Smyth, Greek Grammar (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1920), 677-78.
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when able to act, the one who dared first, if he saw the other unguarded,
exacted revenge all the sweeter on account of the trust than openly, because he
planned safely and because, having triumphed through deceit, he also won the
contest of wits (III. 82. 7. 6).
The ellipsis,

~

ano WlJ npo<J>avovr;' is short for: than he would have if he had

attacked openly. Far from suppressing words of minor importance, Thucydides

almost crosses the boundary of comprehensibility.

III. 82-84 is an example of Thucydides' high prose style. When contrasted with
the straightforward syntax of the following three examples of Thucydides' plain
prose style, the deliberate distortion of III. 82-84's syntax becomes more apparent.
The three selections are chosen from Books I, IV, and VII. Their selection is based
upon my own subjective opinion of what represents Thucydides' plain prose style.
The first is from I. 89, the beginning of the Pentekontaetia:
Oi yap •A&rfvaio1 rpimqJ w1(i;of ~}J}ov €nl ra npayµara €v oir; r[b;ij&rJaav.
fltflOi/ MfJoot aVfXWPYJOav EK rfjr; EiJpW7tYJr; VtKYJflfvur; Kat vavat Kat 7tfC4> iJno
· EA.J...ijvwv Kai oi Kara<J>vyovur; aiJrwv rair; vavatv €r; MvKaAYJV Olf</>OapYJaav,
AEwwxioYJr; µ'Ev b {JaatJ...Evr; rwv AaKEomµoviwv, oanEp ~yfiw rwv €v M11KaA1J
• EJ...J...ijvwv' altfXWPYJOfV flt' oiK01J EXWV wvr; ano IlfA07tOVVtJ001J ;11µµaxo11r;'
oi Of • A&rfvaiot Kat oi ano • Iwviar; Kat • EAAYJ07tOVT01J ;vµµaxo1 'f/O'f/
a<j>WTYJKOTfr; ano {JaatJ...iwr; iJnoµfivavur; ~'f/OTOV f7t0At0pK01JV Mijowv
€xovrwv, Kat €mxflµaaavur; EiJ...ov ailriJv EKJ...movrwv rwv {Jap{Japwv, Kai
µEra WVTO aninJ...rnaav f; . EAAYJ07tOVT01J wr; €Kaaw1 KaTa 7t0Aflr; .
. A&rfvaiwv Of TO KOIVOV, fltflOi/ avwir; oi {Jap{Japot EK rfjr; xwpar; anfJJ...Oov,
OlfKOµiCovw fiJOVr; o8fv iJnf;iOfVW naioar; Kai ywaiKar; Kat riJv 7tfpwvaav
KaTaaKwfjv, Kat riJv 7tOAIV avotKoooµ{iv napwKrnaCovw Kat Ta TflX'fJ. TOV Tf
yap ltfpt{JbJ...011 {Jpaxia flOTijKfl Kat oiKiat ai µ'fv ltOAAat f7tf7tTWKWav, /JJ...iyat
& 7tfp1fjaav, €v air; aiJwl €aKijvwaav oi owawl rwv lIEpawv.

For the Athenians in this manner came into the circumstances by which they
grew. When the Medes, bested by the Greeks on land and sea, left Europe and
when those of them who fled by ship to Mykale were destroyed, Leotychides
the Spartan King, who was the Greeks' general at Mykale, departed for home
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with the allies from the Peloponnese. The Athenians and the allies from Ionia
and the Hellespont who had already revolted from the King remained and
besieged Sestos, held by the Medes. Having wintered there they took it, the
barbarian departing, and afterwards sailed from the Hellespont, each going to
his own city. The Athenian state, since the barbarians had departed their land,
immediately brought back whence they were placed their children and women
and belongings, and prepared to rebuild the city and its walls; only a bit of the
perimeter wall still stood and the majority of houses were trammeled, but a few
survived in which lived the Persian commanders.
Though the style is compact, few words can be said about this passage's
rhetoric. There is climactic word order:

na70a~

Kat yvva'iKa~ Kat rijv :JtfpwfJaav

KaTaOKfvf]v. And there is an ellipsis: w~ <xaawt Kara :JtOAfl~. But the ubiquity of

this phrase in the History argues more for calling it an idiom like a}..}..oq a}..}..o
ypa<j)fl (one man writes one thing, another writes another) than a figure. Finally it

is of some interest that Thucydides considers the singular ro Kotvov plural. Although
my eyes may have missed something, these are the only figures I find present in this
passage.
For the next two passages I present the text of both first with my comments on
each following:
'Ev bf rt{> (movrt Xflµwvt ra µfv 'A&rJvaiwv Kai AaKfoatµoviwv i]avxa~f
01a rijv EKfXflpiav, Mavr1v~~ of Kai Tfyfarat Kai oi £vµµaxo1 €xadpwv
£vv€jJa}..ov Ev AaoooKfi<p T~q 'OpwOiooq, Kat VlKrJ aµ¢1of]p1w~ EYfvfTO.
K(pa~ yap (xaupot rp(tpaVTf~ TO Ka()' <X1JTOV~ rponala Tf aµ¢oupot for17aav
Kat OKVA<X (~ ~fA<j)m}~ an(:Jtfµtpav. 01a¢Oap(vrwv µEvTOl :JtOAAWV fKaT€pot~
Kai ayxwµfx}..ov Tfj~ µ<XX1J~ yfvoµ(V1]~ Kat a<j)f}..oµ(v17~ VVKTO~ TO f_pyov oi
TfyfaTat µfv (n1711}..iaavro Tf Kai f:vOV~ for17aav rpona7ov, Mavrtvfj~ of
anfxwp17aav Tf (~ BovKOAtWVa Kai vaupov avrfor17aav.

During the ensuing winter the Athenians and Spartans remained quiet on
account of the armistice, but the Mantineans and Tegeans and allies of each
clashed at Laodokion in the Oresthid. And victory was uncertain; for each
routed the wing before him and both set up trophies and sent spoils to Delphi.
Many on each side having perished and the battle undecided and night having
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cut short the action, the Tegeans encamped and set up a trophy forthwith. But
the Mantineans departed for Boukolion and set up their trophy later. (IV. 133)
Kat r:avr:rJ µ'Ev r:f; iJµipq. 7tpoEJ...0ovu~ ar:aoiov~ w~ r:waapaxovr:a YJVAiaavr:o
AO</>qJ r:tVt oi 'AO'Yjvaiot. r:fJ o' 1)aupaiq. 7tp~ E:ltOpfVoVW Kat 7tpofJJ...Oov
W~ fLKOat ar:aoiov~, Kat Kar:i:f3rJaav E~ xwpiov a:JtfOOV r:t Kat avr:ov
Ear:par:o:Jtfofvaavr:o, f3ovJ...oµEvo1 'EK u r:wv oiK1wv J...a{3fiv r:t Mwo1µov (wKfir:o
yap b xwpo~) Kat vowp µfr:a a<f>wv avr:wv <f>i:pwOat avr:o0fv. EV yap r:4J
7tpoa0fv E:Jtl :JtOAAa ar:aota, 'EµfAAOV ii:vat, OVK a<f>Oovov l]v. oi Of "2:.vpaKOatOt
EV r:ovr:qJ 7tpoEJ...0ovu~ r:i]v oiooov r:i]v EV r:<{I 7tpoa0fV a:JtfT:fLXl~OV. '1v Of J...o<f>o~
Kapupo~ Kai EKar:i:pwOfv avr:ov xapaopa Kp'YjµVWOYJ~' EKaAflW OE 'AKpaiov
7tpo~

ti

J...i::Jta~.

T'l'J o' vaupaiq. oi 'AO'Yjvaiot 7tpof;aav, Kat oi r:wv "2:.vpaKoaiwv Kat
;vµµ<xxwv avr:ov~ t:Jt:Jtfj~ Kai aKOVr:tar:al OVT:f~ :JtOAAOt (xar:i:pwfkv EKWAVOV Kat
EarJKOVT:l~OV T:f Kat :Jtapi:Jt:JtfVOV. Kat xpovov µ'Ev :JTOAVV Eµaxovr:o oi 'AO'Yjvaiot,
E:Jtflr:a aVfXWPrJaav :JtaAtV E~ r:o avr:o ar:par:o:JtfOOV. Kat r:a E:Jttr:fjofla ovlcfrt
bµoiw~ ftXOV. oiJ yap fr:t a:JtOXWPflV oiiJv r:' qv imo r:wv t:Jt:JtfOJV.

And on this day having advanced about forty stades, the Athenians encamped
on a certain hill; on the next day at dawn they began their march and advanced
about twenty stades, and descended into a plain and there made camp, wishing
to take some edibles from the homes (for the place was inhabited) and to bring
along with them some water from there; because for many stades ahead, where
they were to go, it was scarce. During this time the Syrakusans advanced and
walled off the road ahead for there was a steep hill and a rocky ravine on both
sides of it, called the Akraeon cliff.
On the next day the Athenians advanced, and the Syrakusan and allied horse
and spearmen, being many on both sides, hindered them and hurled their spears
and charged their horses. And for a long time the Athenians fought, then
returned back to the same camp. But the situation was no longer the same; for
it was no longer possible to depart on account of the horse. (VII. 78. 4-6)
In the first passage climactic word order occurs again:

Mavr:tvfJ~

O'f Kai

Tfyf<ir:m Kai oi ;vµµax0t EKar:i:pwv, as does an ellipsis: oi TEyfar:m µ'Ev
f:ltYJVAiaavr:o

r:f

Kai dJ01}~ f:ar:rJaav r:po:Jta'iov, Mavr:tvij~ OE a:JtfXWPrJaav

r:f f~

BoVKOAtwva Kai var:Epov avr:f:ar:rJaav, neither of which is remarkable or difficult.

The second passage is more interesting.
The ellipsis of i]µi:pq. at 4. 3 and 6. 1 is common. Of more interest are the
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hyperbaton and paronomasia Thucydides employs. Reflecting the enemy's
surrounding of the Athenians, Thucydides places

avr:ov~

in the midst of the

Syrakusan and allied horse and spearmen: T1J o' iJaupaiq, oi •A&Yjvaim npofJaav,
Kat oi TWV ~vpaKoaiwv Kat £vµµaxwv avr:ov~ innfJ~ Kat aKOVTtaTat OVTf~ JrOAAOt
ixadpw8Ev i:KwAvov Kat

f:arJKOVTt~ov TE

Kat napinnrnov. And contrasting the

sameness of the landscape with the difference of their situation, Thucydides plays
with the similarity in meaning between

(:~

TO aVTO and oµoiw~: Kat xpovov µ'fv

JrOAVV i:µaxovr:o oi . A&Yjvatot, fJrftTa ixVEXWPrJaav naAtV

(:~

TO avTo aTpaTOJrfOOV.

Kat Tix fJrtTfjowx OVKETI oµoiw~ Eixov. ov yap ht anoxwpElV OLOV T' ~v vno TWV
inniwv. Though this last passage is more rhetorical than the other two, its figures

facilitate, rather than hinder, comprehension.
These examples of Thucydides' plain prose style, I think, make it more
apparent that high rhetorical style is one of the things that make III. 82-84 so
complex. But I return to my second question, still unanswered. Why did Thucydides
choose to write the passage in this way? Why the predominance of inconcinnity and
why employ such harsh ellipses if both cause the reader much pain, trouble, and
confusion? Is it because Thucydides had a "bad conscience" as Collingwood
suggests? Is it as Dover argues that he was not always sufficiently self-critical? Or
is it, as Herwerden, our well-meaning editor, thinks, that Thucydides cannot have
written such ungrammatical Greek? I think none. I hold that what we have is what
Thucydides wrote, that the rhetoric of this passage is in good conscience, and that it
is indeed quite critically polished. I suggest that by employing a contorted style
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Thucydides is attempting to reflect the chaos rampant in a city afflicted by stasis.
For him the horrific subject matter prohibits the use of simple, straightforward
language. If he is to communicate the atrocities of stasis at all, it is through
complexity not simplicity. Thus the rhetorical figures, especially inconcinnity and
ellipses, so jar and confuse the reader that he experiences the helplessness felt by
stasis' victims. This feeling of helplessness can excite criticisms like those above.
But once a deliberate purpose makes the chaos meaningful, the complexities invite
the reader to reflect rather than to reject.

STRUCTURE
In the broadest sense, Thucydides organizes III. 82-84 in a ring. He begins by
saying that the stasis at Kerkyra was worse than the others because it was the first
(npwr:'f/) and ends with the statement that the Kerkyraeans used these sorts of

passions first

(npwr:at~)

against one another (III. 82. 1 and III. 85. 1). Another

general structural feature of the passage is that Thucydides tends to make a
statement, either general or specific, and then either to state his reason(s) for making
the assertion or to provide support for it.
At III. 82. 7, for example, he writes that partisans received their opponents'
peace overtures with a guard against his deeds not out of nobility. The reason why
follows, lxvr:mµwpijaaaOai r:i: r:tva nEpt nA.Eiovo~ ~v ~ aiJr:iJv µi'j nponaO{iv (it was
worth more to avenge someone in turn than never to have suffered). At III. 82. 8 he

writes,
nfxvr:wv o' aiJr:wv a'lr:wv apxi'J ~ Ota JT:AEOVE;iav Kat </>tAOr:tµiav, fK
Kai €~ r:o <j>tA.ovtKEiv KaOtar:aµi:vwv r:o np0ff1Jµov

o'

aiJr:wv
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The cause of all this was rule through greed and ambition, and from these, the
desire of those in love with triumph,
and proceeds to give evidence for this assertion,
oi yap €v rai~ nbA.wt npoaravu~ µEra bvbµaw~ EKarEpot eimpEnofJ~ .

For in the cities, the leaders, each with his own fine slogan ...
Though not invariable, reason or support following statement is the basic building
block of the passage.
Of structural interest also is Chapter 84's echoing of the first four sentences of
Chapter 82. Both begin with generalities concerning stasis and end in two gnomic
sentences that attempt to explain the phenomenon. Combining this observation with
the loose ring structure of the whole, one could argue for the schematic: A B ... B
A. But under the microscope such a reduction would prove just tenable. 15

15

Contrary to these assertions, J. R. Ellis argues for the authenticity of III. 84
by proposing that ring composition structures the entire passage. J. R. Ellis "The
Structure of Thucydides' Dissertation on Stasis and the Authenticity of 3.84." J. R.
Ellis, Electronic Antiquity 1 (July 1993): 1-7. He breaks the analysis into three
circular structures, primary, secondary, and tertiary, with ring being placed within
ring like the pattern of a pin-wheel. His primary structure reduces the paragraphs
into the following schema:
A 82. 1-3, Human nature was responsible for this first dreadful stasis.
B 82. 4-7, The civilized virtues were replaced by their opposites.
C 82. 8, Greed and ambition subordinated all public good to the lust for
power.
B' 83, The civilized properties were scorned and abandoned.
A' 84-85. 1 Human nature overcompensated for misfortune in this first
stasis. (p. 1)
Ellis' schematic teems with oversimplification and inaccuracy. Thucydides
does not say that "human nature [is] responsible for this first dreadful stasis." Rather
he condemns human nature and war. Even if you wish to call hesitancy (µ€A.kqat~),
prudence (TO aw<j>pov), intelligence (TO ~1JVfTOV), planning for safety ( aa<j>aA.Ei17 Of
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In addition to these structural observations, the content of III. 82-84 argues for
dividing the passage into four sections. The first runs from ovTwq wµfJ to Twv
1:1µwp1wv awniq. and forms a ring. Its first sentence,
OVTOJq wµi'] < iJ > aTaatq npovxwpYJOE, Kai 'foo£E µfx}..}..ov, otim EV wiq 7rpWTYJ
EYfvEW, ElrEl vaupbv YE Kai nav wq EilrElV TO • EAAYJVIKOV EKtvfJBrj, ota</Jopwv
oiJawv EKam:axov wiq TE TWV ofJµwv npoaTaTatq wvq • Affr]vaiovq E7rayw0at
Kai wiq b}..iyotq wvq AaKEOatµovio11q

So rawly did the stasis advance, in fact it seemed worse since it was the first.
When later all of Greece, so to speak, was convulsed, there were struggles on
both sides: the leaders of the people striving to invite in the Athenians and the
oligarchs, the Lakedaemonians,
provides a transition from Thucydides' narrative of the events of stasis on Kerkyra
to his analysis of the phenomenon in general. The second,
Kai Ev µ€v EipfJvu oi1K av Exovr:wv npb</Jaatv oM' fr:oiµwv napaKaAE'iv aiJwvq,
7rOAEµovµ€vwv Of Kat £vµµaxiaq aµa EKar:fpotq TfJ TWV EVaVTlOJV KaKWOEI Kat
a<jJiatv ain:oiq EK wv aiJwv npoanotfJOEt pq.oiwq ai Enaywyal w'iq vEwupi~Etv
1:1 f3ov}..0µ€vo1q Enopi~ovw

For in peace time having no reason, nor being prepared, to call them in .
but being at war and there being an alliance to each side for the purpose of
harming the enemy and likewise benefitting themselves, invitations were readily
available to those desiring revolution,

To Emf3ovAEvaaaOa1), vocal opposition (b avTtA€ywv), neutrality (npof3011}..Evaaq bf
onwq µYjo€v ain:wv &fJaEt ), and kinship (TO £vyyEv€ q) civilized virtues, it is not that
they were replaced but rather that they were despised, as I discuss below. The
civilized properties that were analogously scorned and abandoned in Ellis' B' is only
TO EVYJOEq; the main focus of Chapter 83 centers on explaining why distrust
predominated; B', therefore, is not parallel to B. Thus although chapter 84 does
echo the beginning of Chapter 82, what intervenes cannot be molded into Ellis'
circle.
Ellis' secondary and tertiary circles are more forced than this one. For
example, by trying to knock into roundness Thucydides' disquisition on words, he
fails to see that the structure present is antithetical and haphazard as I discuss above.
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attempts to explain why stasis became so prevalent. The third,
Kai EJcfJCWE JCOAAa Kai XaAEJCa Kara aTixatv Talq JCOAWI, y1yvoµEva µ(v Kai
aiEI €aoµEva, EaJq av iJ avTTj </Jvatq avOpwnwv ~' µa).).ov OE Kat i]avxaiTEpa
Kai w7q ELOWI Ol'YJAAayµi:va, wq av (xaaTat ai µETa/Jo).al TWV ;vvrvx1wv
€</JtaTWVTat

Many and difficult indeed are the things which assault cities during stasis,
things which are happening now and always will as long as human nature
remains the same though they be sometimes worse, sometimes milder, and
different in form as each chance variation asserts its force,
prophesies stasis' continual recurrence, and the fourth offers a reason why:
EV µ(v yap Eipf]v11 Kai ayaOolq npayµaatv ai TE JCOAEtq Kai oi iOtii>Tat
aµEivovq raq yvwµaq 'fxovat Ota TO µTj €q aKovaiovq lxvixyKaq JCtJCTEIV. b OE
JCOAEµoq V</JEAWV TTJV EVJCOpiav WV KaO' i]µi:pav f3iawq otoixaKaAoq Kai npoq
ra napovra raq bpyaq rwv no).).iiJv bµowl

For in peace and prosperity, cities and individuals have better judgement on
account of not falling into unwilling necessities; but war, taking away the
facility of daily life, is a forceful teacher and assimilates the tempers of the
majority to their present circumstances.
Finally returning to stasis in Hellas, the fifth sentence,
€araaial;€ TE ubv ra rwv no).Ewv, Kai ra €¢11aTEpil;ovra nov nvaTEt rwv
npoyEvoµ€vwv JCOAV fJCf</JEpE TTJV VJCEpj3o).Tjv TOV KatvovaOat raq otavoiaq TWV
r' fJCIXEtPfJOEWV JCEptTEXVf/OEI Kai TWV TtµwptWV awniq,

Thus cities and men were in stasis, and those afflicted later, because of their
knowledge of previous occurrences, carried further forth the excess of
inventing both in the ingenuity of their assaults and in the uniqueness of their
retributions,
completes the ring. 16 The schema is:
A Stasis in Hellas
B Why
C Stasis' recurrence

16

note.

This is the only of Ellis' rings that I am in total agreement with. See prior
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B Why
A Stasis in Hellas
Notice also that for the first four statements reason follows statement.
The rest of Chapter 82 makes up the second section. Its focus is the perversion
EV'fJOE~

of the value of words. The third section, Chapter 83, mourns the loss of TO
(simplicity) and the predominance of

To amawv (distrust).

Finally evils that the

oppressed, the indigent, and those impelled mostly by uncontrollable passion
perpetrate; human nature; and the destruction of voµot are the subjects of the fourth
section, Chapter 84. What unites the whole is the thread of a change from an ethic
of peacetime to one of war and stasis.
It seems that as we read the three latter sections the situation moves from bad

to worse. In the first of these three sections, laws though transgressed are still in
existence (Ill. 82. 6. 2). Likewise, though perverted,

7CLar:El~

(pledges) and

opKOl

(oaths) offer some remembrance of stable society (Ill. 82. 6. 5-82. 7) as does the
pretense of holding a vote (III. 82. 8. 10). Finally, in this section an appearance of
rectitude remains important. In fact the leaders are at pains to justify their actions
(Ill. 82. 8. 12). Though at the end of Ill. 82 stasis has reduced the city to a place
where

~

Eva€/frta (piety) is absent and ~ Evnp€nEta )..oyov (the fair-seeming word)

reigns, a semblance of stable society can still be seen.
In the next section, TO

EV'fJOE~

is laughed into oblivion and the city becomes a

battlefield of distrust upon which the less intelligent more often kill the more
intelligent. One has the sense that all pretense to propriety is gone. This sense is
confirmed when we move on to the last section.
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In this section we see what the oppressed, the poor, and those of an
uncontrollable temper can do. Revenge, gain, and malevolence take over and men
destroy their only savior, voµot. Gone are all societal constraints and along with
them the need to justify actions. The analysis culminates in chaos and anarchy.
In step with the breakdown of societal constraints is the movement from the
actions of the leaders to those of the individual. Chapter 82 is largely concerned
with cities, that is, with the striving of factions and their leaders to gain ascendancy.
Chapter 83 divides the populace into two groups, the more and the less intelligent.
Private individuals are the concern of Chapter 84. As we move from the factions
and leaders to private individuals, stasis and men destroy values, trust, and finally
laws. Though these three stages overlap and though their occurrence may be more
synchronic than diachronic, Thucydides does seem to portray them as a parade of
horribles, each worse than the last.
CONTENT
Thucydides has two main concerns in the analysis. He takes pains to show how
society changes from an ethic of peacetime to an ethic of war and stasis and to offer
some explanation for why this change occurs. In his explanation, he reflects upon
human nature and the effect the pressure of war has upon it. He also considers other
contributing factors.
Implicit to his reasoning is a belief in the constancy of human nature, 17
!Wt brbrWf Jro}..J.a Kat XaA€7ra Kara araOLV ra'ic; 7rOAWL, y1yvoµfva µ'fv Kat

17

See I. 22. 4.
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aift fooµEva, EW<; av iJ avr:ij </>VOi<; avOp<iJJrwv ~' µaJ...J...ov Of Kai fjavxai·npa
Kat Wt<; flOWL Ol'YJAAayµiva, w~ av f:Kaar:at al µEr:a{JoJ...al r:iiw ;vvr:vxuiw
E</>LOTWVTat.

Many and difficult indeed are the things which assault cities during stasis,
things which are happening now and always will as long as human nature
remains the same though they be sometimes worse, sometimes milder, and
different in form as each chance variation asserts its force.
Not only is human nature a constant, but impropriety is inherent in it. Thucydides
gnomically states that the majority is ashamed of being honorable dolts but delights
in being clever rogues (III. 82. 7. 10). He also says that conquering laws, human
nature is accustomed to transgress them (III. 84. 2. 1).

It is in this context that the effect of war upon the psyche must be understood.
War presents the opportunity for upheaval,
Kat EV µ€v EipfJvu OVK av EXOVTWV npo<j>amv ovo' Er:oiµwv napaKaJ...{iv avwv~,
noJ...EµmJµf.vwv 0€ Kat ;vµµaxia~ lxµa €Kari.poi~ r:fJ r:wv Evavr:iwv KaKWOft Kai
a<j>iatv avwi<; EK WV aiJWV npoanotf/Ofl pq.Oiw<; ai Enaywyat Wt<; VfWTfpil;ftV
r:t {JovJ...oµivot~ Enopil;ovw.

For in peace time having no reason, nor being prepared, to call them in .
but being at war and there being an alliance to each side for the purpose of
harming the enemy and likewise benefitting themselves, invitations were readily
available to those desiring revolution.
(III. 82. 1. 5)
But war does not change human nature; rather it assimilates it to present
circumstance. Like a chameleon human nature darkens in the presence of war,
EV µ€v yap fipfJvu Kat ayaOoi<; npayµaatv a'l Tf 7f0Afl<; Kat oi i01wr:at
aµfiV<m<; r:a<; yvwµa<; rxovat Ota TO µij E<; aKovaiov<; avayKa<; ninutv. 0 Of
noJ...Eµo~ iJ<j>fAWV r:ijv fVnopiav WV Ka(}' fjµipav {Jiato<; OtoaaKaAO<; Kai npo<;
r:a napovr:a r:a<; bpya<; r:wv noJ...J...wv bµowi.

For in peace and prosperity, cities and individuals have better judgement on
account of not falling into unwilling necessities; but war, taking away the
facility of daily life, is a forceful teacher and assimilates the tempers Of the
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majority to their present circumstances.
(III. 82. 2. 5)
This dark side of human nature is constantly present. Placed in a crisis like stasis, it
happily shows that it is unable to control its passion, stronger than justice, and
inimical to its superior (III. 84. 2. 1).
Of course the cause of stasis is not so easily explained. In addition to human
nature's propensity to err and the pressure of war, there are other factors that
contribute to stasis' outbreak. Greed, love of honor, and desire all play their part
(III. 82. 8. 1). Jealousy, which destroys those who wish no part in the fracas and
which lies at the root of vengeance and cupidity, is another factor (III. 82. 8. 16 and
III. 84. 2. 5). Finally oppression, poverty, and an inability to control passion must
also be accounted for (III. 84. 1).
Thucydides' consideration of all these factors gives one the sense that he is not
attempting an exhaustive definition of stasis and its origin. Rather by recognizing
circumstance and human nature, his explanation shows the difficulty of trying to
explain human behavior. By offering many general causes, his explanation embraces
the multifarious factors that impinge upon behavior.
When we turn our attention from human nature to the change from an ethic of
peacetime to one of war and stasis, we see that the technique Thucydides uses to
communicate the change is to contrast the new ethic with the old. In stasis men
value daring, unthinking, reckless, quarrelsome, intimidating action, but despise
prudent, forethinking, intelligent thought (III. 82. 4-82. 6). This section, Ill. 82. 46, is the one most often referred to by those who comment on the whole excursus
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and also the one least understood.
It is least understood because in the sentence,
Kat rr,v Eiw&v'iav agiwatv TOJV bvoµarwv €c; ra 'fpya avrfj)..}..agav riJ OlKatWOEI

They interchanged the accustomed value of words in relation to deeds as they
saw fit (III. 82. 4),
agiwatc; is usually mistranslated. agiwatc; is commonly understood as meaning.

Proctor, Wilson, and Worthington all argue correctly that it is not the meaning of
words that was changed but their values. 18 It is precisely because words kept their
meanings that such a perversion of language was possible. Although Wilson rejects
his interpretation of the passage, Hogan makes the same argument. Hogan writes, 19
Of course, those who employed avopEia <j>tAfratpoc; to name what was actually
ro}..µa a}..fJywwc; relied (whether consciously or unconsciously) on the high
estimation of avopEia <j>tAfratpoc; in order to carry their points. In this sense
they did not change the estimation of words, but in fact depended on its
remaining the same.
Hogan also suggests that in stasis men considered ro}..µa a}..oywwc; a good thing
and consequently called it by its correct name, a suggestion not at all unreasonable.
For Thucydides' main concern in this passage is the change in ethics, not the
phenomenon of newspeak, that is, of reprehensible behavior made seemly by calling
it something positive or vice versa. Although newspeak is part of the change, it is

18

D. Proctor, The Experience of Thucydides (Warminster, Wilts, England:
Aris & Phillips LTD, 1980), 204. J. Wilson, '"The Customary Meanings of Words
Were Changed'--Or Were They? A Note on Thucydides 3.82.4," Classical
Quarterly 32 (1982): 18-20. I. Worthington, "A Note on Thucydides 3.82.4,"
Liverpool Classical Monthly (Oct. 1982): 124.
19

1. T. Hogan, "The agiwmc; of Words at Thucydides 3.82.4," Greek, Rome
and Byzantine Studies 21 (1980): 146.

83
not all.
For example, of the seven esteemed vices, only r:o).µa aAoywwc; could have
been called by a different positive name (avopEia </>tAfratpoc;). Though r:oAµa
aAoywwc; may have been called avopEia </>tAfratpo<;, the most important point is

that r:o).µa aAoywwc; was seen in a positive light. What concerns Thucydides is the
way behavior was perceived, not what it was called. Similarly when the Kerkyraeans
lobby the Athenians for an alliance, they consider their previous isolationist policy in
a new light,
Kat JtEplfar:rJKEV iJ OOKOVaa i]µwv 7tpoupov aw<j>poavv'Yj' r:o µi'j EV aAAor:piq
gvµµaxiq r:fJ WV JtEAa<; yvwµJ'} gvyKtVOVVEVEIV, vvv ajJovAia Kat aa()frfta
<j>atvoµiv'Yj.

What once seemed the wise precaution of refusing to involve ourselves in
alliances with other powers, lest we should also involve ourselves in risks of
their choosing, has now proved to be folly and weakness.
(I. 32. 4. 4, trans. Crawley)
Just as the Kerkyraeans conveniently change their view of the proper foreign policy,
so Thucydides notes the change in values that occurs in stasis.
This change is seen most clearly in the other vices. r:o o' i:µJtAfJKr:wc; bgv is not
referred to otherwise, but rather it is added to the criteria that determine manliness.
The troublemaker, b xaAE:Jtaivwv, is called nothing; he is simply trusted. Likewise
the plotter, i:m{JovAEvaac;, is intelligent and the suspecter, imovofJaac;, more
fearsome. The preemptor, b <j>Oaaac;, and suborner,

o E:JttKEAEvaac;,

are praised

(E7t1'JVEiw). For six of the seven esteemed vices, the point is not that they were

made to look good by using a positive description, but that the partisans valued
them.
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In the case of the despised virtues, the phenomenon of newspeak is more
prevalent. Party members could have easily disparaged µ0.}..:rJOtc; npoµYJ{)f]c; by
calling it oflAia ebnpEnfjc;. The same can be said for r:o aw<j>pov ( r:ofJ aviivopo1J
npoaxrJµa), r:o npoc; anav /;1JVfTOV (€nl nav apyov), aa<j>a).fiq, Of r:o
€mf3011).fvaaaBat

(anor:pon~c;

npo<j>aatc; eiJAoyoc;), and npof3o1JAfvaac; of- lmwc;

µYJOEV avr:wv Offjafl ( r:~c; Tf fr:atpiac; OtaA1JTY/c; Kai r:ovc; €vavr:io1Jc; fKJlfJlA'f/Yµfroc;)

but not for b avr:1).€ywv (the gainsayer). He is merely suspected. Thus, Thucydides
does concern himself with the phenomenon of newspeak, but newspeak is only one
aspect of the change from an ethic of peacetime to one of stasis. As the passage
proceeds Thucydides explores this change in more detail.
r:o /;1Jyyfv€c; (kinship) loses its consequence (III. 82. 6. 1). niaTftc; (pledges)

are no longer consecrated (III. 82. 6. 5). Peace proposals, r:a Ka).wc; AfyoµEva, are
suspect (III. 82. 7. 1). opKot (oaths) are sealed out of necessity, and it is considered
commendable if by transgressing them one subdues his foe (III. 82. 7. 4 ). The
veneer of the people's political equality (n).fjOovc; Tf iaovoµiac;

no).m~c;)

or the

prudent aristocracy (apwr:mcpar:iac; aw<j>povoc;) puts a nice shine on all of this so
that by a specious word (fv7tpfnfiq, & ).iJyov) the leaders obtain better repute
(aµftVOV

~K01JOV)

(III. 82. 8. 3). fVOf{3fia (piety), r:o fVYJBfc; (simplicity), and r:o

yfvvaiov (nobility) disappear and as a result the city becomes a battlefield of distrust

(III. 82. 8. 12 and III. 83. 1). Finally men destroy their one salvation, voµot (III.
84. 3. 1). In the change from an ethic of peacetime to an ethic of stasis, men
destroy the very values that ensure their existence.
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In addition to contrasting the new ethics with the old, Thucydides uses
metaphor and personification in his effort to communicate the phenomenon of stasis.
At III. 82. 2. 5 Thucydides personifies the city but also recognizes that it consists of
individuals. Thus he writes,
EV µ€v yap EipfJV'l'J Kat ayaOoir:; npayµaatv at u JTOAflt:; Kat oi iotiin:at
aµfiV01Jt:; Tar:; yvwµar:; 'fxovat Ola TOµ~ i:r:; aKmJ<JimJt:; lxvayKar:; JTJJTTflV.

For in peace and prosperity, cities and individuals have better judgement on
account of not falling into unwilling necessities.
The argument is sometimes made that at the beginning of his History, Thucydides
thinks individuals' impact in the political arena negligible, but by the end of the

History, mainly because of Alkibiades, he comes to acknowledge and even to stress
the individual's importance. 20 I think Thucydides recognition of the individual here
and the emphasis he places on the power of Perikles (to say nothing of
Themistokles) provide sufficient evidence for rejecting this view. But at the same
time I do think correct the observation that individuals play a greater role as the

History proceeds. I attribute their greater role to the effect of stasis, not to any

20

H. D. Westlake writes, "In the second half of the History, while Thucydides
continues to attach importance to the reactions of the masses, he seems to have come
to believe that the personality of leading individuals was a much more influential
factor than he had been prepared to acknowledge; that their aspirations and rivalries,
their general qualities of leadership, their success or failure in imposing their will on
other leaders might, and often did, determine the course of history. It may be that
the principal reason for this shift of attitude should be sought in the impression made
upon him by the career of one man--Alcibiades." H. D. Westlake, Individuals in
Thucydides (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 319. Dennis Proctor
writes that "as Thucydides grew older, he moved further away from the sophistic
generalities of his early years of authorship, and became more interested in the
particular things that happened and the individual human beings who brought them
about," (The Experience of Thucydides, 60).
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revolution in Thucydides' thought. As stasis runs its course, the city-state can no
longer function as an individual. Rather individuals' personal pleasures direct it
down their own paths.
Thucydides also personifies human nature. In Chapter 84 human nature,
reigning over laws, accustomed to do wrong contrary to them, happily shows that it
is unable to control its passion, stronger than justice, and inimical to its superior. 21

In his personification of human nature, Thucydides implies that the propensity for
evil is within us all. He notices the different forms this propensity takes, and far
from saying that it will be realized in all of us, he simply remarks its presence. In
her book The War, Marguerite Duras, a novelist and memoirist, gives a more
prosaic and explicit voice to this same notion, 22
This new face of death that has been discovered in Germany--organized,
rationalized--produces bewilderment before it arouses indignation. You're
amazed. How can anyone still be German? ... One of the greatest civilized
nations in the world, the age-long capital of music, has just systematically
murdered 11 million human beings with the utter efficiency of a state industry.
The whole world looks at the mountain, the mass of death dealt by God's
creature to his fellows. Someone quotes the name of some German man of
letters who's been very upset and become very depressed and to whom these
things have given much food for thought. If Nazi crime is not seen in world
terms, if it isn't understood collectively, then that man in the concentration

21

Human nature shows its wicked propensities in an extended chiasm. In the
previous sentence, Thucydides presented the evils that were likely to be perpetrated
by three types of private citizens: oi v{JpEt apxoµEVOl TO JTAEoV aw<j>poavvr;, oi
JTEVim; riji; EiwfJviai; anaJ...J...agEiovrii;' Of µi'f fJTl JTAWVEgiq' and Ix.no 1aov Of
µaJ...wra f mi>Vui; aJTatOEVOiq bpyiji; JTAELOWV fK</>EpoµEVOl. The oppressed (A)
corresponds to inimical to its superior (A); the indigent (B), to stronger than justice
(B); and those of uncontrollable passion (C), to unable to control its passion (C).

r,

22

Duras, The War, in The Norton Book of Modern War, ed. Paul Fussell (New
York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), 516-17.

87
camp at Belsen who died alone but with the same collective soul and class
awareness that made him undo a bolt on the railroad one night somewhere in
Europe, without a leader, without a uniform, without a witness, has been
betrayed. If you give a German and not a collective interpretation to the Nazi
horror, you reduce the man in Belsen to regional dimensions. The only possible
answer to this crime is to turn it into a crime committed by everyone. To share
it. Just like the idea of equality and fraternity. In order to bear it, to tolerate
the idea of it, we must share the crime.
Neither Duras nor Thucydides believes in a pure and innocent human nature.
Just as Thucydides and Duras share similar views on human nature, so it is
interesting that the metaphors Thucydides uses in Ill. 82-84 are the same ones we
use today when discussing war. For Thucydides, war is a teacher of violence,
b Of

JtOAEµo~

npo~

v¢EAWV TYJV Eimopiav WV Ka(}' i]µi.pav
Tix mxpovux Ta~ bpya~ TOW JtOAAWV oµowi.

f3imo~ otoaaKaAo~

Kat

But war, taking away the facility of daily life, is a forceful teacher and
assimilates the tempers of the majority to their present circumstances. (Ill. 82.
2. 7)
It is perhaps his most famous metaphor and indicates clearly that human nature is

subject to the vicissitudes of life. E. B. Sledge, World War II Marine veteran, offers
an example of war's brutal effect upon human nature. Having described an incident
in which a marine extracts gold fillings from the mouth of a wounded Japanese by
slashing his cheeks open to each ear and by prying them out with the point of his
kabar, Sledge writes,
Such was the incredible cruelty that decent men could commit when reduced to
a brutish existence in their fight for survival amid the violent death, terror,
tension, fatigue, and filth that was the infantryman's war ... The fierce
struggle for survival in the abyss of Peleliu eroded the veneer of civilization
and made savages of us all. We existed in an environment totally
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incomprehensible to men behind the lines--service troops and civilians. 23
This incredible savagery of human nature Thucydides emphasizes when in the next
sentence, he continues the metaphor,
f:araaia~i Tf oVV ra TWV :JrOAfWV, Kai ra f<j>1JOTEpi~ovra :Jr01J :JrVOTft TWV
npoyEvoµivwv nokiJ f:Jrf</>fPf riJv imEpf3oA.iJv rov KatvovaBat rix~ Otavoia~ rwv
r' E:JrtXflPfJOfWV 7rfp1uxvfJaE1 Kai rwv rtµwptwv aroniq,.

Thus cities and men were in stasis, and those afflicted later, because of their
knowledge of previous occurrences, carried further forth the excess of
inventing both in the ingenuity of their assaults and in the uniqueness of their
retributions. (III. 82. 3. 1)
In the Funeral Oration Perikles claims that Athens is the school of Hellas. Here
Thucydides asserts that war is her schoolmaster from whom unique and ingenious
violence is learned.
The school metaphor is very much alive in today's war rhetoric and
literature. 24 Battles are "tests of courage" which must be "passed" and from which
one "learns" the appropriate "lessons." Henry Reed, teacher, journalist, author of
popular radio plays, and WWII veteran, recalls the lessons he endured while an
army cadet,
Lessons of the War
to Alan Michell

23

E. B. Sledge, With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and O/anawa (New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 120-21. Sledge gives another example of
the brutalizing-effect of war when he describes the innocent act of his buddy
splashing chunks of coral into a jap's skull, like a child throwing pebbles into a
puddle (ibid., 123).
24

Note also license plates and bumper stickers that declare war their owner's
university.
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Vixi duellis nuper idoneus
Et militavi non sine gloria
I. NAMING OF PARTS

To-day we have naming of parts. Yesterday,
We had daily cleaning. And to-morrow morning,
We shall have what to do after firing. But to-day,
To-day we have naming of parts. Japonica
Glistens like coral in all of the neighbouring gardens,
And to-day we have naming of parts.
This is the lower sling swivel. and this
Is the upper sling swivel, whose use you will see,
When you are given your slings. And this is the piling
swivel,
Which in your case you have not got. The branches
Hold in the gardens their silent, eloquent gestures,
Which in our case we have not got.
This is the safety-catch, which is always released
With an easy flick of the thumb. And please do not let me
See anyone using his finger. You can do it quite easy
If you have any strength in your thumb. The blossoms
are fragile and motionless, never letting anyone see
Any of them using their finger.
And this you can see is the bolt. The purpose of this
Is to open the breech, as you see. We can slide it
Rapidly backwards and forwards: we call this
Easing the spring. And rapidly backwards and forwards
The early bees are assaulting and fumbling the flowers:
They call it easing the Spring.
If you have any strength in your thumb: like the bolt,
And the breech, and the cocking piece, and the point of
balance,
Which in our case we have not got; and the almond-blossom
Silent in all of the gardens and the bees going backwards
and forwards,
For to-day we have naming of parts.
II. JUDGING DISTANCES
Not only how far away, but the way that you say it

90
Is very important. Perhaps you may never get
The knack of judging a distance, but at least you know
How to report on a landscape: the central sector,
The right of arc and that, which we had last Tuesday,
And at least you know
That maps are of time, not place, so far as the army
Happens to be concerned--the reason being,
Is one which need not delay us. Again, you know
There are three kinds of tree, three only, the fir and
the poplar,
And those which have bushy tops to; and lastly
That things only seem to be things.
A barn is not called a barn, to put it more plainly,
Or a field in the distance, where sheep may be safely
grazing.
You must never be over-sure. You must say, when reporting:
At five o'clock in the central sector is a dozen
Of what appear to be animals; whatever you do,
Don't call the bleeders sheep.
I am sure that's quite clear; and suppose, for the sake of example,
The one at the end, asleep, endeavours to tell us
What he sees over there to the west, and how far away,
After first having come to attention. There to the west,
On the fields of summer the sun and the shadows bestow
Vestments of purple and gold.
The still white dwellings are like a mirage in the heat,
And under the swaying elms a man and a woman
Lie gently together. Which is, perhaps, only to say
That there is a row of houses to the left of arc,
And that under some poplars a pair of what appear to be humans
Appear to be loving.
Well that, for an answer, is what we might rightly call
Moderately satisfactory only, the reason being,
Is that two things have been omitted, and those are important.
The human beings, now: in what direction are they,
And how far away, would you say? And do not forget
There may be dead ground in between.
There may be dead ground in between; and I may not have got
The knack of judging a distance; I will only venture
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A guess that perhaps between me and the apparent lovers,
(Who, incidentally, appear by now to have finished,)
At seven o'clock from the houses, is roughly a distance
Of about one year and a half. 25
The last section of Reed's poem parodies the lectures given on unarmed
combat. The school metaphor also surfaces in song,
High above the Chattahoochee
And the Upatoi,
Stands our noble Alma Mater,
Benning School for Boys.
Salt in Tablets, scorching sun,
Touch your toes on count of one,
Expert, bolo, school solutions,
Phenix City institutions.
Hail to Benning, Hail to Benning,
Follow Me's the cry.
You must use the school solution.
Follow me, or die. 26
(sung to the melody of "Far
Above Cayuga's Waters")
For these writers as for Thucydides, the classroom of war or war as schoolmaster is
ironic and contemptuous. It is ironic because war represents the absence of intellect.
In it men reach the extreme of irrational acts that beggar credulity. Survival and
brutality are the only learning. Because of these ironies, the metaphor cannot help
but paint a contemptuous picture.

25

H. Reed, "Lessons of the War," in The Norton Book of Modern War, ed.
Paul Fussell (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), 318-22.
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Graduation Program, The Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga., April 18, 1944
quoted in P. Fussell, Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World
War (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 60.
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Thucydides employs two more metaphors in his struggle to communicate
human behavior under the pressure of war. In the first, stasis is a contest in which
the one who acts first and deceptively wins the contest of wits (b <jJBaaar; Bapafjam,
fl toot a<jJapKT:ov, fjowv Ota TlJV niaTtV htµwpElW

r, ano WV npo<jJavofJt;, Kat TO TE

npoaEAaµ{JavEv). He continues the metaphor by having the factional leaders actually

make contests (aBJ...a €n0tovvw). aywvwµa and aBJ...a bring to mind both theater
and sport.
In The Great War and Modern Memory, Fussell devotes an entire chapter to
"The Theater of War." He writes that war "is too grossly farcical, perverse, cruel,
and absurd to be credited as a form of 'real life.' . . . A temporary army
consisting of strangers forcibly accumulated will offer constant opportunities for
theatrical artifice--that is, fraud, illusion, and misrepresentation--in its members'
relations with each other. 27 Adapting Fussell's insight a bit, I would argue that it
is war itself that offers the opportunities for fraud, illusion, and misrepresentation. I
think that Thucydides chooses the metaphor precisely because it conveys this notion
of artifice. The metaphor captures the factions' deceptive and unreal striving and
desire for power.
The metaphor of war as theater surfaces again when before the annihilation of
the Athenian troops and while the Athenians and Syrakusans are engaging one

27

P. Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (London, Oxford, and New
York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 192 and 195.
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another in the Great Harbor, Thucydides portrays the supporting ground troops as an
audience watching a play. As the combatant audience, lined along the shore, focuses
its attention on the action, Thucydides details each one's joy, uncertainty, and
horror. The whole episode takes on the appearance of the surreal, especially when
defeated, the survivors are forced to abandon their injured comrades, screaming and
hanging upon their necks (VII. 71 and 75).
In addition to its artificial sense, I think Thucydides chooses the metaphor
because of the contentiousness it suggests. Greek theater was entertainment but it
was also a contest with a victor. Thus, it is both contentiousness and artificiality that
make theater a particularly suitable metaphor.
Sport is also contentious and artificial. For this reason war as sport and sport as
war will always be a persistent metaphor. The National Football League provides
parallels particularly suitable to modern warfare. Players/soldiers are drafted and
must attend training/boot camp. Coaches and generals harangue their troops before
they enter the fray. Plays and orders are sent in from the safety of far off
observation posts. Opponents stare at one another across No Man's Land. Inches of
land are violently fought after, medals of valor proffered. Teammates help the
injured to the safety of the sideline (or behind the lines). Casualties are borne off on
stretchers. Linemen hold the trenches. There are bombs, spearing, traps, blitzes, and
flanking maneuvers.
The outlook of the player and soldier is quite similar. Though neither is
superstitious, both cling to their talismans. Just as the imminence of death forces the
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grunt to live in the immediate present, the player's cliche is that he takes each game
as it comes, never looking beyond. Each also is a firm believer in the unknown, that
incalculable element that plays a role in every game and battle. Because of their
artificiality and contentiousness, the metaphors of theater and sport are particularly
appropriate for attempting to communicate incomprehensible war.
Another metaphor Thucydides uses is the crossing of boundaries,
ov µi:xp1

wv otKaiov Kai

TlOV aft ijoovijv fXOV

rfJ noAEt ;vµ<j>opov nportf}frrfr;, i:r; 0€ ro €xari:p0tr;

opi~OVTfr;

...

not setting their endpoint at a place just and beneficial to the city but making
their boundary that which always gives pleasure to each ... (Ill. 82. 8. 3)
Breaking boundaries is a theme familiar to mythology. Dionysus breaks the
boundaries between the city and the wilds, between man and beast, between nature
and culture. He reminds humanity of its dual nature. Factional leaders, with their
monomaniacal pursuit of personal gain and honor, oxymoronically limit their
striving with the boundary of personal gratification. By doing so they cross the
boundary of civility and limit themselves to savagery.
In his address to Amherst College, Robert Frost suggests that all thinking,
except perhaps mathematical, is metaphor or analogy. 28 If this is so, then by the
metaphors of school, theater, sport, and boundaries and by stating the new ethics in
terms of the old, Thucydides dives deep in his effort to fathom war and stasis.

28

Robert Frost, "Education by Poetry: A Meditative Monologue," an address
given at Amherst College in 1930, in The Norton Reader: An Anthology of
Expository Prose, general editor, Arthur M. Eastman, 7th ed. (New York and
London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1965), 1026-34.
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PURPOSE
As we have seen Thucydides, in his analysis, focuses upon why stasis occurs
and upon the change from an ethic of peacetime to one of stasis. He takes pains to
explain the perversion of values and the loss of force of institutions like pledges,
oaths, and voµOL. As we turn our attention from Thucydides' explanation and
description of stasis to his purpose for writing the analysis, the picture becomes
muddied. One reason is the use and abuse the passage has suffered at the hands of
some scholars.
For a considerable time before John Finley's important works on Thucydides,
many positivists believed in an amoral Thucydides. For them the morality sensed in
III. 82-84 proved a stumbling block that had to be removed. For example, the
amoral positivists Shorey, Cochrane, Adcock, and Woodhead all explain away the
morality they sense in III. 82-84.
Shorey writes,
'Most men,' says Thucydides (111.83), 'more easily submit to be called clever
knaves than honest simpletons; they glory in the one epithet and blush at the
other.' There is a seeming injustice in attributing to Thucydides this feeling of
'the many.' But his protest is couched in language half contemptuous: 'Simplemindedness, a chief element of nobility, was quite laughed down. ' 29
Shorey believes that Thucydides' "half contemptuous" language undercuts the moral
tone of the passage.
Because he bases his entire work upon an amoral, deterministic, and scientific
Thucydides, Cochrane also rationalizes the morality he senses in III. 82-84. At the
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end of his chapter on War and Revolution and right after his comments on III. 8284, Cochrane writes,
To him [Thucydides], as a man of science, the conventional represents
successful adjustment to the more or less permanent physical conditions of life,
and to that extent the normal is the right. The war, by disrupting those
conditions, swept away the norms or standards of conduct painfully erected by
men to meet the conditions of peace, and so gave rise to a problem of suffering
which science can merely note, but which it is the task of philosophy to justify
and explain. 30
Cochrane's scientific Thucydides views the conventional merely as necessary:
morality is purely expedient.
Saying that Thucydides' ethical standards are those of his class, Adcock takes a
similar tack. 31 The class, of course, is the aristocracy; Thucydides' ethical stance
he sums up as,
The city comes first: the interests of the city come first, and whatever does not
serve these interests is a bad thing and not a good. The practice of private
virtue, inhibited by private scruples, if it limits the city's power or disregards
its interests, is dismissed with an ironical, contemptuous phrase. When private
virtues--courage, self-abnegation, honesty, a simple-mindedness that has a
large ingredient of nobility, serve the community, they are highly praised: but
only then. 32
Adcock permits Thucydides' stance some morality, but only the simplest sort, based
on expediency to the city.
Woodhead, however, denies Thucydides' stance any morality. Discussing the

30

C. N. Cochrane, Thucydides and the Science of History (London: Oxford

University Press, 1929), 136-37.
31

F. E. Adcock, Thucydides and his History (London: Cambridge University
Press, 1963), 50.
32

lbid.' 51-52.
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bvoµar:a 1wJ..a, which the Athenians forbade the Melians to use, Woodhead assures
us that Thucydides' stasis excursus does not criticize stasis' causing of moral
debasement,
Thucydides knew that in essence they [bvoµar:a KaJ..a] have nothing to do with
the character of power, and that in the exercise of power there are motivating
factors which have no connexion with them. But the good man looks to a moral
code outside and beyond these; and the bad man, knowing that the phraseology
of the code conveys a 'good' connotation with which he wishes to associate
himself, misuses it for his own ends. It is this misuse which Thucydides
criticises in the Corcyrean stasis; not the conflict itself, which is a natural
process. 33
According to Woodhead the analysis is simply a critique devoid of moral content.
Thus for these positivists, III. 82-84 is merely a stumbling block obscuring their
scientific, objective, rationalistic, amoral view of Thucydides.
Of course such a stance is required of them for their objective Thucydides to
remain standing on the bema of science; for a moral Thucydides is an engaged and
impassioned Thucydides, not a dispassionate recorder of events. Mainly as a result
of the early and controversial work done by Cornford, 34 and the works of de

33

A. G. Woodhead, Thucydides on the Nature of Power, Martin Classical
Lectures 24 (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University press published for
Oberlin College, 1970), 21-22.
34

F. M. Cornford, Thulydides Mythistoricus (first publ. by Edward Arnold,
Ltd., 1907; reprint, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971). In his
book Cornford calls the positivist view of Thucydides the 'Modernist Fallacy' (p.
xi). For him Thucydides is a dramatist rather than an historian. Thucydides, in his
view, has an Aeschylean philosophy of human nature in which Tvx'f/ (fortune or
luck) replaces Zeus, but the tragic passions of ToJ..µa (Daring), IUwv€£ia (Greed),
and UY{Jpt~ (Arrogance) still result in u Ar:rJ (Blindness and Destruction) (Chapter
XIII esp. p. 242).
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Romilly, 35 Finley ,36 Parry, 37 and Stahl, 38 scholars' perception of Thucydides
changes. Although some still believe in the objective scientist, others regard his
work as subjective. 39
For the latter group the result of this change in perception is that they are now
freed from the fetters of objectivity and able to appreciate the literary, emotional,
and dramatic elements of Thucydides' work. In addition to this freedom, predictably
many now use III. 82-84 to define the nature of Thucydides' morality. Edmunds and
Proctor are prime examples.
Edmunds uses the excursus to determine "what principles should, according to

35

De Romilly, Histoire et raison chez Thucydide (Paris: Les Belles lettres,
1956). In showing the relation between narrative and speeches, de Romilly provides
grist for those who wish to grind away Thucydides' honesty because the close
relation between the two can be seen as Thucydides' manipulation of facts.
36

0ne of Finley's greatest contributions to Thucydidean studies is the work he
did on the History's unity, "The Unity of Thucydides' History," in Three Essays on
Thucydides (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). By identifying in the rest
of the work the ideas expressed in Books VI and VII, Finley established a
conceptual unity for the History. Once attention became focused on the
interconnections and relationships among the Books of the History, it was no big
step for those who wished to call foul. They could view these connections as
Thucydides' manipulating the facts to make them conform to his philosophy or to his
prejudices.
37

See A. M. Parry, "The Language of Thucydides' Description of the
Plague," BICS (1969): 106-18. Parry argues against a scientific Thucydides but for a
precise and dramatic Thucydides. See also, "Thucydides' Use of Abstract
Language," Yale French Studies 45 (1970): 3-20; "Thucydides' Historical
Perspective," Yale Classical Studies 22 (1972): 47-61; and Logos and Ergon in
Thucydides (Salem, New Hampshire: Arno Press, 1981).
38

H. P. Stahl, Thukydides: Die Ste/lung des Menschen im geschichtlichen
ProzefJ (Munich: Beck, 1966).
39

See Chapter 1.
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Thucydides, govern political life within the city. "40 Since in the excursus
Thucydides' position is one of censure, Edmunds thinks that Thucydides' ethical
sympathies should appear. 41 According to Edmunds, the ethical sympathies that
appear reflect traditional ethical thought and show Thucydides' identification with an
ethics that is conservative and Spartan. 42
Proctor also thinks the passage indicative of a man of deep moral conviction. 43
But for Proctor Thucydides' morality is democratic not oligarchic. Proctor writes
that Thucydides "viewed the scene unmistakably from the standpoint of a democrat;
and revolution, in his eyes, was generally an oligarchical, not a left-wing,
activity. "44 The passage, however, encompasses wrongs committed by both
oligarchs and democrats. Thus, using this passage to label Thucydides' morality as
democratic or oligarchic must be wrongheaded.
A similar but methodologically sounder interpretation is the one that views this
passage as evidence for Thucydides' belief in the moral degeneration that occurs in
wartime. Finley views the episodes of Mytilene, Plataea, and Kerkyra as examples

40

L. Edmunds, "Thucydides' Ethics as Reflected in the Description of Stasis

(3.82-83)," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 79 (1975): 73. Edmunds seems
to accept de Ste. Croix's distinction that Thucydides believes that different ethical
concerns govern relations between cities and those of citizens within a city. For de
Ste. Croix's views see, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1972), 16-28.
41

lbid.' 74.

42

lbid.' 91.

43

0. Proctor, The Experience of Thucydides, 205.

44

lbid.' 53.
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of the theme that "war produces violence and violence political chaos. "45 Connor is
of similar mind.
Connor sees III. 82-84's purpose as unifying and defensive. Ill. 82-84 adds the
disruption of values and the perversion of language to the deaths, exiles, migrations,
earthquakes, and plagues, and it looks forward to Athens' internal struggles and
eventual demise. Thus it justifies Thucydides' claim of preeminence for this war (I.

1. 2) and unites the beginning with the end. 46 Connor emphasizes language's
inability to impede violence, the disappearance of traditional Greek restraints and
conventions under the pressures of the war, and the complete destruction of human
morality. The reigning principle is self-interest. The importance of Ill. 82-84 lies in
what it tells about the nature of the war and the mind of its participants not in its
strategic or material significance. 47 The cause of it all is found within human
nature. 48
Macleod also emphasizes the degenerative interpretation. 49 For him
Thucydides sees in stasis and war circumstances uncovering human nature. 50 By
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1. Finley, Thucydides (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942; reprint,
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), 180.
46

R. Connor, Thucydides, 103-4.
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1bid.' 88-89.

48

lbid.' 102-3.
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C. Macleod, "Thucydides on Faction (3.82-83)," Proceedings of the

Cambridge Philological Society 25 (1979): 52-68.
50

Ibid.' 52-53.
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inversion war and stasis undo human progress by the very means of that
progress. 51 Thus, necessity, which brings men together and enhances life's
standard, in war and stasis, subverts civilization. Laws are ignored. Human
ingenuity troubles itself to destroy rather than to create. Intelligence plots or
suspects; language is perverted.
Conversely, Cogan rejects the moral interpretation of the passage. Cogan
rightly recognizes that the events of Mytilene, Plataea, and Kerkyra have no material
effect on the war. What then, he asks, is their purpose? His answer is that they
indicate a change in the progress of the war. This change is what he calls the
ideologizing of the war. Henceforth Athens supports democracies, Sparta,
oligarchies. Henceforth alliances are made with factions not governments.
Henceforth factions in the smaller city states can take the initiative in the war by
calling in the appropriate superpower. Mytilene, Plataea, and Kerkyra establish this
new basis as the rule. 52
Cogan's thesis hinges upon his observation that before the events of 428/27,
Athens had no policy that required her to deal solely with democracies. His basis for
this argument is that before 428/27 the Athenians sided with the Kerkyraeans and
the oligarchs of Epidamnos against the democrats of Epidamnos, but did not support

51

52

1bid.' 54.

M. Cogan, The Human Thing: the Speeches and Principles of Thucydides'
History (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 59-60 and 150.
For a different view cf. I. A. F. Bruce, "The Corcyraean Civil War of 427 B.C.,"
Phoenix 25 (1971): 108-117 and C. Orwin, "Stasis and Plague: Thucydides on the
Dissolution of Society," Journal of Politics 50 (1988): 831-47.
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any oligarchies after the crucial events of 428/27. Though the argument is clever, it
completely obscures the picture.
Athens sides with the pro-democratic party of the Kerkyraeans against the
Korinthians, not against the democrats of Epidamnos. Though the conflict at
Epidamnos is the cause of the conflict between Kerkyra and Korinth, the defensive
alliance Athens concludes with Kerkyra has nothing to do with Epidamnos or with
her own policy toward democracies. Athens makes an alliance with Kerkyra because
it is expedient to do so. Likewise in the war it is expedient for her to support
democracies. If, however, it were advantageous for her to support an oligarchy, I
think it certain that she would have done so. Athens' as well as Sparta's shameless
currying of Persia both at the beginning of the war and at the end should be
sufficient to indicate that both sides were willing to deal with any type of regime
that would help them win the war.
Barnard also rejects the moral interpretation of the passage. Barnard writes that
"Thucydides' aim was to explain what happened to mind and intellect during stasis,
not what happened to ethical values and norms." Barnard's Thucydides is amoral. 53
Ultimately Barnard thinks that in the stasis excursus, Thucydides "greatly
exaggerates" the importance of stasis but fails to appreciate factors, such as
economic and political equality or class hatred, that a modern historian would
emphasize. This failure gives "all his observations about 'the contest for cleverness'
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M. A. Barnard, "Stasis in Thucydides: Narrative and Analysis of
Factionalism in the Polis," (Ph.D. diss., UNC at Chapel Hill, 1980), Abstract.
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an air of unreality. "54
Contrary to Cogan and Barnard's denial of the moral content of the passage,
when Thucydides writes that neither side strengthened pledges to themselves in
accordance with divine custom (rt{> BEi<p voµcp), when he writes that no one thought
with piety (EilaE{Jfiq,) or with nobility (yEvvatOT'YJTL), when he laments the
disappearance of simplicity (ro EV'YJBEc;), I find it impossible to deny the passage's
moral--but not moralizing--tone. But if we accept its moral tone, are we also to
accept the thesis of moral degeneration?
Cogan persuasively argues that the Spartans and Athenians are as brutal at the
beginning of the war as they are at its end. Cogan draws attention to evidence for
Spartan and Athenian brutality from the beginning of the war. He notes that since
the war's start, the Spartans had the policy of killing any allied or neutral traders
they captured at sea. And in retaliation for this policy, in the second year of the
war, the Athenians executed envoys from Korinth, Sparta, and Argos. 55
Although Cogan's argument is persuasive, again I find it difficult to reject
totally the argument that the events of Mytilene, Plataea, and Kerkyra mark a
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1bid p. 160. Barnard examines Thucydides' view of stasis' causes and
effects. He defines the Archaic understanding of stasis, derives a Thucydidean
definition of stasis, examines the causes and symptoms of stasis as understood by
Thucydides, and finally presents a Thucydidean theory of stasis. To Barnard, 111.8284 gives human nature ("which for Thucydides means ambition, greed and fear") as
the principal cause of stasis; the contributing causes are war and stasis itself. 111.8284 seeks to explain what happens to the intellect during stasis; it is not concerned
with ethical values and norms. Stasis distorts intelligence in two ways: rash and
unthinking action force its disappearance or it becomes perverted to cleverness.
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Cogan, The Human Thing, 60.
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heightening in the prosecution of the war, especially in light of Athens' policy in the
Pentekontaetia. During this period Athens does enslave inhabitants, take hostages,
tear down walls, and exact tribute. Athens may not be kind to her subjects, but she
does not kill all the male and enslave all the female inhabitants of a revolted citystate as she nearly does to Mytilene in 427 and does do to Skione in 421 as well as
to Melos in 416/15 (Ill. 49, V. 32. 1, and V. 116. 4). Thus, though the participants
may be as brutal at the beginning of the war as at the end, the war, as Thucydides
himself asserts, does seem to have a particularly pernicious effect on them.
Besides showing the degeneration that happens to human nature and society
under the pressure of war, III. 82-84 establishes stasis as a major phenomenon of
the war. Because stasis afflicted nearly all of Hellas and was a major reason for
Athens' defeat, 56 Thucydides treats the phenomenon with special regard.
Furthermore it is my belief that Thucydides pays stasis such regard because he
viewed the war itself as a kind of stasis fought by Greeks against Greeks. Thus in
Chapter 4, by relating Ill. 82-84 to the rest of the History, I will attempt to show
that Thucydides' understanding and interpretation of stasis are similar to his
understanding and interpretation of the war in general. For this reason the ideas
expressed in Ill. 82-84 can be used as a key for interpreting the History.

56

See II . 65 .

CHAPTER 4
III. 82-84: A KEY FOR UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORY

In the previous chapter I explicated the style, structure, meaning, and purpose
of III. 82-84. The task now at hand is to relate III. 82-84 to the rest of the History.
At least one scholar, Proctor, thinks that the reflections in III. 82-84 bear little
relation to the rest of the work. Proctor argues that Thucydides wrote his excursus
on stasis as a result of the revolution of the Thirty. Thucydides was so moved by the
bitter strife of 404-3 that he felt impelled to relate its horrors. Kerkyra's civil strife
provided the perfect opportunity for him to relate his feelings. Thus he "duly
translated his own reactions to the revolution of the Thirty into reflections on
revolution as a general phenomenon of the war, to which, truth to tell, his own
record bore very little witness." 1
Against Proctor, I hold that Thucydides views the war itself as a type of stasis

1

D. Proctor, The Experience of Thucydides (Warminster, Wilts, England: Aris
& Phillips LTD, 1980), 208. Proctor is not alone in thinking that Thucydides wrote
the excursus because he was influenced by the reign of the Thirty; G. B. Grundy
writes that the chapters were "evidently written under the influence of very strong
feeling,--feeling so strong that it can only have been caused by events which
appealed to the author in a very intimate and special way. The cruelties of the
period of the tyranny of the Thirty, which inflicted a shock upon the Greek world
from which it never wholly recovered, may have evoked from the historian this
striking description of the effects of aram~." G. B. Grundy, Thucydides and the
History of his Age, 2d ed. (Oxford: Henderson and Spalding, 1948), 475.
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and that his reflections on stasis form part of the basis for his understanding of the
war in general. For this reason, I contend that Ill. 82-84 can be used as a key for
understanding the History. By tracing stasis' presence and effects in the History, I
aim to show that Thucydides' reflections on it form part of the basis for his
understanding and interpretation of the war, and that Thucydides views the war itself
as a type of stasis.
That Thucydides' understanding and interpretation of stasis and of the entire
war are similar can be seen most clearly by noting that the ethics that he says take
over during stasis are similar to the ethics that he says predominate in the
Peloponnesian War. The sum of these ethics is that men value daring, unthinking,
reckless, quarrelsome, intimidating action; that they despise prudent, forethinking,
intelligent thought; that they lose their regard for laws (voµo1), justice (biKrJ), kinship
(To

.;vyyEvi~),

pledges

(niau1~),

(opK01); that fVOE{JEia (piety), TO

peace proposals (Tix
fV'YJOE~

KaAw~

AEyoµEva), and oaths

(simplicity), and To y<:vva'iov (nobility)

disappear; that distrust and a desire for personal gain predominate; and that specious
words attempt to hide hideous deeds.
At the outset it is important to note that in the History, Thucydides makes it
clear that stasis need not only be the outbreak of violence that occurs when citizens
of an individual city-state struggle for control of its government. As we will see in
greater detail later on, just as Hermokrates, in his speech at the congress at Gela in
424, argues that any warring amongst city-states in Sicily is stasis (IV. 59-64), so
does Thucydides portray the Sicilian War itself as a type of stasis; stasis need not be
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confined by the walls of an individual city-state.
Before noting the similarities between the ethics of stasis and those of the war,
to show how great a role stasis plays in the war, I will briefly detail the ubiquity of
the phenomenon in the History.
From the Archaeologia through Book VIII, stasis is one of Thucydides' prime
concerns. In the Archaeologia, 2 Thucydides argues that the Peloponnesian War is
the greatest war in Hellas' history. One of the reasons he offers is that in the past
Hellas was not stable. In early times, migrations were frequent as were outbreaks of
stasis:
Ota yap aper:i'jv yfJ~ ai Tf ovvaµfl~ Ttat µEi~ov~ €yy1yvoµEvat ar:aaft~
i:voroiovv €; WV €¢0fipovw, Kat aµa imo aJ...J...o¢vJ...wv µaJ...J...ov bCEj30VAfVOVW.

The goodness of the land favoured the aggrandizement of particular individuals,
and thus created faction which proved a fertile source of ruin. It also invited
invasion. (trans. Crawley I. 2. 4. 1)
Even after the Trojan War, stasis plagues Hellas:
~ Tf yap avaxwp'fjat~ TOJV • EJ...A.1]vwv €; • IJ...iov xpovia yEvoµEv'fj llOAAa
EVfoxµwaf, Kat ar:aaft~ EV r:a'i~ lfOAWlV w~ Elfl noJ...v i:yiyvovw, a</J' WV
EKlflnWVTf~ r:a~ noJ...rn; fxTl~OV.

The late return of the Hellenes from Ilium caused many revolutions, and
factions ensued almost everywhere; and it was the citizens thus driven into
exile who founded the cities. (trans. Crawley I. 12. 2. 1)
In Thucydides' argument for the Peloponnesian War's preeminence, stasis is one of
the primary obstacles to Hellas' achieving anything of note in her early history.
With the tyrants of Sicily excepted, Thucydides also argues that tyranny was a

2

For a thorough treatment of the purpose and meaning of the Archaeologia,
see R. Connor, Thucydides (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 20-32.
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main reason for Hellas' subsequent failure to achieve any deed worthy of recording
(I. 17). It is in this context that Thucydides offers ebvoµia 3 (good government) as

the prime reason for Sparta's defeat of Athens:
iJ yap AaKEOaiµwv µer:a r:ijv KTiatv TOJV vvv fVOIKOVVTOJV avr:ijv !J..wplinv brl
lrAEtOWV
'faµEv XPOVOV ar:aataaaaa oµwq fK n:aJ...mr:awv Kat YJVVoµfjffr/ Kat
aki awpavvrnwi; ~v. ET'YJ yap fOTI µaJ...wr:a ur:paKOOLa Kat bJ...iyOj lrAEiOJ l:i;
r:ijv TEAEVr:ijv WVOE WV n:oJ...iµov a<f>' ov AaKEomµovun r:iJ avr:iJ lrOALTEiq_
XPWVTaL, Kat 01' aiJTO ovvaµEVOI Kat r:a fV r:a'ii; aJ...J...mi; lrOAWI KaBiar:aaav.

aw

For this city, though after the settlement of the Dorians, its present inhabitants,
it suffered from factions for an unparalleled length of time, still at a very early
period obtained good laws, and enjoyed a freedom from tyrants which was
unbroken; it has possessed the same form of government for more than four
hundred years, reckoning to the end of the late war, and has thus been in a
position to arrange the affairs of the other states. (trans. Crawley I. 18. 1. 4)
Just as in Hellas' infancy stasis blocked her growth, so does stasis' absence account
for Sparta's victory in the Peloponnesian War.
The obvious obverse of this coin is that stasis' presence is the primary cause
for Athens' defeat. At II. 65 Thucydides himself makes this contention:
b µ"Ev yap iJavxa,ovr:ai;

Kat TO V<X1JTIKOV BEpan:EVovr:ai; Kat apxi'Jv µij
l:mKr:wµi:vovi; l:v r:4> n:oJ...i:µOj µYJOE r:iJ noAEL K1vo11vEiJovr:ai; 'E<f>YJ nEp1fowBa1 · 4 oi
TE

3

Gomme writes that Evvoµia implies two things: "a constitutional government
(the rule of law, as opposed to the tyrannies, however benevolent) and internal
peace, absence of ar:ami;. This is what the Greeks in general, so much given to
ar:ami;, admired in Sparta; it does not necessarily mean that they admired the
Spartan constitution as such, nor the military mode of life; only that internal peace
and the rule of law are things to be desired for their own sake, almost above all
else," A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1945), 128.
4

Thucydides is of course arguing that had Perikles' policy been followed,
Athens would have won the war. Because Thucydides commends Perikles' policy
and praises Perikles himself, scholars commonly assume that Perikles' views and
Thucydides' are the same. (For this tendency in Thucydidean studies, see Connor,
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OE 5 Tafn;a TE J'laVTa Eq WVVaVTioV 'fnpa;av Kat a}..).. a 'f;w WV J'lOAEµov
ooKofJvTa Eivat Kadx Taq ioiaq <j>1}..,onµiaq Kat 'lOw KiporJ KaKwq 'f q TE a<j>aq
avwvq Kat wvq ;vµµaxovq EJ'lOAlTfVOav, a KawpOovµEva µ'fv wiq iouinatq
nµi'J Kat w<j>EAia µiU}..,ov f]v, a<j>a}..,ivTa Of TfJ J'lOAfl Eq TOV J'lOAEµov {3Aaf3rJ
KaOiaTaw . . . oi Of VOTEpov laOI µa}..,}..,ov abwt npoq a}..,}..,ij}..,ovq OVTEq Kat
bpEyoµEVOI WV npwwq 'l:xaawq yiyvwOat frpanovw KaO' ifoovaq np oijµ<p Kat
Ta npayµaTa fVOIOOVat. f; WV lr.}..,}..,a TE J'lOAAa' wq EV µEyaA't} J'lOAfl Kat
apxi'Jv EXoVO'tJ' iJµapTfJO'Yj Kat b Eq LIKfAiav J'lAofJq' oq oiJ waofJwv yvwµ'Yjq
aµapT'Yjµa qv 7lpoq ovq EJ'lfJOaV, OOOV oi fKJ'lEµtjJaVTfq oiJ Ta npoa<j>opa wiq
oixoµivmq (my1yvwOKOVTEq, a}..,}..,a Kadx Taq ioiaq owfJo}..,aq 7lEpl T~q wfJ
ofJµov npoaTaaiaq Ta TE EV np OTpawnio<p aµf3kvTEpa EJ'loiovv Kai Ta 7lfpt
TfJV n6}..,1v npwwv EV a}..,}..,ij}..,mq frapaxO'f/aav. 6 a<j>a}..,ivTEq o'f Ev °'2:.1KEAi<J /x}..,}..,'tJ

"A Post Modernist Thucydides?," The Classical Journal 72 (1977): 295.) But
Thucydides' praising Perikles does not make their views the same. Thucydides
praises a number of people in the History: Archidamos (I. 79. 2); Themistokles (I.
138. 3), Brasidas (IV. 81. 2-3); Alkibiades (VI. 15. 3-4); Peisistratids (VI. 54. 5);
Hermokrates (VI. 72. 2); Phrynichos (VIII. 27. 5); Antiphon (VIII. 68. 1-2); and
Theramenes (VIII. 68. 4). If scholars were to equate the viewpoints of all these
personages with Thucydides' own, they would err just as much as they do when the
equate the views of Perikles and Thucydides. It also does not necessarily follow
from Thucydides' declaration that adherence to Perikles' policy would have resulted
in victory for Athens that Thucydides himself agrees with the policy. Thucydides
may have agreed with Perikles that Athens had to fight Sparta to remain autonomous
(I. 140-141. 1), but he certainly makes it clear that he thinks Athens oversteps her
bounds when during and after the episode at Pylos she refuses Sparta's peace
overtures (IV. 21. 2; 41. 3). Similarly when he states that the executions Athens
makes in the affairs of the mutilation of the herms and of the profanation of the
mysteries had a salubrious effect on the city, it does not follow that he agrees with
such a means (VI. 60. 5). On the contrary the narrative makes it clear that the
executions appalled him as I discuss later.
5

Note that oi bf is non-specific and all-encompassing. With this phrase
Thucydides condemns Nikias and Alkibiades as well as Kleon. Cf. R. Connor,
Thucydides, 61 n. 27.
6

Thucydides' statement that the Sicilian Expedition failed more because of
personal machinations at home does not mean he approved of the expedition as J.
Finley seems to believe: "he [Thucydides] later says that even the Sicilian expedition
was not in itself a mistake." J. Finley, Thucydides (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1942 repr. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), 152. Thucydides
clearly thinks the expedition a mistake (iJµapTfJO'Yj Kai b Eq LIKEAiav n}..,ofJq) and
another example of Athens' grasping for more (cf. note 4); oiJ waofJwv .. : oaov
does not exclude one reason while emphasizing another, rather it allows for both,
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if napaaKEvfJ Kat wv vavr1Kov r<{> nJ...fov1 µopiqJ Kat Kara r'f/v noJ...1v FJOrj i:v
araao OVif~ oµw~ + rpia + µ"Ev fi'YJ lxVTfixov wi~ if npoifpov vnapxovm
noJ...Eµio1~ Kat wt~ lxno °'2:.tKEAia~ µEr' aimvv, Kat rwv ;vµµaxwv h1 wt~
nJ...fomv a</JWi'YJKOat, KvpqJ if vaifpov jJamJ...f:w~ :JlatOt npoayEvoµf:vqJ, o~
napEtXf xpfJµara IlfAO:JlOVV'YjGJOl~ E~ TO vaVilKOV, Kat ov npoifpov i:vf:ooaav
aiJWL Ev a<{Jim Kaia Ta~ ioia~ ota<{Jopa~ 7lfpl7lWOVif~ i:a<{JixA'Yjaav.

r,

He [Perikles] told them to wait quietly, to pay attention to their marine, to
attempt no new conquests, and to expose the city to no hazards during the
war, and doing this, promised them a favourable result. What they did was the
very contrary, allowing private ambitions and private interests, in matters
apparently quite foreign to the war, to lead them into projects unjust both to
themselves and to their allies--projects whose success would only conduce to
the honour and advantage of private persons, and whose failure entailed certain
disaster on the country in the war ... With his successors it was different.
More on a level with one another, and each grasping at supremacy, they ended
by committing even the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude.
This, as might have been expected in a great and sovereign state, produced a
host of blunders, and amongst them the Sicilian expedition, though this failed
not so much through a miscalculation of the power of those against whom it
was sent, as through a fault in the senders in not taking the best measures
afterwards to assist those who had gone out, but choosing rather to occupy
themselves with private cabals for the leadership of the commons, by which
they not only paralysed operations in the field, but also first introduced civil
discord at home. Yet after losing most of their fleet besides other forces in
Sicily, and with faction already dominant in the city, they could still for three
years make head against their original adversaries, joined not only by the
Sicilians, but also by their own allies nearly all in revolt, and at last by the
king's son, Cyrus, who furnished the funds for the Peloponnesian navy. Nor
did they finally succumb till they fell the victims of their own intestine
disorders. (trans. Crawley II. 65. 7. 1 and 65. 10-12)
Stasis snatches empire away from Athens as before the Peloponnesian War it did
from the Epidamnians (I. 24. 4. 1).
In the beginning of the History, Thucydides gives another reason for stasis'
importance. At I. 23 Thucydides lists the calamities that make the Peloponnesian
War the greatest event in Hellas' history. Among them are exile and murder, caused

while emphasizing one.
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by both war and stasis (I. 23. 2. 5). Because stasis is the primary cause of Athens'
defeat, because its absence accounts for Sparta's victory, and because it caused so
much destruction throughout Hellas, at the outset of his History, Thucydides
highlights its importance.
In addition to stasis' prominence in the Archaeologia, occurrences of stasis
pervade the rest of the History. At III. 82. 1 Thucydides says that stasis was so rife
in the cities because Hellas was at war:
bfft vaupov YE Kat :nixv wq Ei:JCElV TO • EAA'YJVIKOV [EV OUXOEI] EKtvfJfh]'
ota<f>opwv ovawv EKaOTaxov wiq TE TWV ofJµwv :npoaTaTatq wvq • Afh]vaiovq
E:naywOat Kat wiq b).iymq wvq AaKEOatµovio11q.Kal EV µ'Ev Eipfjvr; OVK av
EXOVTWV :npo<f>amv oiJO' hoiµwv :napaKaAEtV avwvq' :!COAEµovµfrwv OE Kai
;11µµaxiaq aµa EKaTipou; Ti; TWV €vavTiwv KaKWOEl Kai a<f>iatv avwlq EK WV
avwfJ :!CpOO:JCOlfjOEL pq.oiwq ai E:JCaywya/ Wtq VEWTEpi~EIV Tl {Jo11).oµ(v0tq
E:nopi~ovw.

When later all of Greece, so to speak, was convulsed [in stasis], there were
struggles on both sides: the leaders of the people striving to invite in the
Athenians and the oligarchs, the Lakedaemonians. For in peace time having no
reason, nor being prepared, to call them in ... but being at war and there
being an alliance to each side for the purpose of harming the enemy and
likewise benefitting themselves, invitations were readily available to those
desiring revolution.
Thucydides' narrative is filled with cities that call upon either the Athenians or
the Lakedaemonians to help them expel their political foes. In 429/28 the Athenians
expect a pro-Athenian faction within Spartolos in Bottiaea to hand the city over to
them, but the opposition party prevents the betrayal (II. 79). The Tenedians, the
Methymnians, and a pro-Athenian faction within Mytilene betray to Athens the
revolt of the island of Lesbos, except for Methymna. Later, reduced to starvation,
the commons of Mytilene threaten to hand over the city to the Athenians unless the
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few divvy up the remaining provisions. As a result the leaders come to terms with
the Athenians (428/27; III. 27-28). A faction of Kolophonians at Notion calls upon
the Athenian Paches' assistance (428/27; III. 34). Stasis at Kerkyra ends in the
destruction of the oligarchic faction (427-25; Ill. 70-84; IV. 46-48). Treachery
hands Eion and Anaktorion over to Athens (425; IV. 7; IV. 49). Fearing the return
of exiled oligarchs, the Megarian democrats plan to betray their town to the
Athenians. The Athenians and the conspirators succeed in capturing Nisaea and the
long walls. But Brasidas, commanding the Peloponnesian forces, prevents their
taking the city. Consequently Megara' s newly formed oligarchic regime executes
about 100 of those thought to be most guilty of conspiring with Athens (424; IV. 6674). Pro-Athenian democrats plot with Demosthenes to betray their Boeotian cities to
Athens (424/23; IV. 76-77; 89; 101. 3). At Akanthos stasis erupts over admitting
Brasidas into the city (424; IV. 84-88). By offering moderate terms to the faction
hostile to him, Brasidas peacefully obtains the surrender of Amphipolis (424/23; IV.
103-106). A pro-Spartan faction betrays Torone to Brasidas (424/23; IV. 110-114).
Negotiations take place between Brasidas and Potidaea and Mende for the betrayal
of the cities (423; IV. 121). Mende revolts from the Athenians, and Brasidas
receives her even though the revolt occurred after the armistice between Athens and
Sparta. Later with the help of the democratic faction, Athens regains Mende (423;
IV. 123; 130). Brasidas makes an attempt on Potidaea but fails (423; IV. 135). A
pro-Spartan faction of the Parrhasians of Arkadia calls upon the Spartans to free
them from Mantinean control (421; V. 33). With the help of Sparta, Chios revolts
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from Athens but later the demos helps return the city to Athens (413/12-411; VIII.
5. 4-15; 24. 4-6; 31.1; 38). Chalkideus and Alkibiades effect the revolt of
Klazomenae from Athens. The Athenians later return the democrats to power.
Astyochos orders the pro-Athenian party to depart Klazomenae. They refuse, but
Astyochos fails to subdue the town (412/11; VIII. 14. 2-3; 23. 6; 31. 2). Athens
supports a democratic uprising at Samos. The Samian demos and Athenian navy
successfully defeat a later oligarchic coup (412/11-411/10; VIII. 21; 63. 3; 73; 75.
2-3). Rhodian aristocrats call in the Peloponnesians who persuade the island to
revolt from Athens (411; VIII. 44. 1-2). Thasian exiles conspire with the
Peloponnesians to cause a revolt from Athens (411; VIII. 64. 3). Originally invited
by the Euboeans, the Peloponnesians cause the entire island of Euboea (except for
Oreos) to revolt (411; VIII. 5; 95).
Stasis is not confined to cities calling in the Spartans or the Athenians. The war
begins with the oligarchic faction at Plataea opening the gates for the Thebans (431;
II. 2-6). The Mytilenians unsuccessfully attempt to gain Methymna by treachery
(428/27; Ill. 18). Mytilenian exiles take Antandros by treachery (425/24; IV. 52. 2).
By treachery the Boeotians capture Panakton, a fortress on the Athenian border
(422; V. 3. 5). As a consequence of an Athenian siege and of treachery, Melos
surrenders to Athens (416/15; V. 116. 3). The Thespian demos rises unsuccessfully
against those in power (415/14; VI. 95. 2). By treachery the Boeotians take Oropos
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(411; VIII. 60. 1). 7

It is important to note that a fine line separates revolt, anoar:aau;' from stasis,
adxau;, for in any revolt there is present in the city some faction that disagrees with

the dominant party's resolution. When revolt is decided upon, stasis either breaks
out or is latent; therefore, anoar:aOL~ necessarily implies OUXOL~. 8
For example, stasis breaks out at Mytilene as a result of her desire to revolt
from Athens:
MEux OE r:iJv EafioJ...iJv r:wv IfrJ...onoVVrJOiwv EiJOI)~ Afo{Jo~ nJ...iJv MrJOVµVf]~
a7lfa'T:'YJ an' • AO'Yjvaiwv, fi01JA'YjOivu~ µ'Ev Kai npo WV noJ...iµov, a}..}..' oi
AaKEbatµf>VtOI oiJ npoaEbff,avw, avayKaaOivu~ b'E Kai T:aVT:'YJV r:iJv anoar:aatv
npor:Epov blfvoovvw no1f]aa0Ba1. r:wv n yap J...1µivwv r:iJv xwmv Kai u1xwv
oiKobf>µ'YjOLV Kai VEWV 7lOlrJOIV EniµEVOV uJ...wOfjvat, Kai oaa EK WV Ilovwv MEt
<'x</>tKfoOat, wf,or:a~ 7:( Kai alwv, Kai a µffanEµnoµEVOl haav. TEvibwt yap

r,

7

The brief treatment Thucydides allots the above incidents of stasis
exemplifies a characteristic of his methodology. As Rawlings writes:
Thucydides took the trouble to describe in detail the developments at Corcyra
and to make at this point in his narrative general remarks on the course of
stasis in the cities of Greece because Corcyra was the first of the revolutions
that occurred during the war (3.82.1). It could thus be used as an exemplum
of stasis generally ... [Ill. 82-83] were designed to serve as a description of
stasis in the abstract, stasis per se; they serve as an analysis that can safely
be applied to the other staseis which occurred during the war as well.
Thus the stasis excursus enables Thucydides to treat in brief other staseis of the war.
H. R. Rawlings, The Structure of Thucydides' History (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1981), 212.
8

This observation may seem to run counter to Thucydides' statement at II. 8.

5: OVTW~ <EV> bpyfJ dxov oi nJ...Eiov~ W1J~ • AO'Yjvaiov~' oi µ'Ev r:fJ~ apxfJ~
anoJ...vOf/vat fiovJ...oµEVOt, oi OE µr, apxBwat <f>of3ovµEVOl (thus the majority held
Athens in anger, some desiring to be free from her empire, others fearing lest they
be conquered). But it must be stressed that Thucydides is painting with broad
brushstrokes and that this stroke does not deny the existence of pro-Athenian
sentiment in Hellas as Thucydides narrative makes clear.
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OV"ff<; ain:oi<; Ota<j>opot Kat M'Y}Ovµva"iot Kat ain:wv MvrtA'Yjvaiwv ioi<! avopE<;
Kara au1atv, npo;Evot • AOr]vaiwv, µ'Y}vvral yiyvovrat wi<; • AOr]vaiot<; on
;vvo1Ki~011ai TE riJv Afof3ov E<; riJv MvnA~V'YJV fii<! Kai riJv napaaKEVYJV anaaav
µEux AaKEOatµoviwv Kai Botwrwv ;vyyEvwv ovrwv lnl (xnoau1aEt i:nEiyovrat ·
Kat Ei µ~ Tl<; npoKaraAfp/JETat !f/O'YJ, aup~awOat avwv<; Afof3ov.

Immediately after the invasion of the Peloponnesians all Lesbos, except
Methymna, revolted from the Athenians. The Lesbians had wished to revolt
even before the war, but the Lacedaemonians would not receive them; and yet
now when they did revolt, they were compelled to do so sooner than they had
intended. While they were waiting until the moles for their harbours and the
ships and walls that they had in building should be finished, and for the arrival
of archers and com and other things that they were engaged in fetching from
the Pontus, the Tenedians, with whom they were at enmity, and the
Methymnians, and some factious persons in Mytilene itself, who were proxeni
of Athens, informed the Athenians that the Mytilenians were forcibly uniting
the island under their sovereignty, and that the preparations about which they
were so active were all concerted with the Boeotinas their kindred and the
Lacedaemonians with a view to a revolt, and that unless they were immediately
prevented, Athens would lose Lesbos. (III. 2; trans. Crawley)
At Kerkyra, stasis breaks out because one faction wants to revolt from Athens
and join Korinth:
Earaaia~ov, E7fElOYJ oi aixµaAWWl ~)..Oov avw"i<; oi EK
TWV 7rEpt • Enioaµvov vavµax1wv imo KoptvOiwv a<j>EOivu<;' rt{> µ€v )..by<p
OKTaKoaiwv ra)..avrwv wi<; npo;<:vot<; Ot'YJYYV'Y}µi:vot, 'l.py<p 0€ 7fE7fEtaµivot
KoptvOiot<; Ki:pK11pav npoanotijaat. Kai 'fnpaaaov ovwt, 'fKaawv rwv noAtrwv
µETtOVTE<;, onwq anoarfjawatv • AOr]vaiwv riJv 7f0AlV.

Oi yap KEpKVpa"iot

The Corcyraean revolution began with the return of the prisoners taken in the
sea-fights off Epidamnus. These the Corinthians had released, nominally upon
the security of eight hundred talents given by their proxeni, but in reality upon
their engagement to bring over Corcyra to Corinth. These men proceeded to
canvass each of the citizens, and to intrigue with the view of detaching the city
from Athens. (III. 70. 1; trans. Crawley)
Fearing the return of exiled oligarchs, the Megarian democrats plan to betray
their town to the Athenians:
yvbvu<; Of oi WV o~µov npoararat ov ovvarov TOV oijµov i:aoµEVOV vno TWV
KaKwv µEra a<j>wv KapupEiv, nowvvrat )..byov<; Of:iaavu<; npo<; wv<; row
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• A&f}vaiwv ar:par:YJyoiJr;, 'IJmoKf)(lr:YJ r:E r:ov •Api<j>povor; Kat !:l.YJµoaflfvYJ r:ov
•AAKtaOivovr;, f3ovJ..oµEvo1 Evoovvm r:Yjv noJ..1v Kat voµil;ovur; Uaaaw a<j>im
r:ov KtV01JVOV ¥j r:ovr; EKTCWOVr:ar; VTCO a<j>wv Kau}..(}{iv.

The leaders of the commons, seeing that the sufferings of the times had tired
out the constancy of their supporters, entered in their alarm into
correspondence with the Athenian generals, Hippocrates, son of Ariphron, and
Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, and resolved to betray the town, thinking this
less dangerous to themselves than the return of the party which they had
banished. (IV. 3; trans. Crawley)
The Athenians and the conspirators succeed in capturing Nisaea and the long walls.
But Brasidas, commanding the Peloponnesian forces, prevents their taking the city.
Consequently Megara's newly formed oligarchic regime executes about 100 of those
thought to be most guilty of conspiring with Athens (IV. 66-74). 9
In addition Thucydides' words at III. 82. 1 also imply revolt:
ETCEI vaupov YE Kat nav wr; ElTCEiV r:o • EAAYJVLKOV [EV ar:aaEJ] EKLvfJ&YJ'
01a<j>opwv ovawv ixaar:axov r:o'ir; TE r:wv ofJµwv npoar:ar:mr; r:ovr; 'A&f}vaiovr;
EnaywOm Kai r:oir; bJ..iy0tr; r:ovr; AaKEomµoviovr;. Kat EV µ'Ev EipfJV1J OVK av
EXOVT:OJV npo<j>amv ovo' (r:oiµwv napaKaAEiv avr:ovr;, TCOAEµovµi:vwv Of Kat
l;vµµaxiar; aµa EKar:fp0tr; r:fJ r:wv i:vavr:iwv KaKwaEJ Kai a<j>imv avr:oir; EK r:ov
aiJr:ofJ npoanOL'f/aEL pq.oiwr; ai (naywyal Wit; VEWr:Eptl;ELV T:I {3ovJ..oµEVOlt;
Enopil;ovr:o.

When later all of Greece, so to speak, was convulsed [in stasis], there were
struggles on both sides: the leaders of the people striving to invite in the
Athenians and the oligarchs, the Lakedaemonians. For in peace time having no
reason, nor being prepared, to call them in ... but being at war and there
being an alliance to each side for the purpose of harming the enemy and
likewise benefitting themselves, invitations were readily available to those
desiring revolution.
The above shows the fine distinction there is between anoar:amr; and ar:amr;,

9

See also: Samos (I. 115-17); Akanthos (IV. 84-88); Amphipolis (IV. 103106); (Mende (IV. 123; .130); Argos (V. 76-84; 116; VI. 7. 1; VI. 61. 3);
Messene (VI. 74. l); Chios (VIII. 5; .24; .31; .38); and Samos (VIII. 21; :63 .3;
.73; .75).
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the important place stasis occupied in Thucydides' mind, and the many occurrences
of stasis during the war. If, however, Thucydides confined himself only to noting
the occurrences of stasis and only to stressing stasis' prominence in Hellas' early
history, Proctor would be justified in his assertion that Thucydides' record bears
little witness to his reflections on stasis, but Thucydides does not. Thucydides is
careful to note the presence of stasis and its ethics at Sparta and at Athens, and he
details the course stasis runs during the oligarchic coup of 411 at Athens. In addition
the near dissolution of the Peloponnesian League during the Peace of Nikias; the
dissension among the members of the League in Book VIII; and the Sicilian account
are events portrayed by Thucydides as indicative of stasis and its ethics.
SICILY
Before Athens' fateful expedition to Sicily, war plagues the island. The
Syrakusans and, excepting Kamarina, the other Dorian cities are waging war against
the Leontines, the Chalkidian (i.e., Ionian) cities, and Dorian Kamarina. In 427 the
Leontines send an embassy to ask Athens for her assistance. The Athenians send 20
ships under the command of Laches (III. 86). In 426 the Athenians decide to send
40 more ships to Sicily and to replace Laches with Pythodoros. Taking a few ships,
Pythodoros embarks for Sicily with Sophokles and Eurymedon to follow with the
rest of the armament (Ill. 115).
The events of Pylos intervene and it is not until after the end of the stasis at
Kerkyra that Sophokles and Eurymedon sail for Sicily (IV. 48. 6). In the meantime
Athenian forces continue to support the Leontines and their allies against Syrakuse
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and hers (IV. 24-25). In 424 Kamarina and Gela make peace. Subsequently the rest
of the warring Sicilian states meet at Gela to discuss ending hostilities. It is at this
congress that Hermokrates, a Syrakusan, makes a pan-Sikeliot plea for peace. He
considers the war a kind of national stasis that threatens to destroy the island's
autonomy.
Exhorting the cities of Sicily to make peace, Hermokrates argues that unless
Sicily unites against Athens, Athens will subjugate a divided island (IV. 60. 1). He
argues that civil strife will be her death:
[xpiJ] voµiaat i f ar:aatv µaJ...tar:a </JOEipELv r:a~ nbJ...Et~ 1cal r:i]v ~1KEJ...iav, ~~ YE
oi EVOlKOl ;vµnavu~ µ"Ev fnt/JovAEVbµdJa, Kar:a nOAf.l~ Of otfor:aµEv.

and we should understand that the intestine discords which are so fatal to
communities generally, will be equally so to Sicily, if we, its inhabitants,
absorbed in our local quarrels, neglect the common enemy. (trans. Crawley IV.
61. 1)
Later in his speech he appeals to the various cities to unite together given that they
are neighbors, they inhabit one land, are surrounded by one sea, and share the
common name, Sikeliots (IV. 64. 3). For the most part Hermokrates' pan-Sikeliot
plea succeeds. Barring the exceptions that follow, Sicily does unite against Athens.
Ironically, after the peace of Gela, stasis, supported by Syrakuse, destroys the
city of the Leontines. Leontine oligarchs call in the Syrakusans and expel the demos
for wishing to redistribute the land. The Leontine oligarchs destroy the city and go
to live at Syrakuse (V. 4). When Athens hears what has happened, she sends Phaeax
to stir up support for the Leontine democrats against Syrakuse. The embassy fails
(V. 4-5).
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Also, for a time, civil strife places Messene in the hands of the Lokrians (422;
V. 5). Later, in 415/14, after the Athenian expedition arrives at Sicily, a proAthenian faction is to betray Messene to Athens. But the recalled Alkibiades
forestalls the plot by communicating it to Messene's pro-Syrakusan faction (VI. 74.
1).

In addition, at the outset of the Sicilian expedition, Katane refuses admittance
to the Athenians because of the presence of a pro-Syrakusan faction. They do allow
the generals to come in and speak, and while Alkibiades is speaking, the army
forcibly enters the town. The Syrakusan faction flees, and the rest vote for an
alliance with Athens (VI. 50. 3-51. 2). Finally, the pro-Athenian faction at Akragas
drives out the party friendly to the Syrakusans (VII. 46 and 50. 1).
But as I indicate above, these incidents of stasis are exceptions. Except for the
important cities of Leontini, Akragas, Naxos, and Katane, all Greek Sicily unites
with Syrakuse for the defense of the island. Of course the barbarian Egestans
support Athens, for their embassy of 416, asking for help in their dispute with
Selinos and Syrakuse, provides Athens with her pretext for intervening. And some
of the barbarian Sikels also support Athens.
In this cursory summation of the actual and near outbreaks of stasis that Sicily
suffered, it has perhaps come clear that against Hermokrates' plea for unity, Athens'
strategy is to stir up revolution. In his speech of 415, Alkibiades argues that Sicily is
stasis-torn. He says that:
(1) the cities of Sicily easily change their constitutions (ai nb}..rn; Kat
EXOVat iWV :rtOAliWV ra~ µEraj3o}..a~ Kat E:rtlOOXa~)

pq,oia~
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(2) no one fights for his fatherland or obeys its laws, but because each one,
taking from the state by persuasive words or stasis, thinks that if he is
unsuccessful he can live elsewhere, persuasion and stasis are his shield and
spear (Kat ov&tc; 01' avTO we; mpt oiKEiac; JraTpiooc; OVTf Ta Jrfpt TO awµa
(m}..01c; Ef,iJprvTat OVTf Ta EV TfJ xwpq. voµiµ0tc; KaTaOKfVa"ic;. OT/ OE 'fraawc;

fJ

EK WV }..(ywv JrfiBftV OlfTat fJ OTaatix~wv ano WV KOIVOV Aa{Jwv a}..}..YJV yf;v' µi'f
KawpOwaac;, oiKijaflv, TmiTa Ew1µa~fTat)

and
(3) the Sikeliots are not likely to follow one plan or to act in concert, but will
probably yield to an agreeable offer especially if they are in stasis as is said
(Kat OVK fiKoc; TOV WIOVWV oµtAOV oVTf )..iJyov µ1{f yvwµ'I] ixKpofxaOat OVTf Ee; Ta
€pya KOIVWc; TpinwOat. Taxv o' av we; 'fraaw1, fl Tl KaO' fJoovi'Jv }..(y0tw,
npoaxwpo7Ev, a}..}..}..wc; u Kai Ei aTaata~ova1v, wanEp nvvOavoµEOa). (VI. 2-4)
As Thucydides does in his stasis excursus (Ill. 82. 2. 5), Alkibiades switches from
the collective action of cities to the individual maneuverings of its citizens, and as
Thucydides does, Alkibiades stresses lawlessness (III. 84. 2-3), the reign of
persuasive rhetoric (III. 82. 8. 13), the struggle for personal glory at the expense of
the state (111. 82. 8), and the readiness to accept whatever is pleasurable (fJooviJ) (III.
82. 8. 10). Besides the irony of Alkibiades' speaking these words, this speech's
echoing of Thucydides' reflections in III. 82-84 gives the reader the basis by which
he is to understand the conflict.
Alkibiades' speech also serves other thematic purposes. It shows what could
have happened had Sicily not had so prudent and effective a statesman as
Hermokrates, and what still might have happened, Hermokrates notwithstanding,
had Alkibiades not been recalled. (Would Alkibiades' personality and persuasive
rhetoric have been strong enough to overcome those of Hermokrates?) And it looks
forward to Alkibiades' own machinations for power (hence the irony) and to the part
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they play in Athens' downfall.
Finally the speech foreshadows what direction Alkibiades' plan for subduing
Sicily will take. Having arrived at Sicily, Nikias, Alkibiades, and Lamachos give
their opinions concerning what plan they are to follow. Nikias suggests settling
matters between the Egestaeans and Selinuntines, making a display of Athens' power
to the other cities, and then sailing home (VI. 47). Alkibiades suggests sending
heralds to gain support, fomenting revolution between the Sikels and Syrakuse,
gaining the friendship of others, and taking control of the Messinese, whose position
in the passage and entrance to Sicily would provide an excellent harbor and base for
their army.
Alkibiades' plan is the opposite of Hermokrates'. Alkibiades wishes to divide
Sicily first and then to attack Syrakuse and Selinos. In short his policy is one of
stasis (VI. 48). Though he suggests that they attack Syrakuse immediately while the
city is unprepared and while fear of the armament is at its height, Lamachos votes
for Alkibiades' plan (VI. 49). Although Alkibiades is recalled, Nikias adopts the
policy of stasis. Later, after the disastrous attack on Epipolae in 413 when
Demosthenes is urging complete withdrawal, partially because of a fifth column in
Syrakuse, Nikias argues for remaining and pressing the siege (VII. 48). In addition,
at VII. 55. 2. 4, Thucydides ascribes part of the despondency of the troops to their
failure to win allies by causing civil strife (uiJ ovvaµEVOI fJlfVfYKflV ov-r' EK
JlOAtTEia~ Tl µE-rafioAij~ TlJ Ota</Jopov aiJwi~' 4> npoafJyovw av). Thus, in strategy'

the war in Sicily can be seen as a type of stasis with the Sicilians struggling to
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maintain unity and the Athenians trying to foment discord.
Thucydides' catalogue of allies before the battle in the Great Harbor further
supports the idea that the Sicilian war is a type of stasis. Thucydides' opening words
make clear the system by which he orders the catalogue:
ov Kar:a oiKrJV r:1 µaJ.J.ov ov& Kar:a ;vyyivflav µEr:' aJ.J.~J.wv ar:avuq, ix}.}.'
wq EKfxar:otq r:iJq ;vvr:vxiaq fJ Kar:a r:o ;vµ<j>ipov fJ avay!OJ EaXfV.

right or community of blood was not the bond of union between them, so much
as interest or compulsion as the case might be. (trans. Crawley VII. 1. 3).
Expedience or force not justice or kinship rules.
Because the Ionian Athenians willingly go against Dorian Syrakuse ( 'A&f]vaim
µ'Ev avr:o[ "IwvEq

bet tiwptaq 'i.vpaKoaiovq EKovuq

~}.(}ov),

they do so out of

expediency not compulsion. Speaking the same tongue and using the same voµo1, the
Lemnians, lmbrians, and Aeginetans, all Athenian colonists, come along. The
Ionian subjects are the Eretrians, Chalkidians, Styrians, and Karystians from
Euboea; from the islands are the Keians, Andrians, and Tenians; and from Ionia are
the Milesians, Samians, and Chians. All except the Chians, who are autonomous,
come under compulsion.
Other subjects coming under compulsion are the Aeolians: Methymnians,
Tenedians, and Aenians. Out of hatred come the Plataeans. Notice how by his word
order Thucydides stresses that blood fought against blood:
ovw1 o'f AioJ.ijq AioJ.Evmv wiq Kr:iaam Bmwr:oiq < r:oiq > µEr:a 'i.vpaKoaiwv
Kar:' avixyKrJV l:µaxovr:o, IUar:atiJq Of Kar:avr:tKpv Botwr:ol Bmwr:oiq µovot
EiKor:wq Kar: a r:o 'fxBoq.

These Aeolians fought against their Aeolian founders, the Boeotians in the
Syracusan army, because they were obliged, while the Plataeans, the only
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native Boeotians opposed to Boeotians, did so upon a just quarrel. (trans.
Crawley VII. 5. 2)
Aio}.~r;

strikes against Aio}.fvatv and Bo1wwl against Bo1wwlr;. The catalogue

continues in this vein with Thucydides emphasizing kinship and compulsion. Dorian
Rhodians are forced to fight against Dorian Syrakusans and the Geloans, colonists
from their city. Dorian Kytherians, colonists from Sparta, fight against Sparta (VII.
57. 6). Athens' control of the sea forces the participation of the Kephallenians and
Zakynthians, though they are autonomous (VII. 57. 7. 1). Nominally forced, but
more out of hatred for Korinth, the Kerkyraeans fight against their metropolis
Korinth and their relatives, the Syrakusans (VII. 57. 7. 4). The Messenians come
under force (VII. 57. 8). Megarian exiles fight against the Megarian Selinuntines
(VII. 8. 3).
The rest come along more of their own accord. Hatred of Sparta and desire for
personal gain lead Dorian Argos to fight alongside Ionian Athens against her Dorian
brethren (VII. 57. 9). Profit (Ki.poor;) makes the Mantineans and other mercenaries
from Arkadia believe the enemy is their fellow Arkadians, who are fighting along
with the Korinthians (VII. 9. 5). For pay the Kretans willingly fight against, not
alongside of, their colonists who founded Gela along with the Rhodians (VII. 57. 9.
9). The Akamanians come for pay but also out of friendship for Demosthenes and
out of goodwill to the Athenians (VII. 57. 10).
Of the Italians, civil strife forces the Thourians and Metapontians to join
Athens. The Sicilian Naxians and the Katanians fight with Athens as well as most of
the barbarian Sikels and the barbarian Egestaeans, who invited Athens to Sicily (VII.
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57. 11). Finally Athens has on her side some Tyrrhenian enemies of Syrakuse and
lapygian mercenaries.
Dorian, autonomous, and Greek are the Syrakusans, the Kamarinaeans, the
Geloans, the Selinuntines, and the Himeraeans (VII. 58. 1). Syrakuse has on her
side those of the Sikels who did not go over to Athens (VII. 58. 3. 3). The Spartans
provide a general, some Neodamodes (freedmen), and Helots (VII. 58. 3. 4).
Korinth, with ships and infantry, the Leukadians, and the Ambrakiotes come on
account of kinship (VII. 58. 3. 7). Arkadian mercenaries, paid by Korinth, come,
and under compulsion come the Sikyonians. Finally the Boeotians also join in (VII.
58. 3. 10).
Many insights can be gleaned from this catalogue. Expediency, compulsion,
and kinship order the arrangement. Kinship of course suggests that the battle and
war are a type of stasis, with kinsmen killing kinsmen. The reason for this murder
(<f>ovor;) is either profit (Kipoor;, i.e., expediency) or compulsion (avixyKrJ). Of the

Athenian allies only the Plataeans and Akarnanians act for reasons other than these.
Expediency, compulsion, and kinship are also three of the main aspects of
Thucydides' stasis excursus. Men work for private gain regardless of the public cost
(III. 82. 8). War assimilates to present circumstances the tempers of the majority
(III. 82. 2. 8). And kinship is more alien than partisanship (III. 82. 6. 1).
It is also significant that of the Syrakusans and their allies the vast majority

fights not for gain or under compulsion but for autonomy and of its own free will.
Thus the catalogue suggests that the Athenian loss is in part attributable to the
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effects of stasis and that the Syrakusans win because they are, for the most part, free
of these effects. Finally, I think it no mistake that in his summary of this event,
Thucydides writes,
;vv€f3YJ u 'lpyov wfn:o [ • EAArJVtKov ] 10 -rwv Kara -rov noAEµov -rovoE µiytawv
yEvfoOat, OOKftV o' 'fµ0tyf Kat WV aKofJ • EAA'fJVlKWV iaµEv, Kat Wt~ i'f
Kpa-rfjaaat A.aµnpo-rawv Kat wi~ Otac/JOapEtOl ovowxfo-rawv

This was the greatest Hellenic achievement of any in this war, or, in my
opinion, in Hellenic history; it was at once most glorious to the victors, and
most calamitous to the conquered. (trans. Crawley VII. 87. 5)
I think it safe, then, to conclude that stasis plays a prominent role in the
Sicilian Expedition and that Thucydides views this war as a type of stasis. But stasis'
time on stage is not limited to the Sicilian act. Thucydides shows that stasis and its
ethics are present even in Sparta. In addition, it is my belief that Thucydides
portrays the near breakup of the Peloponnesian League during the Peace of Nikias-and to a lesser degree the dissension present in the League in Book VIII--in terms of
stasis and its ethics. Thus stasis nearly destroys the Peloponnesian League and with
it Sparta's preeminence in Hellas. Finally, as a result of the coup of 411, stasis
almost destroys Athens' empire.

SPARTA
At the first congress of Sparta, in 432, after the Korinthians and Athenians
have spoken, Archidamos, king of the Spartans, steps forward and urges the
Spartans not to declare war hastily but to consider the magnitude of the war and to
take two to three years to prepare for the coming struggle (I. 80-85). Though he has

10

Secl. Kruger.
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had experience of many wars and of the suffering that walks hand and hand with
them, it is no surprise that the Spartans reject Archidamos' advice for Sthenelaedas'
simple, straightforward, and thoughtless exhortation for war. 11 In the excursus
section on virtues and vices, Thucydides deplores this very replacement of prudent
thought by unthinking, daring action.
Later when the Peloponnesians first invade Attika (431), Archidamos suffers
public censure because his tarrying on the Isthmus, his slow marching into Attika,
and his delaying at Oenoe are thought to be evidence of Athenian sympathies. His
motivation is said to be his thinking that the Athenians would submit rather than
allow their land to be ravaged (II. 18). But his failure to act quickly, or rather his
desire to act prudently, nearly convict him of treason. Though Sparta's EiJVoµia wins
the war, it does so at great cost, and not even Sparta is free from the ethics that take
over in wartime.

11

The Spartans' choice brings to mind the words of Chief Seattle to Governor
Isaac Stevens:
Youth is impulsive. When our young men grow angry at some real or
imaginary wrong, and disfigure their faces with black paint, it denotes that
their hearts are black, and then they are often cruel and relentless, and our
old men and old women are unable to restrain them. Thus it has ever been.
Thus it was when the white men first began to push our forefathers further
westward. But let us hope that the hostilities between us may never return.
We would have everything to lose and nothing to gain. Revenge by young
men is considered gain, even at the cost of their own lives, but old men who
stay at home in times of war, and mothers who have sons to lose, know
better.
Chief Seattle, "Address," in The Norton Reader: An Anthology of Expository Prose,
general editor, Arthur M. Eastman, 7th ed. (New York and London: W. W. Norton
& Company, 1988), 693-4.
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At the end of ten years' fighting, Sparta's reputation is at an all time low. In
fact since the disaster of Pylos (425/24), Sparta has feared civil strife:
¢of3ovµEvot µi] a</Jiat vEwupov n yiv'YJTat r:wv nEpt r:i]v Kadwr:amv.

they lived in constant fear of internal revolution. (trans. Crawley IV. 55. 1)
Far from being formidable, Sparta's reputation is at its nadir and to boot she is
despised (1)nEpw</>ffr/):

r,

Kar:a yap 7:0V xpovov wvwv 'if AaKfOaiµwv µaA.tar:a oi] K<XKW<; TJKOVOf Kai
V7TEpw</>ffr/ Ota r:ac; ;vµ</Jopac;' oi 'if • ApyELOl aptar:a foxov wlc; naatv, ob
;vvapaµEVOl WV • AntKOV noA.iµov, aµ</Jor:ipotc; Of µaA.A.ov 'l:vanovoot OV7:f<;
EKKapnwaaµEvot.

For at this time Lacedaemon had sunk very low in public estimation because of
her disasters, while the Argives were in a most flourishing condition, having
taken no part in the Attic war, but having on the contrary profited largely by
their neutrality. (trans. Crawley V. 28. 2. 5)
In addition to her fear of internal strife, Sparta is faced with dissension amongst the
members of the Peloponnesians League.

PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE
As a result of Sparta's humbling and miffed at her treaty and subsequent
alliance with Athens, the Korinthians propose to the Argives that they pass a decree
inviting any independent Hellenic state to make a defensive alliance with them (V.
27). Needing little coaxing because they wish to challenge Sparta for the supremacy
of the Peloponnese, the Argives accept the proposal:
Mi;avr:o 'if r:avr:a ol •ApyELOl µaA.A.ov opwvr:E<; 7:0V 'if AaKEoatµoviwv a</Jiat
7TOAEµov EaoµEVOV (€n' €;ooq> yap npo<; avwv<; al anovoa/ ~aav) Kat aµa
Uniaavuc; r:fJc; ITEA.onovv1]aov i]y1]aw0at ·

Argos came into the plan the more readily because she saw that war with
Lacedaemon was inevitable, her truce with her being on the point of expiring,
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and also because she hoped to gain the supremacy of Peloponnese. (trans.
Crawley V. 28. 2)
After the Corinthian offer to Argos (V. 27), the Mantineans and their allies join
the Argive alliance' (V. 29). Having made a separate alliance with Korinth, the
Eleans join the Argives (V. 31). Next the Korinthians and Chalkidians of Thrace
join (V. 31). The Boeotians and Megarians remain undecided (V. 31). Tegea refuses
to join (V. 32). The Boeotians and the Megarians refuse to join Argos' alliance (V.
38). This breaking up of the Peloponnesian League and Korinth's invitation to Argos
to take over control are directly analogous to Thucydides' description of stasis as
pro-Spartan or pro-Athenian factions inviting Sparta or Athens to help them gain
control of the polis.
An uprising by any one of the factional city-states, Korinth, Boeotia, Elis, or
Megara, is particularly imminent. Each is a threat to Sparta's supremacy of the
Peloponnese. In addition, Korinth's soliciting Argos to challenge Sparta further
threatens this supremacy. The entire narrative, (V. 16-83), exemplifies the political
maneuvering for power and the disregard for treaties that are present during stasis.
And it is for these two reasons that I think Thucydides intended this section to be
understood in terms of stasis and its ethics.
In addition, it is not until Sparta quashes the rebellion with force that the rapid
changing of alliances ceases. 12 Having defeated the Argives and their League (V.
57) in 418/17 at the battle of Mantinea, the Spartans regain their former esteem (V.

12

Cf. III. 82. 7.

129
75). Consequently, the Argives and Mantineans come to terms with Sparta (V. 76;
V. 81). Nonetheless, during the seeming Peace of Nikias, stasis is a battle away
from dissolving the Peloponnesian League and destroying Sparta's preeminence.
Sparta's victory at Mantinea saves the League from dissolution and her from
ignominy. By winning the battle, Sparta avoids stasis, and throughout the war, she
continues to do so. But Book V shows how insidious a force stasis is. 13 Even
Sparta nearly breaks under her pressure.
In Book VIII stasis again threatens the Peloponnesian League. In part the
dissension among the Peloponnesians is the result of Alkibiades' advising
Tissaphernes to let the Athenians and Peloponnesians wear one another out so that
neither would be strong enough to threaten his empire (VIII. 45-46).
Two means of achieving this end that Tissaphernes seems to have followed are
his dropping the pay to the Peloponnesian soldiers from a drachma to three obols
and dispensing it irregularly and his failure to bring his Phoenician fleet to aid them.
As a result the soldiers of the Peloponnesian League become irritated and clamor for
engaging the enemy in a decisive battle (VIII. 78). Their dissatisfaction with
Tissaphernes they direct against the Spartan admiral Astyochos whom they believe to
be in cahoots with Tissaphernes for private gain (VIII. 83. 3).
Anger reaches the point that Astyochos, responding brashly to Dorieus' demand
for his soldiers' pay and threatening him with his baton, barely avoids the soldiers'
rush by taking refuge at an altar (VIII. 84). Sparta replaces Astyochos with

13

As does Book VIII, treated in detail below.
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Mindaros and, by so doing, avoids stasis once again (VIII. 85. 1).

ATHENS
Though Sparta avoids stasis, Athens does not. In 458/57 the Spartans assist
Doris, their original homeland, in her struggle against the Phokians. Having
compelled the Phokians to come to terms, the Spartans consider what route to take
home. Sailing across the Gulf of Krisa seems unsafe as does the route across
Geraneia, since the Athenians hold Megara and Pegae. The Spartans decide to
remain in Boeotia and deliberate further, especially because a fifth column in Athens
has been secretly conspiring with them to demolish the democracy and to end the
construction of the long walls (I. 107).
Although nothing comes of the plot, the seeds of stasis have been sown in the
reader's mind, and upon them the rays of Thucydides' comments at II. 65 shine
strongly. The next instance of stasis' existence in Athens occurs in 431 when King
Archidamos first invades Attika. Archidamos encamps upon and specifically
ravages Acharnae. 14 His hope is that Athens will engage in battle. But if she does
not, he hopes that having lost their land and, therefore, being less willing to risk
themselves for their neighbors' land, the Acharnians will engender civil strife in
Athens (II. 20. 4). Were it not for Perikles' supreme control, Archidamos' plan
might have succeeded (II. 21).
For clearer instances of stasis at Athens we turn to Books VI-VIII. Before

14

Acharnae was the largest of Athens' demes and provided a significant
number of hoplites to the Athenian infantry (II. 19. 2 and II. 20. 4).
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urging the Athenians to embark on the Sicilian Expedition of 415, Alkibiades 15 is
introduced as being at odds with Nikias and being desirous of private gain and
glory:
{Jov}..fJµEvo~ n'{J TE NtKi<f €vavrwva0at, wv Kat €~ raAAa 01a¢opo~ ra 1roAtrtKa

Kat OTl avwfJ ota{JOA(J)~ €µvf700rj, Kat µaAtaTa arparrJyiJaOai TE bctfivµmv Kat
Uni,wv °'2:.tKEAiav TE ot' avwfJ Kat KapxrJOOVa A~ljJwOat Kat Ta TOta aµa
EVTVX~Oa~ xp~µaai TE Kat obf,1J Wc/JEA~OEtV.

wishing to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent and also because of the
attack he had made upon him in his speech, and who was, besides, exceedingly
ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and
personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes. (trans.
Crawley VI. 15. 2. 2)
Thucydides' emphasis on Alkibiades' personal dispute with Nikias and on his desire
for personal gain and glory convict him of behavior that helps cause stasis. 16
Thucydides explicitly condemns him when he writes that his desires being greater
than his means most of all destroyed Athens:
WV yap EV af,uiJµart imo TOJV aarwv, Tai~ €mOvµia1~ µEi,oatv ~Kara ri]v
imapxovaav oiJaiav txpiJw f~ TE Tix~ innorpoc/Jia~ Kat Ta~ aAAa~ oanava~.
OJCEP Kat Ka0ELAEV VOTEpov TlJV TWV . A&rjvaiwv JCOAlV oiJX YJKtOTa.

For the position he held among the citizens led him to indulge his tastes beyond
what his real means would bear, both in keeping horses and in the rest of his
expenditure; and this later on had not a little to do with the ruin of the

15

As is the rule in Thucydidean studies, scholars are directly opposed in their
estimation of Alkibiades' character in the History. J. Finley takes a negative stance
on Alkibiades' character, (Thucydides, 218-20); conversely R. Connor thinks that
Alkibiades' "extravagances and ambition are not the problem," but the city's
"inappropriate response to him," (Thucydides, 164). As I argue in the text the
important distinction is between Alkibiades' dangerous personal actions and desires
but excellent statesmanship and his rivals' just as dangerous personal actions and
desires but inferior statesmanship.
16

See Ill. 82. 8.
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Athenian state. (trans Crawley VI. 15. 3)
This last statement requires more comment, for Thucydides' next statement seems to
shift the blame from Alkibiades to the hoi polloi:
<f>ofl'YJ(Nvu~ yap ain:ov oi 7toJ...J...ot r:o µiyEOo~ r:ij~ u 1wr:a r:o i:avwv awµa

1tapavoµia~ f~ r:r,v oial'rav Kat r:ij~ otavoia~ WV KaO' EV 'lxaawv EV onp

yiyvotw E1tpaaafv, w~ wpavvioo~ i:mOvµovvr:t 1tOAiµwt KaOfor:aaav, Kat
OYJµoaiq. Kpixr:wr:a otaOivr:t r:a wv 7toAiµov ioiq. 'fKaawt wi~ l:mr:rJoevµamv
avwv axOwOivr:f~' Kat aJ...J...ou; i:mr:pbpav'rf~' ov Ota µaKp01i 'fa</>YJA<XV r:r,v
1tOAtV. 17

Alarmed at the greatness both of his license in his own life and habits and of
the ambition which he showed in all things soever that he undertook, the mass
of the people set him down as a pretender to the tyranny, and became his
enemies; and although publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be
desired, individually, his habits gave offence to everyone, and caused them to
commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the city. (trans.
Crawley VI. 15. 4)
I have quoted these passages because they are essential to any interpretation of the

History. Besides stasis in general, whom does Thucydides hold responsible for
Athens' demise, Alkibiades, the Athenian demos, or both?
I do not think there is a clearcut answer. On the one hand, Thucydides shows
throughout the History that the personal motives that impel Alkibiades are the ones
that lead to stasis, but he also recognizes Alkibiades' strong and effective leadership.
On the other hand, he condemns the just as personal motives of Alkibiades' enemies

17

Scholars disagree as to whether o1tEp Kat Ka0EtAEv from the quote above and
ob ota µaKpofJ 'fa</>YJA<XV r:qv 1tOAtv refer to Athens' defeat at the hands of the
Syrakusans in 413 or to her defeat at the hands of Sparta in 404 or the first to her
defeat in 404; the second to her defeat in 413. Because of ob ota µaKpov, I incline
toward the last understanding. For a different view, see Gomme, Andrewes, and
Dover, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, vol. 4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1970), 242-45.
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and their inferior statesmanship. If there is any answer to Thucydides' thoughts on
the enigmatic Alkibiades, I think it must be the one put into Aeschylus' mouth by
Aristophanes at the end of the Frogs:
[ OiJ XPi'f J...f:ovwr; mciJµvov €v noAft Tpi<j>flv.]
MaJ...taTa µi:v J...f:ovTa µi'f 'v noAfl Tpi</>Etv ·
~v o' fKTpa<j>fJ Tlt;' wir; Tponmr; V7frJPfTflV.

[A lion's cub must not be reared in the city.]
A lion must not be reared in the city
but if one is, submit to his ways. (1431 a & b-1432)
That Thucydides thinks the political maneuverings of Alkibiades' enemies stasiscausing comes clear in his narrative on the mutilation of the herms 18 (VI. 27-28;
53; 60-61) and in his Harmodios and Aristogeiton excursus (VI. 53-59).
On the eve of the Sicilian Expedition the berms are mutilated. 19 This
mutilation is taken as ominous for the expedition and as part of a plot to destroy the
demos:
WV Tf yap fKJfAOV oiwvor; fOOKfl flVat Kat f7fl ~11vwµoaiq, aµa VfWTEpwv
npayµaTwv Kai /Jf/µ011 KaTaJ...vaEwr; yEyfV'i]OOat.

as it was thought to be ominous for the expedition, and part of a conspiracy to
bring about a revolution and to upset the democracy. (trans. Crawley VI. 27.
3)
Some metics and slaves give testimony not concerning the mutilation of the berms

18

The berms were marble or bronze pillars with human head and phallus and
sacred to the god Hermes, The Oxford Classical Dictionary, ed. N.G.L. Hammond
and H.H. Scullard, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 505.
19

For a thorough discussion on the mutilation of the berms and profanation of
the mysteries, see Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover, A Historical Commentary on
Thucydides, 264-88.
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but concerning the profanation of the mysteries, 20 and Alkibiades is implicated in
this charge (VI. 28). Concerning these events Thucydides is clear on two things:
one, it was never found out for certain who the guilty parties were and, two,
Alkibiades' enemies took hold of the charge to discredit him and thereby to obtain
their own unhindered control of the people (VI. 60. 5 and VI. 28. 2):
KaV wfn:q> oi µ'fv na0ovu~ aOYJAOV ~V fi aoiKW~ fr:er:tµwpYJVTO, ij µEVTOL {x}.,}.,'f/
21
no}.1~ €v r4> napovn nEpt</Javw~ w</JEAYJTO

In this it was, after all, not clear whether the sufferers had been punished
unjustly, while in any case the rest of the city received immediate and manifest
relief. (trans Crawley)
and
WV Kat TOV •AAKt{Jdxo'f/V f7r1JTLWVTO. Kai avTa v;ro}.aµfiavovu~ oi µaALOTa T4>
• AAKt{JtfxOJJ axOoµEVOl €µnoowv OVTl a</Jiat µYj avwi~ TOV ofJµov {JE{Jaiw~
7rpOWTaVat, Kat voµiaavu~, fi aVTOV fl;EAaOftaV, 7rpWTOl av flVat

Alcibiades being implicated in this charge, it was taken hold of by those who
could least endure him because he stood in the way of their obtaining the
undisturbed direction of the people, and who thought that if he were once
removed the first place would be theirs. (trans Crawley)

Their conniving brings to mind Thucydides' words of III. 82. 8. 10:
Kat YJ µETa 1/JfJ</Jov aoiK01J KarayvwOf(J)~ YJ XELPL KTWµfVOl TO Kpau'iv

acquiring power either with the condemnation of an unjust vote or by force.
Alkibiades offers to stand trial before embarking on the expedition, but afraid
that with the army's support Alkibiades would be acquitted, his enemies have the

2

°For another ancient account of the profanation of the mysteries, see
Andokides, ITEpi rwv µvarYJpfwv.
21

€v r4> napovr1: the importance of this phrase cannot be overemphasized.
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trial put off. Their plan is to have him brought home from Sicily upon some graver
charge (VI. 29).
Hence it happens that the Salaminia, Athens' official ship, arrives at Sicily and
charges Alkibiades and others with the profanation of the mysteries and the
mutilation of the berms (VI. 53. 1). Of this recall Thucydides writes:
oi yap • AOrrvaiot, €:rmoiJ iJ ar:par:ta a:rti:rtAflJOEV' ovo'fv ~aaov ~fJr:170tv
E:rtOLOVVW r:wv :rtEpt r:a µvar:fJpta Kat r:wv :rtEpt Wi)(; • Epµa~ opaaOivr:wv' Kat
ov OOKtµa~OVTE~ WV~ µ17vvr:a~, a).).a :rtavr:a v:rcimr:w~ a:rtOOEXOµEVOl, Ota
:rtov17pwv avOpw:rcwv :rtiar:tv :rtavv XP'f/OWV~ r:wv :rtOAtTWV ;v).).aµfiavovr:E~
Kar:ioovv, xp17aiµwupov ijyofJµEvot Eivat fiaaaviaat r:o :rcpayµa Kat ebpEiv ~
Ota µ17vvwv :rtov17piav r:tva Kat XP'f/OTOV OOKovvr:a ElVat air:taOivr:a avEAEYKWV
Ota</JVyEiV.

For the Athenians, after the departure of the expedition, had continued as
active as ever in investigating the facts of the mysteries and of the Hermae,
and, instead of testing the informers, in their suspicious temper welcomed all
indifferently, arresting and imprisoning the best citizens upon the evidence of
rascals, and preferring to sift the matter to the bottom sooner than to let an
accused person of good character pass unquestioned, owing to the rascality of
the informer. (trans. Crawley VI. 53. 2)
It is worthwhile, I believe, to compare these words of Thucydides with those he

writes about Sparta's investigation into Pausanias' despotic conduct, some 50 years
earlier. 22
Sparta recalls Pausanias twice. On his first recall the charge was that he was
acting more as a tyrant than a general (478; I. 95. 3). 23 Having been acquitted,

22

In 4 79 Pausanias was instrumental in defeating the Persians at the Battle of
Plataea (I. 130. 1). Recalled twice by Sparta for acting like a tyrant, he is starved to
death by the Spartans for having plotted a helot revolt (I. 131-134).
23

Pausanias was the head of the allied Greek forces, who were attacking
various cities of the Persian Empire (I. 94-95).
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Pausanias leaves Sparta without orders, again behaves as if clad in royal purple, and
again Sparta recalls him (c. 470; I. 131. 1). Thucydides says that Sparta's suspicion
of Pausanias is based on four things: Pausanias' contempt of the laws; his imitation
of the barbarians; his attributing the defeat of the Mede to himself on the tripod that
was dedicated to Delphian Apollo; and his intrigue with the Helots (I. 132. 2-4).
These suspicions notwithstanding, the Spartans distrust even the information
concerning the last which they received from the Helots, their reason being that they
did not have indisputable proof. Although admitting her great suspicion, Thucydides
emphasizes Sparta's lack of tangible evidence against Pausanias:
(x}..}..' oM' Q)(; ovo( r:wv Ei}..wr:wv µ'f/V1JTat<; Ttal mar:evaaVTfC r,;iwaav VfWUpov
Tl JCOlftV E<; avr:ov, XPWµfVOl r:c{J r:pOJC<Jj lJjJCfp fi<i>Oaatv E<; a<j>a<; avwv<;, µi'J
T<XXfi<; fiVat JCfpt avopo<; 'J:.JCapr:uXW1J avf1J avaµ<j>ta{JrJr:fJr:wv UKµ'ffpiwv
{Jo1JAf'iJaai Tl avfJKWWV,

Even now, mistrusting the evidence even of the Helots themselves, the ephors
would not consent to take any decided step against him, in accordance with
their regular custom towards themselves, namely, to be slow in taking any
irrevocable resolve in the matter of a Spartan citizen, without indisputable
proof. (trans Crawley I. 132. 5).
When one compares these reflections of Thucydides with what he says concerning
the Athenian investigation, his disgust becomes all the more apparent.
It is in the suspicious context of the mutilation of the herms that Thucydides

relates the events of Harmodios and Aristogeiton. 24 At least part of his reason for
this excursus is to show how uncritically most Athenians accept past events. His

24

For a thorough explication of some of the other strands interwoven in this
excursus, see H. P. Stahl, Thukydides: Die Stellung des Menschen im
geschichtlichen Prozej3 (Munich: Beck, 1966), 1-11.
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point, of course, is that just as they are lax concerning the truth of the past so they
are lax in determining the truth of present events. Just how critical Thucydides is of
their indolence becomes apparent when the Spartan investigation of Pausanias is
compared with the Athenian condemnation of Alkibiades.
As well as showing how uncritically the Athenians accept the past, the
Harmodios and Aristogeiton excursus is intended, I think, to show how great is the
Athenian demos' (irrational?) fear and suspicion of tyranny and oligarchy (VI. 53.
3). Since the Athenians considered the profanation of the mysteries and the
mutilation of the berms part of an oligarchical and tyrannical conspiracy ([b

oijµo~]

1JJrOJrT'f/~ f~ WV~ mpt TWV µvartKWV ri]v airiav ).ajJbvux~' Kat Jravra avwl~ fOOKfl

€Jrl ;vvwµoaiq b).1yapx1Kf; Kat rnpavvucfJ JrEJrpaxOm, VI. 60. 1), the excursus helps

explain how the execution of many prominent Athenians could have occurred
without any tangible proof.
If, however, the only conclusion to be drawn from all this is that the Athenians

are uncritical about the past and are suspicious of tyranny and oligarchy,
Thucydides' efforts are but sound and fury. But when one sees that the motives
behind the Athenian investigation are driven in part by Alkibiades' enemies' wish to
get rid of him and to gain control of the demos for themselves, then the whole
clarifies into a picture of the seeds of stasis and its ethics firmly taking root in the
city of Athens, and a fuller understanding of Thucydides' words at II. 65 is
obtained.
When we tum our attention to the Athenians' motives for undertaking the
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Sicilian Expedition, the picture is further clarified. Thucydides' words introducing
this section are ominous:
WV o' ain:ov XELµwvo~ • A&rJvatOl i:{JofJ)..ovw aVOl~ w:il;ovl napaOKfVfJ -r:ijr:;
µE-r:a AfxXrJW<; Kat EiJpvµioovwr:; lent ~lKEAiav lCAEvaavur:; Kauxa-r:pitpaaBm, ft
ovvmvw, anflpOl oi lCOAAOt ovur:; ToV µEy€Bovr:; -r:fjr:; vfJaov Kat TWV EVOlKOVVTOJV
wv ;c)..fJBovr:; Kat • EAAfJvwv Kat Bapf3apwv, Kat o-r:l ov ;co)..)..6;} TlVt
1'noodaupov noAEµov lxvrJpovvw Fj wv npor:; ITEAonovvrJaiovr:;.

The same winter the Athenians resolved to sail again to Sicily, with a greater
armament than that under Laches and Eurymedon, and, if possible, to conquer
the island, most of them being ignorant of its size and of the number of its
inhabitants, Hellenic and barbarian, and of the fact that they were undertaking a
war not much inferior to that against the Peloponnesians. (trans. Crawley VI.
1)
The general mindset of the Athenians is one of ignorant daring. This daring, I
believe, indicates that the ethics that are becoming prevalent in Athens are the ethics
of stasis that Thucydides details at III. 82. 4-6, where mad daring replaces prudent
thought. All points of the compass are pointing toward doom, doom for the
expedition and doom for the city. Stasis' ethics, of course, provide the ship. To
emphasize the magnitude of Sicily and Athens' ignorance of it, Thucydides spends
four chapters listing Sicily's Greek and Barbarian inhabitants (VI. 2-5). 25

25

0n Thucydides' excursus on the inhabitants of Sicily, Andrewes and Dover
write that as elsewhere "Thucydides digresses in order to correct inaccuracies in
published works (cf. i. 97. 2 on the Pentekontaetia) and tradition (cf. vi. 54. 1) or in
order to give his readers interesting material which they are unlikely to find
elsewhere (e.g. ii. 97, on Thrace; 96 is in substance, though not in form, a part of
this digression)" (A Historical Commentary, vol. 4, 198). On the contrary
Thucydides does not include material merely to correct inaccuracies or merely to
give his readers "interesting material." While correcting inaccuracies, the
Pentekontaetia shows the growing power of Athens and thus lends support to
Thucydides' ixArJBW-r:a-r:rJ npiJ<j>am~; correcting inaccuracies as well, the excursus on
Harmodios and Aristogeiton evidences Athens' indolence concerning the truth of
both past and present events, helps explain why the murder of so many prominent
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In addition to her ignorance, Athens' reasons for wishing to conquer Sicily are
purely ones of personal greed, also indicative of stasis. I explained above the
personal motives Alkibiades has for wishing to undertake the expedition, and those
of Athens are kith and kin. Thucydides writes that the desire for sailing fell upon
everyone:
Kai €pwt; fVf7tf0f wit; :naatv oµoiwt; fK:JtAfVOat. wit; µ'Ev yap :npwf3vr:€pmt; Wt;
~ Kar:aar:peipoµ€vott; i:</>' a f:JtAfOV ~ oiJOf:v av O</>aAflaav µfyixA'fJV ovvaµtv,
wit; o' EV r:f; ijAtKiq. r:fJt; r:f a:JtOVO'f/t; :nOB<p 01/JfWt; Kai (}fwpiat;, Kat fVfA:JtlOft;
OVr:ft; aw&fjawOat. 0 OE :JtOAVt; oµtAOt; Kai ar:par:tWT:'f/t; EV r:f r:4> :napovr:t
apyvptov oiaflV Kai :npoaKr:fjawr:fJt ovvaµtv OfJfV aiOtoV µwfJo</>opav iJ:nap£flv.

All alike fell in love with the enterprise. The older men thought that they
would either subdue the places against which they were to sail, or at all events,
with so large a force, meet with no disaster; those in the prime of life felt a
longing for foreign sights and spectacles, and had no doubt that they would
come safe home again; and the idea of the common people and the soldiery was
to earn wages at the moment, and make conquests that would supply a neverending fund of pay for the future. (trans. Crawley VI. 24. 3).
That this is not a blissful and innocent 'fpwt; (desire), the next sentence, striking like
a squall, makes clear:
wau Ota r:i'jv ayav r:wv :JtAfOVWV f mfJvµiav' fl r:<p lxpa Kai µi'j !f/pWKf' OfOtWt;
µi'j lxvr:txflpowvwv KaKOVOVt; oo£flfV fivat r:f; :JtOAfl ijavxiav ~YfV.

With this enthusiasm of the majority, the few that liked it not, feared to appear
unpatriotic by holding up their hands against it, and so kept quiet. (trans.
Crawley VI. 24. 4).

Athenian citizens could have happened, and most importantly shows that an ethic of
stasis predominates in Athens; the paragraphs on Thrace are necessary because
Thucydides thinks it of utmost importance to know the nature and the resources of
the players in the History. His emphasis on the great resources of Sitalkes' empire,
second only to the Skythians, implies that had the Athenians joined him with their
fleet, as they had planned, they could have strengthened their interests in Thrace (II.
96-101).
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Echoing Thucydides' observation that the troublemaker is always trusted, his
gainsayer suspect (Kal 0 µ'fv xaAE1WlVWV JCUJ1:f)(; aift, 0 o' llV7:lAEYWV airr<{> VJCOJC'l:or;
III. 82. 5), this sentence clearly indicates that an ethic of stasis has taken hold in
Athens and of course presages the disaster at Syrakuse and those of 411 and 404. In
addition, if Cornford is correct in Thucydides Mythistoricus, Thucydides is alluding
to the words Aeschylus has Klytaemestra speak on the return of the conquering army
from Troy: 26
"Epwr; 0€ µ~ rtr; nponpov €µninr:'fJ ar:par:<{>
nopOEiV a µ'ij XP'iJ KEpOEOLV VlKWµ€vo11r;.
oEi yap npor; oixo11r; voar:iµo11 awrYJpiar;
KaµlfJai oiav}..011 0anpov KwAov na}..1v.

May no passion fall before upon the host
To sack what is forbidden bested by greed;
For a safe return home
they have half their race yet to run. (341-44)
One final comment on the Sicilian Expedition is required. At II. 65. 11
Thucydides attributes the disaster at Sicily mainly to stasis at Athens:
€; WV a).Aa i f JCOAAa, wr; EV µqaA'fJ JCOAfl Kat apxiJv EXOVO'fJ, ~µapr:~ffr/ Kat b
€r; ~lKEAiav n}..ovr;, or; ov r:oaovr:ov yvwµ'Yjr; aµapr:'Yjµa ~v npor; ovr; €nfJaav,
OOOV oi fXJCEµ'ljJaVifr; OV r:a npoa</Jopa r:otr; oixoµ(votr; EJCLYLYVWOKOVifr;, 27

26

F. M. Cornford, Thucydides Mythistoricus (first publ. by Edward Arnold,
Ltd., 1907; reprint, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), 214.
27

This statement may perplex the reader of Books VI and VII because in
relating the Sicilian expedition, nowhere does Thucydides say or show that the
leaders at home failed to send the army the necessary supplies. In fact the Athenians
prepare and send off an armament even greater than the conservative estimates of
Nikias, (compare VI. 25 with VI. 43), and in response to Nikias' fateful letter of
414/13 requesting reinforcements, they send an armament nearly equal in size to the
first (VII. 42. 1-2). What then does Thucydides mean by the words, oaov oi
EKJCEµ'ljJavnr; ob r:a npoa<f>opa r:olr; oixoµ€vo1r; €my1yvwaKovr:Er;? It seems r:a
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(x).).a Kar:a r:a~ ioia~ otaj3o).a~ mpl r:~~ WV oijµov npoar:aaia~ r:a '(( fV r:4>
ar:paWlCfO<{J aµf3kuupa flCOlo1JV Kai r:a 1C€pt r:r,v lCOAIV npwwv EV (x).).ij).01~
frapax&r]aav. a<jJaAfVU~ Of fV ~lf((Aiq. a).).'IJ 'ff napaaKWYJ Kai WV vavr:IKOV
r:4J lCAEoVI µopi<p Kai Kar: a r:r,v lCOAIV !f/OrJ EV ar:aa(l ovu~ oµw~ + r:pia + 28 µ'Ev
ErrJ avuixov wi~ u npor:fpov imapxovm lCOAfµiOL~ Kat wi~ ano ~IKfAia~
µfr:' avr:wv, Kai r:wv ;vµµaxwv ET/ Wt~ n).fomv ix</>WT:rJKOaL, Kvp<p 'ff vaupov
f3am).€w~ nmol npoayfvoµ(v<p, o~ napfiXf XPiJµar:a IlfA01COVVrJaio1~ €~ r:o
vavr:1Kov, Kai ov npbupov f-viooaav ~ avwl f-v a<J>im Kar:a r:a~ ioia~ ota<f>opa~
1C€p1nwovu~ Ea</>fxArJaav.

This [committing the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude], as
might have been expected in a great and sovereign state, produced a host of
blunders, and amongst them the Sicilian expedition, though this failed not so

npba<f>opa cannot refer to supplies as Arnold argues, "the words oiJ r:a npoa<f>opa
w'i~ oixoµivOL~ €my1yvwaKovu~

signify not voting afterwards the needful supplies
to their absent armament," but must mean suitable or fitting. Arnold,
E>OYKYMM-IT.: The History of The Peloponnesian War by Thucydides (London:
Whittaker and Co., 1882), 276. In fact the next part of the sentence supports this
contention:
(x).).(x Kar:ix r:a~ ioia~ Otaj3o).a~ 1C(.pl r:~~ WV oijµov npoar:aaia~ r:a 'ff fV r:4J
ar:pawni: Olp aµj3).vupa f-noiovv Kai r:a 1C€pl r:r,v lCOAIV npwwv fV (x).).ij).01~
frapax&r]aav.

For a similar use of npba<j>opa meaning suitable or fitting, compare VII. 62.
2: Kai yap w;or:m lCOAAOI Kat aKOVTLar:al f-mj3ijaovr:w Kai OXAO~, 4> vavµaxiav
µ'Ev lCOWVµfVOI fV lC(Aayfl OVK av f-xpwµdJa Ola r:o j3).fxnu1v av r:o r:~~ (mar:iJµrJ~
r:f; f3apVT:rJTI r:wv VfWV, fV Of r:f; (v(J{x<}( ijvayKaaµEv'fJ ano r:wv VfWV lC(~Oµaxiq.
npoa<J>opa for:m (compare also, I. 125. 2. 3 and II. 46. 1. 2). For a similar
interpretation of npoa<j>opa, see: Poppo/Stahl, Thucydidis de Bello Peloponnesiaco

Libri Octa (Leipzig: 1889; reprint, New York and London: Garland Publishing,
INC., 1987), 147.
I cannot resist noticing that Nikias' reliance on numbers, instead of on skill,
by which Athens' navy surpasses all others, dooms the upcoming naumachia.
28

Whether Thucydides is referring to the events of Sicily or those of 411
depends upon the phrase !f/o'Y/ f-v ar:aafl ovu~ oµw~ + r:pia+. Classen/Steup and
Gomme think the former and posit an OKTW. J. Classen and J. Steup, Thukydides
(Berlin: Wiedmann, 1892-1922), 177-78. A. W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary
on Thucydides, 5 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945-1981), 196-97. Thucydides'
description of the politics at Athens in terms of stasis and its ethics lends support to
this view.
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much through a miscalculation of the power of those against whom it was sent,
as through a fault in the senders in not taking the best measures afterwards to
assist those who had gone out, but choosing rather to occupy themselves with
private cabals for the leadership of the commons, by which they not only
paralysed operations in the field, but also first introduced civil discord at home.
Yet after losing most of their fleet besides other forces in Sicily and with
faction already dominant in the city, they could still for three years make head
against their original adversaries, joined not only by the Sicilians, but also by
their own allies nearly all in revolt, and at last by the king's son, Cyrus, who
furnished the funds for the Peloponnesian navy. Nor did they finally succumb
till they fell the victims of their own intestine disorders. (trans. Crawley II. 65.
7. 1 and 65. 10-12)
It is a striving for control of the demos (i.e., stasis) that Thucydides holds

responsible for the disaster in Sicily. This striving can refer to at least two events:
the recall of Alkibiades by his political enemies (VI. 28-29) and Athens' failure to
accept the request to be relieved of command made by Nikias, the reluctant and
physically ill leader of the expedition (414/13; VII. 10-17). 29
Although we do not have Thucydides' account of the last seven years of the
war, which include the disaster of Aegospotami and Athens' subsequent capitulation

29

L. Pearson thinks that the narrative of the Sicilian Expedition "is not written
in such a way as to bear out his [Thucydides'] remark in 2.65 that the Athenians
failed to support the expedition adequately after starting it on its course. When the
Athenians recall Alcibiades they are not represented as withdrawing support from
the expedition and the failure of Nicias to act decisively is not blamed on the
political atmosphere in Athens." L. Pearson, "Thucydides as Reporter and Critic,"
Transactions of the American Philological Association 78 (1947): 50-51. Pearson
fails to appreciate the significance of these two events, both of which indicate that
stasis has taken hold in Athens and show Athens' poor decision-making and both of
which are a result of the political atmosphere in Athens. For more extreme
corroboration of my view, see W. E. Thompson, "Thucydides 2.65.11," Historia
20 (1971): 141-54. For a middle-of-the-road interpretation, see H. D. Westlake,
"Thucydides 2. 65. 11," Classical Quarterly 52 (1958): 102-10.
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to Sparta, we do have his account of the events surrounding the stasis of 411, 30
which strongly marks the predominance of an ethic of stasis at Athens.
The events leading up to the stasis of 411 begin in this same year when
Alkibiades, with the aim of being recalled by the Athenians, begins to advise
Tissaphernes that the Athenians would be better allies than the Spartans (VIII. 46
and 47). Alkibiades sends word to the Athenians at Samos that if there were an
oligarchy at Athens, he would be able to procure for them the help of Tissaphernes,
Darios' satrap.
All those in power at Samos except Phrynichos accept Alkibiades' proposals
and prepare to send an embassy led by Peisandros to persuade Athens (VIII. 48-49).
By representing Tissaphernes as Athens' only hope of safety, Peisandros obtains the
acquiescence of the Athenian demos, and the democracy is abolished (VIII. 54 and
63).
The public cry of the oligarchs is that only persons serving in the war are to
receive pay and that only five thousand able in person and in purse are to serve in
the government. In reality only the heads of the revolution actually serve (VIII. 66.
1). Because of its language and its depiction of Athens' condition at this critical
moment, it is worth quoting Chapter 66 in full:
~v 0€ wfrco einrpEn€~ npo~ wv~ n}.Eiov~, E:TrEt €£ELv YE rijv no}.1v olnEp 1cat
µdJiaraaav EµEAAOV. oijµo~ µ€vwt oµw~ Erl Kat f3ov}.Tj ~ ano WV KVaµov
£11vE}.€yEw · l:.{3ofJ}.Evov bf oM€v ort µTj wl~ £vvwrwat ooKoi'YJ, aJ.,.}.a Kat oi

3

°For a discussion of other possible accounts concerning these events, see
Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover, A Historical Commentary on ThuGydides, vol. 5,
184-256.
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}.,iyovnc; fK wirrwv ;,aav Kai r:a PrJfirJaoµfva ;rpbnpov avw7c; ;rpovaKf7TW.
avr:iAfyi TE oVifoc; 'fr:t r:mv (x}.,}.,wv, OEOtwc; Kai bpmv 7TOAV r:o ;vvEOT:YJKO<;. fl M
r:tc; Kai avui7tot, fiJfh)c; fK r:po;rov r:tvoc; f7tlT:YJOfiov fr:dfvf/Kfl, Kai r:mv
opaaavr:wv OVT:f l;fJr:rJOt<; ovr:' fl V7t07tr:EVOlVW OtKaiwatc; €yiyvfw, aAA'
f/avxiav fiXfV o Of/µoc; Kai Kar:a7TAYJ;tv WtaVT:YJV wau Kipooc; o µi'f ;rfxaxwv r:t
{Jiawv, fi Kai atyrf>YJ, €voµtl;fv. Kai r:o ;vvWr:rJKoc; ;ro}..v ;r}.,fov fJyovµfvot fivat
ij OOOV fr:vyxavfV OV f/OOWVW r:a'ic; yvwµatc;, Kai €;rnp{iv avr:o aOVVar:Ol OVT:f<;
Ota r:o µiydJoc; r:fJc; 7tOAfW<; Kai Ota r:i'Jv aAA~AWV ayvwaiav oVK flXOV [ avwl
€;rnpftV]. Kar: Of r:avr:o wfno Kai ;rpoaoAo<jJvpaaBai r:tVl ayavaKr:fJaavr:a'
wau aµvvaaBat €m{JovAfvaavr:a, aovvawv fJv. 'if yap ayvmr:a av YJVpfv £{>
€pft 'if yvwptµov amawv. aAA~Aotc; yap a;ravuc; v;ro;rr:wc; ;rpoaf;aav oi WV
o~µov, we; µEr:ixovr:a r:tva r:mv ytyvoµivwv. €vfJaav yap K<XI ovc; OVK av ;ror:i
r:tc; <{>fw €c; OAtyapxiav r:pa;rfoBat. Kai r:o (x;rwwv OVWl µiytawv ;rpoc; wvc;
7tOAAovc; (;roirJaav K<XL 7TAftar:a €c; r:i'Jv r:mv /J}.,iywv aa<jJaAft<XV w<jJiAYJO<XV,
{Ji{JatoV r:i'Jv amar:iav r:<{> of/µOj ;rpoc; faVT:OV Kar:aar:fJaavuc;.

a

But this was a mere catchword for the multitude, as the authors of the
revolution were really to govern. However, the assembly and the council of the
bean still met notwithstanding, although they discussed nothing that was not
approved of by the conspirators, who both supplied the speakers and reviewed
in advance what they were to say. Fear, and the sight of the numbers of the
conspirators, closed the mouths of the rest; and if anyone ventured to rise in
opposition, he was presently put to death in some convenient way, and there
was neither search for the murderers nor justice to be had against them if
suspected; but the people remained motionless, being so thoroughly cowed that
men thought themselves lucky to escape violence, even when they held their
tongues. An exaggerated belief in the numbers of the conspirators also
demoralized the people, rendered helpless by the magnitude of the city, and by
their want of intelligence with each other, and being without means of finding
out what those numbers really were. For the same reason it was impossible for
anyone to open his grief to a neighbour and to concert measures to defend
himself, as he would have had to speak either to one whom he did not know,
or whom he knew but did not trust. Indeed all the popular party approached
each other with suspicion, each thinking his neighbour concerned in what was
going on, the conspirators having in their ranks persons whom no one could
ever have believed capable of joining an oligarchy; and these it was who made
the many so suspicious, and so helped to procure impunity for the few, by
confirming the commons in their mistrust of one another. (trans. Crawley)

In this paragraph echoes of III. 82-84 abound. At III. 82. 8. 12 piety
disappears and fair-seeming words prevail: wau fVOf/JELf! µ€v ovMupot i:voµtl;ov,
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Eim:purEiq. OE }.,byov oi~ gvµf3ai'fj bwj>Obvw~ Tl OtanpiigaaOat aµflVOV YJKOVOV. Here

the oligarchs make oligarchy

dmpEnfj~

by asserting that the Five Thousand will

share in the government. Surpassing the suspicion of III. 82. 5 (Kai b µEv
XaAE:Jtaivwv maTo~ aiEi,

o o'

av1:1).£ywv ainfi; fmo;;rw~), here murder and fear of

death do away with any opposition. The disappearance of justice that Thucydides
notes at III. 82. 8. 9 and III. 84. 3 manifests itself here in the wanton impunity of
murderers. Because not suffering prevails over trust

(KpEiaamJ~

OE

ov'l'f~ anav'l'f~

}.oytaµii; f~ TO avf:}.mawv WV {3Ef3aiov µi'J ;;ra(Jfiv µa}.}.ov npovaKO:JtOVV Pj maTfVOat
Mvvavw), Thucydides says that the stasis-plagued city becomes a battlefield of

distrust: TO OE aV1:1TfTiixOm

(x}.,}.,fj}.01~

Tf; yvwµri aniaTW~ f:Jtl :JtOAV OtfjVEYKfV (III.

83. 1-2). Here also not suffering is gain; distrust, survival. Chapter 66 clearly marks
the blossoming of civil strife and its ethics at Athens.
Ironically Samos, the birthplace of the oligarchy, becomes the base for the
democrats violently opposed to the government at home. When some three hundred
Samians, whom Peisandros won over to oligarchy, decide to put down the
democracy at Samos, Leon and Diomedon, Phrynichos' replacements and unwilling
supporters of the oligarchy, along with Thrasyboulos, Thrasyllos, and the Athenian
soldiery, come to the people's aid, put down the coup, and establish Samos as their
democratic base (VIII. 73). Echoing III. 82 . 8 (niivTwv
:JtAfOVE£iav Kat <j>1}.01:1µiav, ff(

o'

o'

ainwv ainov apxi'J

aVTWV Kai f~ TO </>tAOVIKflV KaBtaTaµf:vwv TO

npbff1Jµov), Thucydides writes:
f~

</>tAOVtKiav

avayKa~OVTf~

Ka0£aTaaav TOV XPDVOV WVWV oi µEv Ti/V :JtOAtV
O'fjµoKpa'l'fiaOat, oi OE TO aTpaTO:JtfOOV b}.1yapx{'taOat.

Tf

iJ Ota
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The struggle now was between the army trying to force a democracy upon the
city, and the Four Hundred an oligarchy upon the camp. (trans. Crawley VIII.
76. 1)
Stasis' stormy sea separates the two factions of Athens.
The Athenians at Samos recall Alkibiades and elect him general (VIII. 81-82).
Subsequently Alkibiades with difficulty overcomes the prevailing sentiment of the
camp and prevents its sailing against the Peiraeus. To the envoys from Athens who
had come to Samos to explain the situation at Athens and to allay concerns,
Alkibiades proposes that the Four Hundred be deposed and that the Five Thousand
rule along with Kleisthenes' Council of Five Hundred (VIII. 86).
At Athens moderate oligarchs like Theramenes and Aristokrates welcome
Alkibiades' proposals, their real reasons, as Thucydides writes, being their distrust
of the stability of the oligarchy and their desire to be the sole leaders of the
commons:
~v Of wfn:o µ'Ev ax'iJµa :JCOAlilKOV WV Aiiyov airrol~' Kar' ioia~ Of </>tAOrtµia~
oi :JCOAAOl avrwv re{> TOLOVr<p npoOEKflVTO, fv Ot:JCEp Kai µaAtara OAtyapxia EK
017µ01cparia~ yEvoµiv17 a:JCOAAVrat. navu~ yap av&rjµEpov a.gwvmv ovx O:JCOJ~
'Iaot, /x).).a Kat :JCOAV npww~ avro~ 'fraaw~ dvat. EK Of 017µ01cparia~
aipfoEOJ~ y1yvoµfr17~ pqov ra anof3aivovra W~ OlJK ano rwv bµoiwv
l:AaaaovµEvb~ n~ <j>ipEt.

But this was merely their political cry, most of them being driven by private
ambition into the line of conduct so surely fatal to oligarchies that arise out of
democracies. For all at once pretend to be not only equals but each the chief
and master of his fellows; however under a democracy a disappointed candidate
accepts his defeat more easily, because he has not the humiliation of being
beaten by his equals. (trans. Crawley VIII. 89. 3)
In addition to these fair-seeming words that reign in stasis, the metaphor of the
contest that Thucydides uses in III. 82 surfaces again here:
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ijywvi~ero

ovv fi;- 'fraaw;- airro;- :rtpiin:o;- :rtpoarar'Yj;- WV ofJµov yEvfoOm.

and it was now a race between them as to which should first become the leader
of the commons. (trans. Crawley VIII. 89. 4. 4)

As a result of this contention, the oligarchs split into two camps: moderates like
Theramenes and Aristokrates who wish the Five Thousand to rule, and extremists
like Phrynichos, Aristarchos, Peisandros, and Antiphon, who are most opposed to
democracy.
The extremists work posthaste on building a wall in Eetionia, a mole of
Peiraeus. Theramenes rightly avers that the purpose of the wall is not to prevent the
democrats at Samos from storming the Peiraeus but to welcome the fleet and army
of the enemy (VIII. 90-91). The mindset of the extremists is that they want
oligarchy and empire above all. Their second preference is independence with ships
and walls, and finally rather than see democracy restored and their lives forfeited,
they would invite in the enemy, make peace, and give up the walls and ships (VIII.

91. 3).
As the building of the wall continues, 42 Peloponnesian ships sailing for
Euboea anchor at Epidauros and overrun Aegina (VIII. 91 and 92). Theramenes and
Aristokrates realize that unless they act the extremists will invite the enemy in. And
so after many seditious words and suspicions (noA.A.wv 1cal araatwnKwv }..bywv Kai

vnotpiwv npoayEvoµ€vwv), Aristokrates, a taxiarch, along with the hoplites who were
building the wall in Eetionia, arrests the general Alexikles, an extreme oligarch.
Moving inside the mind of the two parties, Thucydides paints a picture of confusion:
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IIELpata Kau1}.:f1</>Bat Kai r:ov ;vvflkYJµµfrov r:d}vavm, o'f r:E iv r:<{> IIflpatEi
WV~ EK WV aauw~ oaov OVJC(l) EJCl a<t>a~ JCapEiVat.

All was now panic and confusion. Those in the city imagined that Piraeus was
already taken and the prisoner put to death, while those in Piraeus expected
every moment to be attacked by the party in the city. (trans. Crawley VIII. 92.
7)

Only by the intervention of the older men and by Thucydides, a Pharsalian

proxenos, throwing himself between the two and reminding them of the enemy's
presence, are the rival factions kept from engaging one another (VIII. 92. 8).
The city quiets and readies itself for protecting Euboea from the
Peloponnesians. But the Peloponnesians easily defeat the hastily embarked and
poorly prepared Athenians ships and effect Euboea's revolt (VIII. 95). Thucydides
writes that if the Spartans had followed up this victory by sailing against the
Peiraeus, they could easily have increased dissension in Athens and taken control of
the whole of Athens' empire. True to their slow and undaring character, however,
the Spartans prove themselves the most convenient of foes (VIII. 96. 4-5). This first
instance of clear stasis at Athens nearly undoes her, and indeed should have, had the
Spartan character been less conservative.
Athens' sobering defeat gives the advantage to the moderate oligarchs. The
Athenians depose the 400 and hand over control of the city to the Five Thousand,
the government that Thucydides praises as the best of his time for its moderate
combination of the concerns of the few and the many. 31 The Athenians also vote to

31

Kal ovx TJKWTa Oij r:ov JCpwwv xpovov EJCi YE i:µofJ • A&YJvaiot </>aivovr:at EV

JCOAtr:efJaavr:E~

(for the first time in my lifetime the Athenians were especially well
governed (VIII. 97. 2). This statement of Thucydides has been the focus of much
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recall Alkibiades (VIII. 97). Of the extremists, Peisandros and Alexikles withdraw
to Dekeleia. Aristarchos makes good his escape by going to Oenoe, an Athenian fort
besieged by the Boeotians, and by tricking the Athenians into surrendering the fort
to the Boeotians (VIII. 98). So ends stasis at Athens.
Stasis' prominence in the Archaeologia, its affliction of individual cities, its
prominence in the Sicilian Expedition, its presence in Sparta, its near destruction of
the Peloponnesian League and with it Sparta's preeminence in Hellas, and its
affliction of Athens show how much a part of the war stasis and its ethics are. In
fact, I believe, stasis and its ethics are so much a part of the war that Thucydides
himself saw the fighting between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians as a type of

debate, primarily because scholars think it at odds with Thucydides' admiration of
democratic Athens under the tutelage of Perikles. Attempts to reconcile Thucydides'
favorable treatment of Perikles and of Periklean Athens with his statement here
usually result in taking a very narrow interpretation of the latter. The narrow
interpretation makes a distinction between the form of government and the quality of
rule: EV :rroJ...1uvaavu<; refers not to Athens' constitution but to the manner by which
they governed. It translates rov :rrpwwv xpovov as "the initial period [of this rule],"
and it lessens the force of ovx f/Ktara by translating it "at least." For an example of
this interpretation, see Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover, A Historical Commentary on
ThuGydides, vol. 5, 331-39). Against this view Connor argues that the statement
here is part of a major development of attitude in the work: Thucydides' estimation
of democracy changed as he wrote the History (Thucydides, 228 n. 34).
I suggest that there need not be any tension to resolve or to explain.
Nowhere does Thucydides praise democratic Athens. The closest he comes to
praising democracy at all is when he says that in a democracy a candidate accepts
defeat more easily because he is not beaten by his equals (VIII. 89. 3). In most
other instances he criticizes the fickleness of the demos. I do not mean to argue that
Thucydides is an oligarch; he is equally critical of oligarchy (VIII. 89). What I wish
to argue is that praise of Perikles is praise of the man's ability and no more (see
note 4). Thucydides' praise of Perikles is not at all incompatible with his praise of
the moderation that resulted from The Five Thousand's successful fusion of the
needs of the few and the many. As I argue below, it is moderation or Evvoµia that
Thucydides admires most, not any specific form of government.
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stasis, with Greek killing Greek. Certainly Thucydides does not equate the two for
in his litany of disasters at I. 23. 2. 4, he distinguishes between those caused by war
and those caused by stasis:
</>Vyal -r:oaai& avOpw:!tWV Kai <J>fwo~' 0 µ€v Kar' avrov T:OV :JtOAEµov' 0
01a ro araaiixl;ELv.
OV'l'f

Of

never was there so much banishing and blood-shedding, now on the field of
battle, now in the strife of action. (trans. Crawley)
But just as his interpretation and understanding of the phenomenon of stasis are
similar to his interpretation and understanding of the events considered above so
does stasis and his reflections on it form part of the basis for his interpretation and
understanding of the war fought by the Peloponnesians and Athenians.

THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
It has already been argued that Thucydides conceives of the Sicilian War as a

type of stasis. Sicily is depicted as a polis and any alliance with Athens is viewed as
stasis within this polis. Thucydides makes this point most strongly in his catalogue
of allies before the Battle in the Great Harbor (VII. 57-58). It has also been
contended that Thucydides portrays the near dissolution of the Peloponnesian League
in terms of stasis and its ethics, with various members struggling for ascendancy.
Finally, Thucydides devotes much of Book VIII to the stasis that embroils Athens in
411.
Turning our attention to the fighting between the Peloponnesians and the
Athenians, I likewise contend that like the strategy of the Athenians in the Sicilian
War, the strategy of the Spartans and of the Athenians in the Peloponnesian War is
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one of stasis. This strategy works on two levels: on the level of the individual citystate and on the level of the League or Empire.
For example, at Ak:anthos stasis erupts over admitting Brasidas into the city:
oi OE 7CEpt TOV o€xwOat ain:ov Kar:' (x).}.J1J...ovc;
XaAKIOEWV .;vvEnayovTEc; Kat b oiJµoc;.

l:ar:aaia~ov'

o'i

TE

µEr: a TOW

The inhabitants were divided into two parties on the question of receiving him,
those who had joined the Chalcidians in inviting him, and the popular party.
(trans. Crawley IV. 84. 2)
and
oi OE • AKavOwt, 7COAAWV AfX(}frr:wv npor:Epov l:n' aµ<J>oTEpa, Kpv<J>a
ow'ljJYJ</>taaµEvo1, 01a TE r:o l:naywya EinEiv r:ov Bpaaioav Kat nEpt rov Kapnov
<J>of3cp €yvwaav oi 7CAEiovc; a<J>iar:aaOat 'AO'f/vaiwv

The Acanthians, after much had been said on both sides of the question, gave
their votes in secret, and the majority, influenced by the seductive arguments of
Brasidas and by fear for their fruit, decided to revolt from Athens. (trans.
Crawley IV. 88. 1)
Likewise stasis erupts at Mende. Brasidas effects the revolt of Mende and
receives her even though the revolt occurred after the armistice between Athens and
Sparta. Later with the help of the democratic faction, Athens regains Mende:
• Ev TOVT<p OE MEvO'f/ a<J>iar:ar:at avr:wv, 7COAtc; EV r:f; IIaAA1/V1J, • EpETptWV
a7COtKia. Kat avrovc; l:o€.;aro b Bpaaioac;

Meanwhile Mende revolted, a town in Pallene and a colony of the
Eretrians, and Brasidas received them. (IV. 123. 1)
and
Kai Ttvoc; avr:<{> TWV ano TOV ol]µov ixVTEl7COVTOc; Kar:a TO ar:aatWTIKOV lm OVK
f7CE.;ftalV OVOE ofotro 7COAEµEiv, Kat
ixvTEi7CfV f7Cta7Caa0€vroc; TE r:f; XflPt vn'
avrov Kat Oopvf3YJ0€vroc;' b oiJµoc; Evfh'Jc; avaJ...af3wv r:a 07CAa 7CEpt0pyi'Jc; EXWPfl
f7Cl TE IIEA07COVVYJOiovc; Kat wvc; r:a l:vavr:ia a<J>iat µET' avr:wv npa.;avTEc;

we;

At this moment one of the popluar party answered him factiously that they
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would not go out and did not want a war, and for thus answering was dragged
by the arm and knocked about by Polydamidas. Hereupon the infuriated
commons at once seized their arms and rushed at the Peloponnesians and at
their allies of the opposite faction. (trans. Crawley IV. 130. 4)
In the above instances, araau; and anoaraau; are inextricably entwined. In
fact, araau; is the direct result of anoaraau;. Furthermore, as I state at the
beginning of this chapter, in any revolt there is some pro-Spartan or pro-Athenian
faction that disagrees with the dominant party's resolution. Thus when revolt is
decided upon, stasis either breaks out or is latent, that is, the one necessarily implies
the other. 32
On the level of the city-state, therefore, the Spartans and the Athenians carry
on a factional war in conjuction with those within the city who are favorable to
them. As the History proceeds, the war is reduced to the Athenians struggling to
maintain the unity of her Empire and the Spartans inciting revolt--a struggle fought
by Athens and the factions favorable to her against Sparta and those favorable to
her.
The Korinthians verbalize this strategy of stasis when they list their reasons for
expecting success in the war:

imapxovat

32

Of

Kat (x).).at boo{ WV noM:µov i]µ'iv,

~vµµaxwv TE

anoaraau;,

This observation may seem to run counter to Thucydides' statement at II. 8.
5: ovrwq <EV> opyiJ flXOV oi n).(iovq wvq •A&rjvaiovq' oi µ£v rfJq apxfJq
ano}..v&f/vat fiov).iJµEVOt, oi Of µi'j apxOwat <f>ofiovµEVOL (thus the majority held
Athens in anger, some desiring to be free from her empire, others fearing lest they
be conquered). But it must be stressed that Thucydides is painting with broad
brushstrokes and that this stroke does not deny the existence of pro-Athenian
sentiment in Hellas as Thucydides narrative makes clear and as do his words at III.
82. 1. 5.
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µaJ..wr:a napaipwt~ ovaa r:wv npoaoowv ai~ iaxfJovat ...
We have also other ways of carrying on the war, such as revolt of their allies,
the surest method of depriving them of their revenues, which are the source of
their strength ... (trans Crawley I. 122. 1)
To effect the revolt of Athens' allies, the Spartans make ample use of the reputation
won in the Persian War for being the liberators of Greece. 33
Brasidas is the Spartan most effective in persuading Athens' allies to revolt.
Many of the cities of Thrace accept Brasidas' clever argument that they revolt from
Athens and join the Spartans in liberating Hellas, or since he understands their
refusal as benefitting the enemy, be compelled to by force.
Throughout the war, Sparta pursues this strategy of inducing revolt. Athens
pursues the same strategy but is not as successful--in part because she is hampered
by continually having to retake her own seceding subjects. Of course for Athens this
strategy is overtly one of subjugating new cities, 34 whereas for Sparta the
subjugation is hidden by the profession that she is liberating Hellas.
For Athens this strategy runs counter to Perikles' advice. In his first speech,
Perikles advises that the Athenians protect their empire and make no new conquests
(I. 144. 1). In the same speech, although he does not expressly use the word stasis,
by saying that the individual members of the Peloponnesian League will each seek
their own and personal ends, Perikles prophesies stasis for the League,

33

34

cf. I. 69. 1; II. 8. 4; III. 32. 2; and IV. 85. 1.

Witness for example Demosthenes conspiring with Boeotian democrats to
betray their cities to Athens (IV. 76-77; 89-101).
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:JCOAfµfiv OE µ~ npoq oµoiav avnnapaaKrnijv aovvaw1, OTaV µfjl'f
fJ01JAfVTYJpio; (vi xpwµfVOl napaxpfJµa Tl bf,iwq E:!Cll'fAWOl :JCCtVl'fq l'f iaotprJ<j>o1
OVl'fq Kat ovx oµo<j>VAOI TO (<j>' fa1JTOV (xaawq O:!CfVO'IJ. Ef, WV </>tAfl µYJOEV
€ml'fAEq yiyvwOat

but they are incapacitated from carrying on a war against a power different in
character from their own, by the want of the single council-chamber requisite
to prompt and vigorous action, and the substitution of a diet composed of
various races, in which every state possesses an equal vote, and each presses
for its own ends, a condition of things which generally results in no action at
all (trans Crawley I. 141. 6),
and as we saw above it does almost divide them. Although Perikles predicts stasis,
as part of his war strategy he does not advise inciting revolt. Not until after his
death in 429, do the Athenians adopt the strategy that the Peloponnesians have had
since the war's inception. Inciting revolt then becomes one of the main strategies of
both combatants.
Both also share an altered system of values. A major component of stasis is
striving for individual gain and glory instead of working for the good of the city. In
stasis personal striving destroys the state:
oi yap €v Taiq noJ...w1 npoaTavl'fq µfl'a bvoµawq €Kal'fpo1 fvnpfnovq,
nJ...fJOovq l'f iaovoµiaq :JCOAmKfjq Kat aptaiOKpaTiaq aw<j>povoq nponµfjafl, Ta
µ£v KOLVa J...oyo; (}fpa:!CfVOVl'fq aOJ...a E:JCOIOVViO, nan/ OE Tpono; aywv1~oµfVOl
aJ...J...fJJ...wv :!Cfp1yiyvwOa1 fl'oAµYJOCtV l'f Ta OflV{JTaTa f:!Cff,'ijaav Tf Taq
T1µwpiaq fl'1 µfi~ovq, oil µ£xp1 wv 01Kai01J Kai T'ij noAfl f,vµ<j>op01J npoT10€vTfq,
f q Of TO f Kal'fpOLq :JCOV aft i]oov~v €xov opi~ovuq' Kai Ff µfTa 'ljrfj<j>ov aoiKOV
KaTayvwafwq Ff XflPt KTWµfvo1 To Kpal'fiv fl'oiµOL ~aav T~v a-bTiKa <j>1J...ov1Kiav
i:KmµnJ...ava1.

For in the cities, the leaders, each with his own fine slogan, the people's
political equality or the prudent aristocracy, looking after the state in word, set
up contests, and vying in every way to surpass one another, dared the most
dreadful deeds, went after ever greater vengeances, not setting their endpoint at
a place just and beneficial to the city but making their boundary that which
always gives pleasure to each, and acquiring power either with an unjust vote's
condemnation or by force, they were prepared to sate their immediate desire
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for victory. (III. 82. 8)
In his speech after the second invasion of the Peloponnesians, Perikles himself
stresses the importance of the state over the individual:
KaJ...wr; µ£v yap </JEpoµEvor; avfjp TO Ka(}' fa1JTOV Ota</J0Etpoµ€V'YJr; TfJr; naTpioor;
ovo£v -Yjaaov ;vvanoJ...J...vTat, KaKorvxwv 0£ i:v ebwxovmJ noJ...J...0 µaJ...J...ov
otaacf>CETat.

A man may be personally ever so well off, and yet if his country be ruined he
must be ruined with it; whereas a flourishing commonwealth always affords
chances of salvation to unfortunate individuals. (trans. Crawley II. 60. 3)
In the stasis excursus, Thucydides' point, however, is that personal greed can
destroy the state.
Although Athens' purpose for fighting the war, at least as verbalized by
Perikles and tacitly agreed to by the Athenians (I. 140), is initially to avoid
subjugation to Sparta, after Perikles' death, in addition to fighting the war with the
Peloponnesians, Athens seeks to expand her empire. This purely personal (ioiq) aim
is indicative of the ethics that take over in a time of stasis.
Sparta also seems to begin the war for a public and noble reason: the liberation
of Hellas from Athens' yoke. Brasidas' actions in Thrace, however, give the lie to
this noble cry and show that Sparta's aim is the same and as personal as Athens',
that is, the domination of Hellas. And Thucydides writes as much at VIII. 2. 4:
navTaxoOEv Tf ebfJ...m&r; ovur; anpo<jJaaiaTwr; anuaOat OlfVOOVVTO TOV
noJ...€µov, J...oy1CoµEvo1 KaJ...wr; uJ...rnTfjaavwr; aiJTofJ Ktvovvwv u wwvTwv
anrJAAaxOat av TO J...01niJv oior; Kai 0 l.xno TWV •AO'Yjvaiwv nEptEaT'YJ av avwvr;'
fl TO "2:.tKfALKOV npoaUafiov' Kai Ka0EJ...ovur; fKEivovr; avwl TfJr; nixarjr;
'EJ...J...aoor; fJorJ aa<jJaJ...wr; ~yfjawOat.

With these reasons for confidence in every quarter, the Lacedaemonians now
resolved to throw themselves without reserve into the war, considering that,
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once it was happily terminated, they would be finally delivered from such
dangers as that which would have threatened them from Athens, if she had
become mistress of Sicily, and that the overthrow of the Athenians would leave
them in quiet enjoyment of the supremacy over all Hellas. (trans. Crawley)
This dichotomy (iOioc; v. oqµoawc;) is a major theme of the History, and, as in the
stasis excursus, serves to differentiate actions which are beneficial from those that
are destructive to the state. 35
As does stasis so does war remove justice from the opponents' actions and
interactions. For example, Athens allies with Kerkyra out of expediency. She kills
ambassadors for revenge. She nearly kills all the male population of Mytilene and
does do so at Skione and Melos. On her side, Sparta executes all sailors captured at
sea, whether they be neutral or not. Out of expediency she levels Plataea and
executes the remaining besieged.
In addition to the disappearance of justice is the disappearance of piety and
nobility (EiJaE{JEia and yEvvatorqc;). In all cases but one peace overtures are rejected
by the party with the upper hand. Thucydides attributes to her greed Athens' refusal
to make peace after Pylos: [ 'A&rjva'iot] wv 0€ nJ...fovoc; ivpiyovw and oi bf
[ 'A&rjva701] µfl~ovwv TE ivpiyovw (IV. 21. 2; IV. 41. 4). When Athens and Sparta

do make peace (i.e., the Peace of Nikias), it is because the war has so weakened

35

An implication suggested by this dichotomy, but nowhere manifestly made
by Thucydides, is that the personal strivings of Athens and Sparta are publicly
harmful to the state of Hellas. That such a pan-Hellenic view would have come clear
had Thucydides finished his History is uncertain. It is certain, however, that such a
view would not have sounded strange in the ears of the Greeks of this period, for in
408 at Olympia Gorgias fulminates against the Greeks currying Persia's favor and
bids them rather to unite against her. J. B. Bury and R. Meiggs, A History of
Greece, 4th ed. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1975), 314.
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them that they require time to recover (V. 14). But even this armistice Thucydides
considers only seeming (V. 26. 2).
Thucydides' assertion at III. 82. 7 best describes the interval of nearly seven
years:

ux 'ff ano TOJV €vavTiwv Ka)JiJr; Afyoµfva fVfOfXOVTO 'fpywv </>VAaKfJ'

fl

npovxolfv, Kai ov YfVVWOTYJTl. avTmµwpfJaaaOai Tf Ttva 7Cfpl n)..fiovor; ~v ~
aVTOV µi'J nponaOfiv. Kai opKOI fl nov apa YfVOIVTO ~vva)..)..ayfJr;' fV TijJ avTiKa
npor; TO anopov fraTip<p 01ooµfVOI iaxvov OVK fXOVTWV (x)..)..o()fv ovvaµtv.

The opposition's noble overtures were received by the stronger party with a
guard against his actions not with nobility. It was worth more to avenge
someone in turn than never to have suffered. If oaths of reconciliation ever
came about, being given to each other in the immediacy of the moment on
account of an impasse, they remained strong while neither side had power from
elsewhere.
Neither side gives back what they agreed. Both carry on the war abroad and violate
the treaty in the Epidaurian and Mantinean wars as well as in other instances (V. 26.
2). In addition I think the sentiment in the quote above is the motivation behind
Thucydides' quoting verbatim the three sets of treaties and alliances made during the
Peace of Nikias.
That the treaty and alliance of Athens and Sparta is made out of necessity and
that the terms are never totally honored have already been made clear. The treaty
and alliance of 420 made by the Athenians, Argives, Mantineans, and Eleans is even
more short-lived. In 419/18, hemmed in by the Peloponnesians, in violation of the
treaty and alliance of 420 with the Athenians, the Mantineans, and the Eleans, the
Argives make a treaty with Sparta (V. 59-60). Later Alkibiades persuades the
Argives, in violation of their treaty with Sparta, to join in an expedition against
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Orchomenos (V. 61. 2).
Having successfully besieged Orchomenos, the allies are divided again when
the Eleans depart, angered because the Athenians and Argives supported the
Mantineans' wish to attack Tegea instead of their desire to march against Lepreon
(V. 62). After their defeat at the battle of Mantinea, the Argives violate their treaty
and alliance with the Athenians, the Mantineans, and the Eleans and make a treaty
and alliance with Sparta (V. 76-79). Not much later the Mantineans follow Argos'
lead (V. 81). The next summer the people of Argos rise up against the oligarchs and
again court an alliance with Athens (V. 82). The ensuing summer Alkibiades sails to
Argos and rids her of 300 suspected Spartan sympathizers (V. 84).
Rather than reverence for one's word the majority of Book V shows deception
and intrigue ruling the actors' actions. In war as in stasis the sanctity of the word
enjoys no worshipers. Individual states struggle for personal gain and glory to the
detriment of any common action. 36 In this respect Book VIII is similar to Book V.
In Markellinos' collection of three introductions to Thucydides, 37 Book VIII is

36

Because of the inclusion of the treaties and the compressed narrative, some
scholars have argued that Book Vis unfinished. See, for example, V. Hunter, "The
Composition of Thucydides' History: A New Answer to the Problem," Historia 26
(1977): 270. But as I argue below the makeup of Book V, as well as Book VIII, is,
I think, in part attributable to the nature of the war during both periods.
37

Markellinos is a Thucydidean biographer probably of the 5th century A.O.
who combined three introductions to Thucydides. The first is probably from Proclus'
Chrestomathia, the second may be the work of Caecilius, Dionysius of
Halikarnassos' contemporary, and the third is part of Zosimus' introduction to the
scholia on Isokrates, Demosthenes, and Thucydides. The Oxford Classical
Dictionary, ed. N.G.L. Hammond and H.H. Scullard, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1970), 646.
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criticized for being unadorned and incomplete:
A€yovat M rwEc; voOeuwOm r:iJv byoorJv iar:opiav · oiJ yap Eivm E>ovKVoioov,
a}.).' oi µ€v </>aat rf]c; Ovyar:poc; avr:ov dvat, oi Of XEvo</Jiiwr:oc;. npoc; ovc;
).(yoµEv O'l'l r:iJc; µ'Ev Ovyar:poc;
OVK 'for:t oiJ).ov. ov yap yvvatKEiac; ~v
</Jvanvc; r:otaV'l'YJV apEr:fJv 'l'f Kat T:fXVYJV µ1µiJaaaOat . fJ'lflr:a' Ei 'l'OtaV'l'YJ r:tc; ~v'
OVK av f(JJ'lOVOa<JE ).a(}fiv' ova' av r:iJv byoOYJV 'fypmjJE µovov' a).).a Kat a).).a
no).).a Ka'l'fALJ'lEV av' r:i}v oiKEiaV EK</Jaivovaa </Jvatv. Or:t OE ovo'f XEvo</Jwvr:oc;
far:tV, xapaKr:'ijp µbvov oVXt {Joi( J'lOAV yap r:o µfoov iaxvofJ xapaKr:iJpoc; Kat
V1/JYJAOV. ov µi}v ovo'f E>wnoµnov, KaOa 'l'lVEc; f];iwaav. r:wl Of, Kai µa).).ov r:oic;
xap1wr:€p0tc;' E>ovKVoioov µ'fv EiVat OOKE'i' {x).).wc; o' aKaAAOJJ'lL<Jr:oc;' 01'
fK'l'VJ'l(J)V yEypaµµ€vrJ, Kai J'lOAAWV n).iJpYJc; fv KE</Ja}..afrp npayµar:wv
KaAAWJ'll<l{ff]Vat Kat ).a{Jfiv frr:aatv 01JVaµfrwv. fV0EV Kat ).(yoµEv
aa0Evi:ar:Epov n(</Jpaar:w b).iyov, Ka06r:t appwar:wv avr:i}v </JaivEr:at
(J1JVT:f0ELKWc;. aaOEvovvr:oc; Of awµar:oc; {Jpaxv 'l'l Kai b ).oywµoc; ar:ovwupoc;
Eivat </JtAEl. µtKpofJ yap avµnaaxo11atv a).).iJ).01c; O 'l'f ).oywµoc; Kat r:o awµa.

we;

o

we;

Some say that the eighth book is spurious because it was not written by
Thucydides: some hold that it is his daughter's work; others that it is
Xenophon's. To them we reply that it is clearly not his daughter's, for it is not
in a woman's nature to mimic such virtue and skill. Second, if there were a
woman of such a nature, she would not wish to remain unknown, and she
would not have written only the eighth book, but also would have left behind
many other works, thereby making clear that such a nature is her own. That it
is not Xenophon's, the style alone shouts, for the middle style combines the
plain and the lofty. Nor is it Theopompos' as some claim. The more acceptable
critics are those who think the book Thucydides' but unadorned and unrevised,
full of events able to be adorned and expatiated. Hence I say that it has been
composed less forcefully because while sick he composed it. The mind of an
invalid tends to be sluggish and less forceful; for mind and body are of little
concern to those suffering.
Most modern critics share this author's viewpoint. 38 The similarity between Book
VIII and Book V, with strict narratives, lacking speeches but containing verbatim
documents and accounting for the majority of V and all of VIII, I think is in part
attributable to the nature of the war during both periods. Since the stasis filled action

38

"Almost all the scholars who have approached Book VIII of Thucydides
have agreed that it is unfinished." H. R. Rawlings, The Structure of Thucydides'
History, 176.
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of Book V has already been discussed, I focus my attention on Book VIII.
The action of Book VIII includes an area stretching from mainland Greece to
the Hellespont, to Ionia, to Rhodes, and to Aspendos. Stasis and revolt account for
most of the action. The cities of Chios (.14), Klazomenae (.14), Miletos (.17),
Lebedos (.19), Erae (.19), Samos (.21; 63. 3; 73; 75. 2-3), Methymna (.22),
Mytilene (.22), Eresos (.23), Rhodes (.44), Oropos (.60), Abydos (.62),
Pharnabazos (.62), Lampsakos (.62), and Thasos (.64) all revolt as does the island
of Euboea (.95). The war that is being fought in Book VIII is a fragmented and
factional one in which the Peloponnesians induce revolt by conspiring with that
faction favorable to them and the Athenians attempt to prevent revolt and to win
back revolted cities by conspiring with the faction favorable to them. 39
Narrative not taken up by stasis and revolt at these cities is consumed by stasis
at Athens and by dissension among the Peloponnesian League. Thus it seems that
the nature of the war during this period requires an episodic narrative. As stasis
determines the fighting between the Peloponnesians and Athenians, as it tears apart
Athens, and as it threatens the unity of the Peloponnesian League, so the narrative
shifts from one arena to the next. Also the lack of speeches in this book may suggest
the lack of a single policy or individual dominating on either side. 40

39

0f course, during the coup of 411, Athens facilitates revolt by forcing
oligarchies upon the members of her Empire (VIII. 64).
40

0f Book VIII, Finley writes , "it is generally assumed that the main part of
the fifth book (25-84) and all the eighth book, both of which lack speeches, are
particularly incomplete, and the view may be correct, especially for the eighth book,
although it seems not impossible that Thucydides may have intended to treat certain
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SUMMARY
Given all the above examples of stasis, I find it impossible to deny stasis'
prominent role in the Peloponnesian War. Stasis plays a central role in one of the
most important sections of Book I, it is one of the most important parts of Book III,
it concerns about one-third of Book IV, and it is involved in most of the action in
Book V, in Book VI, in Book VII, and in Book VIII. In addition, I think it has been
shown that the way Thucydides thinks about stasis is similar to the way he does
about the war, that is, his understanding and interpretation of the two are similar.
This similarity is seen most prominently in the way Thucydides emphasizes the
predominant ethics of the time. Even the Spartan Archidamos is subject to public
rebuke for hesitant and prudent delay. Daring ignorance and greed drive the
Athenians to undertake the disastrous Sicilian Expedition. Thoughtful dissent is
nowhere thoughtfully received. At Sicily and elsewhere kin sheds the blood of kin.
Whether the speaker is Athenian or Spartan, specious words hide ignoble intents.
The Peace of Nikias fails because of a lack of trust in, and of a failure to respect,

years in this unemphatic way." Later Finley expresses this view more strongly, "It
is sometimes said that the narratives of both these periods--namely, the middle of the
fifth book and the eighth book--are unfinished because they lack speeches, but the.
fact is more easily explained by the nature of the periods themselves" (Thucydides,
77 and 246).
Connor elaborates on Finley's suggestion that the seeming incompleteness of
Book VIII is attributable to the nature of the war during this period. He writes that,
"in stasis, however, narrative units, as well as political coherence, disintegrate."
Analogous to the "loss of individual and civic control is a disintegration of the units
and techniques upon which so much of the earlier portions of the work is built." For
example, Thucydides does not focus upon one theater or certain individuals; he
breaks narrative boundaries of summer and winter; and he admits doubt as to what
actually occurred (Thucydides, 214-18).
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the sanctity of oaths. Both sides fight not for public good but for private gain. For
Athens the result of this ethic is stasis and defeat at the hands of the Spartans. For
Sparta this ethic nearly results in the breakup of the Peloponnesian League and in
defeat in the war.
Sparta, however, manages to avoid stasis and to win the war. For her
avoidance of stasis, for her ebvoµia, 41 Sparta receives Thucydides' admiration:
XtOL yap µovOL µer:a AaKfomµoviovc; WV €yw i}afJbµ'fjV rriJomµbv'fjaixv 'ff aµa
Kat fow<j>pbv'fjaav, Kat oacp brEoioov iJ 7TOALc; airr:olc; f7Tl TO µft~ov, r:oacp Of Kat
f°Koaµovvw €x11pwupov.

Indeed, after the Lacedaemonians, the Chians are the only people that I have
known who knew how to be wise in prosperity, and who ordered their city the
more securely the greater it grew. (trans. Crawley VIII. 24. 4)
After all, in the most simplified analysis, Sparta's avoidance of stasis, her ebvoµia,
wins the war, but not without suffering, for indeed true to Melesippos' prophecy, 42
Sparta and the rest of the Hellenes endure much misfortune during the course of the
war.
In addition to noting stasis' ubiquity in the History, my argument for
Thucydides' viewing the Peloponnesian War as a type of stasis is based on the
following: that he is careful to note the presence of stasis in Hellas' early history;
that he holds stasis responsible for Athens' loss and Sparta's victory; that he names

41

If we are to pigeonhole Thucydides at all, we must assert that it is this
moderation, this ebvoµia, that he values rather than argue that he prefers oligarchy
to democracy or vice versa.
42

f]bf i] i]µipa wic; UE}.,,}.,,'fjat µEya).wv KaKWV apl;,EL (this day will be the

beginning of great evils for the Hellenes) (II. 12. 3).
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stasis and war as the two causes of much destruction in the war; that he details the
presence of stasis and its ethics at Athens and Sparta; that he echoes III. 82-84
throughout the work; that he conceives of the Sicilian War as stasis; that he portrays
the near breakup of the Peloponnesian League in terms of stasis and its ethics; that
he portrays the period during The Peace of Nikias in terms of stasis and its ethics;
and that he portrays the action in the Peloponnesian War in terms of stasis and its
ethics.
Furthermore it is my belief that Thucydides was working torwards a climax, as
he does in the Sicilian section, in which he would have made it obvious by a
catalogue or by a battle that the Peloponnesian War is stasis and that the inviting in
of the Persians, just as the Sicilians inviting in Athens and just as Korinth inviting in
Argos, is akin to the invitations factions made to the Athenians and Spartans in their
effort to gain political control of the polis. I also think he would have made it clear
that such an invitation to the Persians was a breaking of the Hellenic bond (like
kinship) that connected all Greeks.

CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS

In the previous chapter I focused on elucidating stasis' role in the war and on
showing that Thucydides' understanding and interpretation of stasis in the stasis
excursus are similar to his understanding of the war in general and that the war is a
kind of stasis. This being so, I think it possible to use the stasis excursus as a key
for interpreting some of the ambiguous and hotly debated sections of the History.
Thus, as an example, I propose to show what light the excursus can shed on the
Mytilenian Debate, often cited as evidence for Thucydides' extreme rationalism and
realism.
The Mytilenian debate of 427 deliberates the best course for Athens to take
when confronted with a revolted ally. When she first deliberates how to proceed
against the revolted and subdued Mytilene, Athens decides to execute Mytilene's
entire male population and to enslave her female, the punishment later meted out in
421 to the Skioneans and in 416/15 to the Melians (V. 32. 1 and V. 116. 4).
The next day, however, thinking their previous decision to execute an entire
population rather than just the guilty savage, the people reconsider:
Kai TQ vaupai<! µETaVota Tu; fvfh)<; ~V avwi<; Kai ava).oytaµo<; wµov TO
f3ov).rnµa Kai µ€ya €yvwa8at, noAtv 'bA'YJV ow<f>8Eipat µa).).ov Fj ov wv<;
aiTiovc;.
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The morrow brought repentance with it and reflection on the horrid cruelty of a
decree which condemned a whole city to the fate merited only by the guilty.
(trans. Crawley III. 36. 4)
Next Thucydides presents us with Athens' reconsideration. Kleon argues for
upholding the first decision; Diodotos argues for punishing only the guilty. Kleon
bases his argument upon justice and expediency:
EV 'ff ;vvEAWV }.,(yw. :rmOoµEVOl µfv i:µol ra TE oiKata €q Mvr1A17vai011q Kat ra
;vµ<J>opa aµa not~OETE, a}.,}.,wq Of yvovTEq rot~ µfv ob xaptEtOOE, bµaq Of
abrovq µfx}.,}.,ov 01KmwawOc

To sum up shortly, I say that if you follow my advice you will do what is just
towards the Mytilenians, and at the same time expedient; but by a different
decision you will not oblige them so much as pass sentence upon yourselves.
(trans. Crawley Ill. 40. 4)
The punishment is just because by their own volition the Mytilenians, though in
possession of walls and a fleet and though autonomous, rose up against Athens (Ill.
39. 1-2). It is expedient because unless Athens inflicts harsh punishment upon those
who choose revolt freely, revolt will become rife throughout the empire (Ill. 39. 78).

Although considerations of justice do subtly enter into his argument (see Ill.
47. 3), Diodotos bases it mainly upon expediency and not on justice:
• Eyw Of napfJAOov OVTE avTEpwv nEpt Mvr1A17vaiwv OVTE Kar17yop~awv. ob
yap 7rEpt rijq fKElVWV aOtKiaq ~µiv 0 aywv, Ei aw<J>povofJµEV, aAAa 7rEpt rijq
~µEr€par; Ebf3ov}.,iaq. FJv TE yap ano<J>~vw navv aotKovvraq abrovq' ob Ota
rovro Kat anOKTEtVat KEAEVOW, Ei µi'j ;vµ¢€pov, ~v TE Kat lxovra~ Tl
;vyyvwµ17~ +ELEV+' Ei rij 7COAEI µi'j ayaOov ¢aiv0tro.

However, I have not come forward either to oppose or to accuse in the matter
of Mytilene; indeed, the question before us as sensible men is not their guilt,
but our interest. Though I prove them ever so guilty, I shall not, therefore,
advise punishment by death, unless it be expedient; nor though they should
have claim to indulgence, shall I recommend it, unless it be clearly for the
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good of the country. (trans. Crawley III. 44. 1-2)
Diodotos' argument from expediency first holds that the death penalty that Kleon
advocates is no deterrent to crime, but rather, if inflicted, will prove more costly to
the Athenians by taking away from rebels the hope of repentance and of atonement
(III. 46). And second it holds that Kleon's policy will alienate the demos which,
throughout the empire, is favorable to Athens.
Diodotos' argument from expediency, based as it is on rationalism and realism,
has provoked some scholars to comment. For example, bothered by Thucydides'
omission of any argument based on mercy and pity, de Ste. Croix writes:
Are the arguments reported by Thucydides limited within such a curiously
narrow scope because Thucydides believed that this was in principle the best
way to argue such a case, or because he thought this type of argument was
successfal in practice in convincing the Athenians and inducing them to change
their minds? ... I am now inclined to accept both; but the first of the two
explanations is the basic one and the second follows from it. I believe
Thucydides thought that public and political argument should always be
conducted on purely rational lines, and that emotion should be excluded
altogether, on the ground that although emotions such as pity may be useful, or
at least harmless, yet once emotion is allowed in at all it is the more violent
ones, such as hatred and the desire for revenge, which are likely to swamp the
rest and lead to dangerous behaviour. 1
De Ste. Croix's Thucydides is calculating and rational and reasonable. He is one
who banishes morality from interstate relations but retains it for dealings between
individuals within the state. 2
Invoking the gods of science and logic, Cochrane also argues that expediency is

1

De Ste. Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1972), 13.
2

1bid.' 18-27.
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the only basis for the argument:
It has been observed as a remarkable fact that both speakers--Cleon, into whose
mouth is put the argument for severity, and Diodotus, who voices the argument
for leniency in the treatment of the rebels--discuss the issue simply on grounds
of expediency. This fact ceases to be remarkable if it be remembered that from
the democratic (and scientific) standpoint, this is the only ground on which the
discussion could logically take place ... Thus, in at least one instance, the
cool and dispassionate consideration of what was expedient prevented a horrible
crime. 3

Cochrane's Thucydides is the objective scientist.
Both de Ste. Croix and Cochrane have failed in their analysis of the passage
because neither employs the appropriate touchstone. Both use one that equates the
realism and rationality that permeates the History with the author Thucydides. I
grant that Thucydides does admire intellect, but I reject the view that denies
Thucydides everything but intellect.
The appropriate touchstone, I believe, is the authorial comments that contain
Thucydides' own thoughts and feelings on the war. The key to interpreting the
Mytilenian Debate and the History itself lies in Thucydides' own opinions. The case
has already been made for using III. 82-84 as this key, and with III. 82-84 in hand I
proceed.
The beginnings of both speeches define for us the characters of the two
speakers. Kleon argues vehemently against cleverness and intellect. According to
him the best helmsmen of the state are the less intelligent:
Of Tf ¢a11}..fn:Epo1 'T:OJV avOpanrwv :7rpiJ1; WV~ £11vf'T:wrfpo11~ w~ f:Jrl 1:0 JCAfoV

3

C. N. Cochrane, Thucydides and the Science of History (London: Oxford
University Press, 1929), 103-4.
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aµflvov oiKofJat r:iu; JlOAflq

The less intelligent of men in comparison to the more intelligent usually
manage cities better. (Ill. 37. 3)
Diodotos, on the other hand, is the advocate of reason and good counsel and the
enemy of hasty passion:
ovu wvq npo(Jfvr:aq riJv otayvwµ'f/V aM1q llfpl MVTIA'f/Vaiwv ainwµat, oVT:f
wvq µEµ<j>oµfrovq µi'J JlOAAaKtq llEpl TWV µEyiar:wv fJovJ...fiJWBat f:JlatVW,
voµi~w Of ofo r:a €vavnwr:ar:a ebfJovJ...iq Eivm, r:axoq u Kai bpyf]v, wv r:o µfv
µffa avoiaq </>tAfl yiyvwBat, r:o OE µEra anat&vaiaq Kai {Jpaxvr:rJWq
yvwµrJq.

I do not blame the persons who have reopened the case of the Mytilenians, nor
do I approve the protests which we have heard against important questions
being frequently debated. I think the two things most opposed to good counsel
are haste and passion; haste usually goes hand in hand with folly, passion with
coarseness and narrowness of mind. (trans. Crawley III. 42. 1)
By their own words, both define themselves. Kleon identifies himself with the less
intelligent whom Thucydides decries when he bemoans the less intelligent's
destruction of the more at III. 83. 4 Thucydides also characterizes Kleon as an
enemy of EiJvoµia and a causer of stasis when he introduces him as the most forceful
(fJ1a16r:awq) of demagogues (Ill. 36. 6). 5 Conversely, Diodotos defines himself as

an advocate of the prudent and hesitant thought that is suspect during stasis (III. 82.
4-5). Thus, the stasis excursus provides us with a means for evaluating Thucydides'

4

For an opposite interpretation of the character of Kleon in the History, see A.
G. Woodhead, Thucydides on the Nature of Power, Martin Classical Lectures
(published for Oberlin College by Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 26,
36-37, 45, 107, and 160.
5

7).

Remember Thucydides' dictum: b Of noJ...Eµoq {Jiawq 01oaaKaJ...oq (III. 82. 2.
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opinion of the speakers. 6
By understanding Diodotos' seemingly enigmatic words at III. 43. 2 in terms of
the stasis excursus, they and the passage itself obtain their proper understanding:
Ka(Jfar:rJKf Of r:aya(}a ano r:ov eb(}fo~ AfyoµEva µ'fjOEV avvnonr:or:Epa flVat r:wv
KaKWV' war:f OfiV oµoiw~ r:ov T:f r:a OftVOr:ar:a f3ov).oµfVOV Jrfiaat anfxnJ
npafxyw8at T:O n).ij(}o~ Ka/ T:OV r:a aµftVW ).(yovr:a l/JfVOfxµfVOV ntOT:OV
yEvia8m.

Plain good advice has thus come to be no less suspected than bad; and the
advocate of the most monstrous measures is not more obliged to use deceit to
gain the people, than the best counsellor is to lie in order to be believed. (trans.
Crawley)
Diodotos' lament is a prime example of those by now familiar
words: Kai 0 µ"Ev xa).fnaivwv

mar:o~ aifi,

0 o' avr:1).€ywv aimy

vnonr:o~

(III. 82.

5).

Andrewes thinks these words of Diodotos nearly cross the border of absurdity:
The fact is that by [43.2] Diodotos has brought paradox dangerously close to
the border of nonsense ... What should the honest man do? Convey just a
flavour of spurious dishonesty, enough to gratify suspicion but not enough to
wreck his proposal? 7
Surely Andrewes' interpretation cannot be the one Thucydides intended. Echoing
Thucydides' statement of the distrust that the advocate of sense creates, Diodotos
rather seems to be stating a truism, oftentimes found in cities in the midst, or on the
brink, of war or stasis.

6

1 do not see how Andrewes' comment, "He [Thucydides] does not identify
himself with Diodotos' view," can be more wrong. A. Andrewes, "The Mytilene
Debate: Thucydides 3.36-49," Phoenix 16 (1962): 78.
7

A. Andrewes, "The Mytilene Debate: Thucydides 3.36-49," Phoenix 16
(1962): 74.

170
Noting the great and exalting excitement of people beating drums, of toy pistols
popping, of firecrackers hissing, of flags blazing, and of breasts burning with
patriotism, Samuel Clemens attests the words of Thucydides and Diodotos,
It was indeed a glad and gracious time, and the half-dozen rash spirits that

ventured to disapprove of the war and cast a doubt upon its righteousness
straightway got such a stern and angry warning that for their personal safety's
sake they quickly shrank out of sight and offended no more in that way .8
Diodotos' words are not nonsense. Rather they are a signpost indicating the nature
of the times.
What is significant is not that Diodotos uses expediency as the basis of his
argument but that given the hostile and suspicious nature of the city, an argument
from expediency is the only one that can succeed. One based upon a justice that
accounts for the lives of the opponent as well, or one based upon humanity, is
doomed to failure if only because such an argument is most easily defeated by
calling its propounder unpatriotic or financially interested. Thus in order to succeed
Diodotos must lie. He must construct an argument based mainly on the benefit of
Athens.
This said, it is true that pity and justice do play a part in the debate. Because of
pity, that is because they think their first decision harsh, the Athenians are moved to
reconsider Mytilene's fate. Also in his argument, Diodotos does invoke justice when
he argues that the Athenians will be committing a crime if they kill the Mytilenian

8

Samuel Clemens, "The War Prayer" in The Norton Reader: An Anthology of
Expository Prose, general editor, Arthur M. Eastman, 7th ed. (New York and
London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1965), 1115.

171
demos which had nothing to do with the revolt. But it must be remembered that
even given this pity and sense of justice, Diodotos' argument from expediency
barely prevails over Kleon's.
In conclusion, Thucydides' stasis excursus unlocks the door leading to a proper
understanding of the Mytilenian Debate. Diodotos' argument of expediency is not
indicative either of a calculating, rational, and reasonable Thucydides or of a
Thucydides who is an objective scientist. Nor are Diodotos' words on the
impossibility of being frank absurd. Both are a sign of the times, current and to
come, for as Skione and Melos indicate once an ethics of wartime and of stasis takes
a firm hold on Athens, Diodotos' narrow victory will not be repeated.
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